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Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries
From:   James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To:     Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>, dhowells@redhat.com,
        dwmw2@infradead.org, jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com
Cc:     herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
        jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com,
        zohar@linux.ibm.com, erichte@linux.ibm.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au,
        keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Date:   Fri, 15 Jan 2021 09:21:51 -0800
In-Reply-To: <20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
References: <20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
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On Tue, 2020-09-15 at 20:49 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of
> now revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI
> Secure Boot enabled.  The dbx is capable of containing any number of
> EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and
> EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries.
> 
> Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the
> entries are skipped.
> 
> Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a
> EFI_CERT_X509_GUID is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to
> the .blacklist keyring. Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the
> keys in the .blacklist keyring are referenced, if a matching key is
> found, the key will be rejected.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>

If you're using shim, as most of our users are, you have no access to
dbx to blacklist certificates.  Plus our security envelope includes the
Mok variables, so you should also be paying attestion to MokListX (or
it's RT equivalent: MokListXRT).

If you add this to the patch, we get something that is mechanistically
complete and which also allows users to add certs to their Mok
blacklist.

James