Received: by 2002:a05:6a10:16a7:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id gp39csp4234898pxb; Tue, 10 Nov 2020 11:05:28 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJykVUV9xHVmqBrkvwBbNsibmWQr6nz35ugB/oP8RX7Hu0pfjqa9B/uF73QIfH28r5GaM0bZ X-Received: by 2002:a50:d784:: with SMTP id w4mr883493edi.201.1605035127799; Tue, 10 Nov 2020 11:05:27 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1605035127; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=NyIE6Jq6UAmhSQx43T+CGeNoQz0Cx4DaX15mNTrvFvuabONujnQjOUXRF+EoJFrmQd gjWnvzFpfCUHGwc1ctVmzcREZqQ/JJe+4hHprfiKcQdcr3+/QW+FN45vBjJfx+eAUaEw bX3tZa0yl8uSCf6cHDfqu0HIrb9wWgZMLy670LNQaM/36gzgLTsxRTl+4Tr1Iq31+/fC uivvMmiVG9ZQkqs7/aChT6CbiHT0+RwWuaP8ZmDcX3m4X4SPqD1njge0HgxdwukVLDfg jBiV3EIDIJaW8KAyFbrQDJVVVNsFwukWO/NVI+oYLVqVErLeMa2qksbhssvPrMwZR94S sthQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject :cc:to:from:dkim-signature; bh=lmCGlIz2VSxo+a7fkJgx4TgmT3DBRnam6r7IXjxZRQg=; b=O1qCfZ4Ah4OneKtYFAmzMTYM0loPCxsoXWzckmyWM0Alr6l77CVwNsB9yWzPAOwkmC Jc3J5mRQlpR6J4kvFBa6XpKaj3VDMK1clNEhmZ7DdWE2/ccqA6LqZPgW4fPpR7KtQ6R5 n1aTaISCJZqd8jVlwROTlDRyR8Es1oKPXnuGTkkjOPsskel70FZ2BO33C1CRt/o5dTQh ExTS4gjelT+58VEXpqJBwpNyXbv5PApzvyZ+RzKfuwkGdXhLhuIWE2729ezreQBf4iW0 eT3eOLg7OZ5KibN3W/mIeHIQb68mKGqmvTdk/yOMtDbFU6hdctp9MEPzZSVUXLOWFpeB Hw3w== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=VU2hR9WE; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id om24si9683744ejb.235.2020.11.10.11.04.59; Tue, 10 Nov 2020 11:05:27 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=VU2hR9WE; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730788AbgKJTEx (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 10 Nov 2020 14:04:53 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:51110 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730775AbgKJTEx (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Nov 2020 14:04:53 -0500 Received: from e123331-lin.nice.arm.com (lfbn-nic-1-188-42.w2-15.abo.wanadoo.fr [2.15.37.42]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BE30C20809; Tue, 10 Nov 2020 19:04:51 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605035093; bh=gSZR+Ff7g9spBCQz3eQtudFEpCncWXr4csxZH83Oho4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=VU2hR9WEh476uvS/e1gXp58RBaUOVKZ9vENCuZ+tYXQqKIpwe7qrSOR7iTyTaptCf NnZ4DG9+8JWPz/t1/Dbg5OEBsaJ1IW1VUB6AbaR8YXxhkAFs9EnuDjPEhV81uvcWNQ MS1CEKBHyweCfdGP1qHLO6y/b/m05RKK/zwP+Wng= From: Ard Biesheuvel To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, Ard Biesheuvel , Ondrej Mosnacek , Eric Biggers Subject: [PATCH v2 1/4] crypto: aegis128 - wipe plaintext and tag if decryption fails Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2020 20:04:41 +0100 Message-Id: <20201110190444.10634-2-ardb@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20201110190444.10634-1-ardb@kernel.org> References: <20201110190444.10634-1-ardb@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org The AEGIS spec mentions explicitly that the security guarantees hold only if the resulting plaintext and tag of a failed decryption are not disclosed. So ensure that we abide by this. While at it, drop the unused struct aead_request *req parameter from crypto_aegis128_process_crypt(). Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- crypto/aegis128-core.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/aegis128-core.c b/crypto/aegis128-core.c index 44fb4956f0dd..3a71235892f5 100644 --- a/crypto/aegis128-core.c +++ b/crypto/aegis128-core.c @@ -154,6 +154,12 @@ static void crypto_aegis128_ad(struct aegis_state *state, } } +static void crypto_aegis128_wipe_chunk(struct aegis_state *state, u8 *dst, + const u8 *src, unsigned int size) +{ + memzero_explicit(dst, size); +} + static void crypto_aegis128_encrypt_chunk(struct aegis_state *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int size) { @@ -324,7 +330,6 @@ static void crypto_aegis128_process_ad(struct aegis_state *state, static __always_inline int crypto_aegis128_process_crypt(struct aegis_state *state, - struct aead_request *req, struct skcipher_walk *walk, void (*crypt)(struct aegis_state *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, @@ -403,14 +408,14 @@ static int crypto_aegis128_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) if (aegis128_do_simd()) { crypto_aegis128_init_simd(&state, &ctx->key, req->iv); crypto_aegis128_process_ad(&state, req->src, req->assoclen); - crypto_aegis128_process_crypt(&state, req, &walk, + crypto_aegis128_process_crypt(&state, &walk, crypto_aegis128_encrypt_chunk_simd); crypto_aegis128_final_simd(&state, &tag, req->assoclen, cryptlen); } else { crypto_aegis128_init(&state, &ctx->key, req->iv); crypto_aegis128_process_ad(&state, req->src, req->assoclen); - crypto_aegis128_process_crypt(&state, req, &walk, + crypto_aegis128_process_crypt(&state, &walk, crypto_aegis128_encrypt_chunk); crypto_aegis128_final(&state, &tag, req->assoclen, cryptlen); } @@ -438,19 +443,34 @@ static int crypto_aegis128_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) if (aegis128_do_simd()) { crypto_aegis128_init_simd(&state, &ctx->key, req->iv); crypto_aegis128_process_ad(&state, req->src, req->assoclen); - crypto_aegis128_process_crypt(&state, req, &walk, + crypto_aegis128_process_crypt(&state, &walk, crypto_aegis128_decrypt_chunk_simd); crypto_aegis128_final_simd(&state, &tag, req->assoclen, cryptlen); } else { crypto_aegis128_init(&state, &ctx->key, req->iv); crypto_aegis128_process_ad(&state, req->src, req->assoclen); - crypto_aegis128_process_crypt(&state, req, &walk, + crypto_aegis128_process_crypt(&state, &walk, crypto_aegis128_decrypt_chunk); crypto_aegis128_final(&state, &tag, req->assoclen, cryptlen); } - return crypto_memneq(tag.bytes, zeros, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0; + if (unlikely(crypto_memneq(tag.bytes, zeros, authsize))) { + /* + * From Chapter 4. 'Security Analysis' of the AEGIS spec [0] + * + * "3. If verification fails, the decrypted plaintext and the + * wrong authentication tag should not be given as output." + * + * [0] https://competitions.cr.yp.to/round3/aegisv11.pdf + */ + skcipher_walk_aead_decrypt(&walk, req, false); + crypto_aegis128_process_crypt(NULL, &walk, + crypto_aegis128_wipe_chunk); + memzero_explicit(&tag, sizeof(tag)); + return -EBADMSG; + } + return 0; } static struct aead_alg crypto_aegis128_alg = { -- 2.17.1