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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id i10si18449165plt.75.2021.04.19.13.44.11; Mon, 19 Apr 2021 13:44:34 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239763AbhDSR7S (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 19 Apr 2021 13:59:18 -0400 Received: from mga02.intel.com ([134.134.136.20]:6449 "EHLO mga02.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234356AbhDSR7S (ORCPT ); Mon, 19 Apr 2021 13:59:18 -0400 IronPort-SDR: OuQ7LYBV0xC64eAX09y0xXdx0BUvGY/Mw2DCS+G9YtyEhoUo66quy7sgZItArS3NkhoUjrNnyd F37X5jANJ4bw== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6200,9189,9959"; a="182505189" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,234,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="182505189" Received: from orsmga008.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.65]) by orsmga101.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 19 Apr 2021 10:58:45 -0700 IronPort-SDR: l0jP108p7qCcR17xC/12EkzfeQC1X1MzsrGc6LP+iFP0ujaOzkggG2yLucmgfYVR0mP8or3+ML F/69UdHWXHeg== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,234,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="426600065" Received: from jcfarwe-mobl1.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.212.244.217]) ([10.212.244.217]) by orsmga008-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 19 Apr 2021 10:58:44 -0700 Subject: Re: [RFC Part2 PATCH 04/30] x86/mm: split the physmap when adding the page in RMP table To: Brijesh Singh , Borislav Petkov Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, ak@linux.intel.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Joerg Roedel , "H. Peter Anvin" , Tony Luck , "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" , Paolo Bonzini , Tom Lendacky , David Rientjes , Sean Christopherson , Vlastimil Babka References: <20210324170436.31843-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> <20210324170436.31843-5-brijesh.singh@amd.com> <20210419123226.GC9093@zn.tnic> <20210419165214.GF9093@zn.tnic> <30bff969-e8cf-a991-7660-054ea136855a@amd.com> From: Dave Hansen Autocrypt: addr=dave.hansen@intel.com; keydata= xsFNBE6HMP0BEADIMA3XYkQfF3dwHlj58Yjsc4E5y5G67cfbt8dvaUq2fx1lR0K9h1bOI6fC oAiUXvGAOxPDsB/P6UEOISPpLl5IuYsSwAeZGkdQ5g6m1xq7AlDJQZddhr/1DC/nMVa/2BoY 2UnKuZuSBu7lgOE193+7Uks3416N2hTkyKUSNkduyoZ9F5twiBhxPJwPtn/wnch6n5RsoXsb ygOEDxLEsSk/7eyFycjE+btUtAWZtx+HseyaGfqkZK0Z9bT1lsaHecmB203xShwCPT49Blxz VOab8668QpaEOdLGhtvrVYVK7x4skyT3nGWcgDCl5/Vp3TWA4K+IofwvXzX2ON/Mj7aQwf5W iC+3nWC7q0uxKwwsddJ0Nu+dpA/UORQWa1NiAftEoSpk5+nUUi0WE+5DRm0H+TXKBWMGNCFn c6+EKg5zQaa8KqymHcOrSXNPmzJuXvDQ8uj2J8XuzCZfK4uy1+YdIr0yyEMI7mdh4KX50LO1 pmowEqDh7dLShTOif/7UtQYrzYq9cPnjU2ZW4qd5Qz2joSGTG9eCXLz5PRe5SqHxv6ljk8mb ApNuY7bOXO/A7T2j5RwXIlcmssqIjBcxsRRoIbpCwWWGjkYjzYCjgsNFL6rt4OL11OUF37wL QcTl7fbCGv53KfKPdYD5hcbguLKi/aCccJK18ZwNjFhqr4MliQARAQABzShEYXZpZCBDaHJp c3RvcGhlciBIYW5zZW4gPGRhdmVAc3I3MS5uZXQ+wsF7BBMBAgAlAhsDBgsJCAcDAgYVCAIJ CgsEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAUCTo3k0QIZAQAKCRBoNZUwcMmSsMO2D/421Xg8pimb9mPzM5N7khT0 2MCnaGssU1T59YPE25kYdx2HntwdO0JA27Wn9xx5zYijOe6B21ufrvsyv42auCO85+oFJWfE K2R/IpLle09GDx5tcEmMAHX6KSxpHmGuJmUPibHVbfep2aCh9lKaDqQR07gXXWK5/yU1Dx0r VVFRaHTasp9fZ9AmY4K9/BSA3VkQ8v3OrxNty3OdsrmTTzO91YszpdbjjEFZK53zXy6tUD2d