Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18;
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring
To:     David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc:     "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
        Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>,
        keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
References: <20210312171232.2681989-1-mic@digikod.net>
 <52f54ebb-6ac7-4d68-f97a-74219ed88d0b@digikod.net>
From:   =?UTF-8?Q?Micka=c3=abl_Sala=c3=bcn?= <mic@digikod.net>
Message-ID: <ef2f9a31-e01f-2443-08a0-c78dd3750cbb@digikod.net>
Date:   Tue, 4 May 2021 12:31:43 +0200
User-Agent: 
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <52f54ebb-6ac7-4d68-f97a-74219ed88d0b@digikod.net>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Precedence: bulk

Are you waiting for the end of the merge window to push to linux-next?

On 07/04/2021 19:21, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Hi David and Jarkko,
> 
> What is the status of this patchset? Could someone take it to -next?
> 
> Regards,
>  Mickaël
> 
> 
> On 12/03/2021 18:12, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> This new patch series is a rebase on David Howells's and Eric Snowberg's
>> keys-cve-2020-26541-v3.
>>
>> I successfully tested this patch series with the 186 entries from
>> https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/dbxupdate_x64.bin (184
>> binary hashes and 2 certificates).
>>
>> The goal of these patches is to add a new configuration option to enable the
>> root user to load signed keys in the blacklist keyring.  This keyring is useful
>> to "untrust" certificates or files.  Enabling to safely update this keyring
>> without recompiling the kernel makes it more usable.
>>
>> This can be applied on top of David Howells's keys-cve-2020-26541-branch:
>> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-cve-2020-26541-branch
>>
>> Previous patch series:
>> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210210120410.471693-1-mic@digikod.net/
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Mickaël Salaün (5):
>>   tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
>>   certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
>>   certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
>>   certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
>>   certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist
>>     keyring
>>
>>  MAINTAINERS                                   |   2 +
>>  certs/.gitignore                              |   1 +
>>  certs/Kconfig                                 |  17 +-
>>  certs/Makefile                                |  17 +-
>>  certs/blacklist.c                             | 218 ++++++++++++++----
>>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c      |   3 +-
>>  include/keys/system_keyring.h                 |  14 +-
>>  scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk            |  37 +++
>>  .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          |  26 +--
>>  tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh            |  91 ++++++++
>>  10 files changed, 346 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)
>>  create mode 100755 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
>>  create mode 100755 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
>>
>>
>> base-commit: ebd9c2ae369a45bdd9f8615484db09be58fc242b
>>