e1i0kBBS6NLAAsqEtneplz88T/v7MpLmpY30N9gQU3QyRC50jJ7LU9RazMjUQY1WohVsR56d ORqFxS8ChhyJs7BI34vQusYHDTp6PnZHUppb9WIzjeWlC7Jc8lSBDlEWodmqQQgp5+6AfhTD kDv1a+W5+ncq+Uo63WHRiCPuyt4di4/0zo28RVcjtzlGBZtmz2EIC3vUfmoZbO/Gn6EKbYAn rzz3iU/JWV8DwQ+sZSGu0HmvYMt6t5SmqWQo/hyHtA7uF5Wxtu1lCgolSQw4t49ZuOyOnQi5 f8R3nE7lpVCSF1TT+h8kMvFPv3VG7KunyjHr3sEptYxQs4VRxqeirSuyBv1TyxT+LdTm6j4a mulOWf+YtFRAgIYyyN5YOepDEBv4LUM8Tz98lZiNMlFyRMNrsLV6Pv6SxhrMxbT6TNVS5D+6 UorTLotDZKp5+M7BTQRUY85qARAAsgMW71BIXRgxjYNCYQ3Xs8k3TfAvQRbHccky50h99TUY sqdULbsb3KhmY29raw1bgmyM0a4DGS1YKN7qazCDsdQlxIJp9t2YYdBKXVRzPCCsfWe1dK/q 66UVhRPP8EGZ4CmFYuPTxqGY+dGRInxCeap/xzbKdvmPm01Iw3YFjAE4PQ4hTMr/H76KoDbD cq62U50oKC83ca/PRRh2QqEqACvIH4BR7jueAZSPEDnzwxvVgzyeuhwqHY05QRK/wsKuhq7s UuYtmN92Fasbxbw2tbVLZfoidklikvZAmotg0dwcFTjSRGEg0Gr3p/xBzJWNavFZZ95Rj7Et db0lCt0HDSY5q4GMR+SrFbH+jzUY/ZqfGdZCBqo0cdPPp58krVgtIGR+ja2Mkva6ah94/oQN lnCOw3udS+Eb/aRcM6detZr7XOngvxsWolBrhwTQFT9D2NH6ryAuvKd6yyAFt3/e7r+HHtkU kOy27D7IpjngqP+b4EumELI/NxPgIqT69PQmo9IZaI/oRaKorYnDaZrMXViqDrFdD37XELwQ gmLoSm2VfbOYY7fap/AhPOgOYOSqg3/Nxcapv71yoBzRRxOc4FxmZ65mn+q3rEM27yRztBW9 AnCKIc66T2i92HqXCw6AgoBJRjBkI3QnEkPgohQkZdAb8o9WGVKpfmZKbYBo4pEAEQEAAcLB XwQYAQIACQUCVGPOagIbDAAKCRBoNZUwcMmSsJeCEACCh7P/aaOLKWQxcnw47p4phIVR6pVL e4IEdR7Jf7ZL00s3vKSNT+nRqdl1ugJx9Ymsp8kXKMk9GSfmZpuMQB9c6io1qZc6nW/3TtvK pNGz7KPPtaDzvKA4S5tfrWPnDr7n15AU5vsIZvgMjU42gkbemkjJwP0B1RkifIK60yQqAAlT YZ14P0dIPdIPIlfEPiAWcg5BtLQU4Wg3cNQdpWrCJ1E3m/RIlXy/2Y3YOVVohfSy+4kvvYU3 lXUdPb04UPw4VWwjcVZPg7cgR7Izion61bGHqVqURgSALt2yvHl7cr68NYoFkzbNsGsye9ft M9ozM23JSgMkRylPSXTeh5JIK9pz2+etco3AfLCKtaRVysjvpysukmWMTrx8QnI5Nn5MOlJj 1Ov4/50JY9pXzgIDVSrgy6LYSMc4vKZ3QfCY7ipLRORyalFDF3j5AGCMRENJjHPD6O7bl3Xo 4DzMID+8eucbXxKiNEbs21IqBZbbKdY1GkcEGTE7AnkA3Y6YB7I/j9mQ3hCgm5muJuhM/2Fr OPsw5tV/LmQ5GXH0JQ/TZXWygyRFyyI2FqNTx4WHqUn3yFj8rwTAU1tluRUYyeLy0ayUlKBH ybj0N71vWO936MqP6haFERzuPAIpxj2ezwu0xb1GjTk4ynna6h5GjnKgdfOWoRtoWndMZxbA z5cecg== Message-ID: <61596c4c-3849-99d5-b0aa-6ad6b415dff9@intel.com> Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2021 10:58:44 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.10.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <30bff969-e8cf-a991-7660-054ea136855a@amd.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On 4/19/21 10:46 AM, Brijesh Singh wrote: > - guest wants to make gpa 0x1000 as a shared page. To support this, we > need to psmash the large RMP entry into 512 4K entries. The psmash > instruction breaks the large RMP entry into 512 4K entries without > affecting the previous validation. Now the we need to force the host to > use the 4K page level instead of the 2MB. > > To my understanding, Linux kernel fault handler does not build the page > tables on demand for the kernel addresses. All kernel addresses are > pre-mapped on the boot. Currently, I am proactively spitting the physmap > to avoid running into situation where x86 page level is greater than the > RMP page level. In other words, if the host maps guest memory with 2M mappings, the guest can induce page faults in the host. The only way the host can avoid this is to map everything with 4k mappings. If the host does not avoid this, it could end up in the situation where it gets page faults on access to kernel data structures. Imagine if a kernel stack page ended up in the same 2M mapping as a guest page. I *think* the next write to the kernel stack would end up double-faulting.