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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id j10si7652114ejd.87.2021.07.15.12.13.25; Thu, 15 Jul 2021 12:13:56 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S243887AbhGOTPZ (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 15 Jul 2021 15:15:25 -0400 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:50311 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S244280AbhGOTOk (ORCPT ); Thu, 15 Jul 2021 15:14:40 -0400 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6200,9189,10046"; a="296255391" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.84,243,1620716400"; d="scan'208";a="296255391" Received: from fmsmga003.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.29]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 15 Jul 2021 12:08:34 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.84,243,1620716400"; d="scan'208";a="495608620" Received: from snchan-mobl2.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.209.125.33]) ([10.209.125.33]) by fmsmga003-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 15 Jul 2021 12:08:32 -0700 Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 06/40] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction To: Sean Christopherson Cc: Peter Gonda , Brijesh Singh , x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm list , linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Joerg Roedel , Tom Lendacky , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ard Biesheuvel , Paolo Bonzini , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Wanpeng Li , Jim Mattson , Andy Lutomirski , Dave Hansen , Sergio Lopez , Peter Zijlstra , Srinivas Pandruvada , David Rientjes , Dov Murik , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Borislav Petkov , Michael Roth , Vlastimil Babka , tony.luck@intel.com, Nathaniel McCallum , brijesh.ksingh@gmail.com References: <20210707183616.5620-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> <20210707183616.5620-7-brijesh.singh@amd.com> <8ab309cd-8465-d543-55c8-5f6529fe74fd@intel.com> From: Dave Hansen Autocrypt: addr=dave.hansen@intel.com; keydata= xsFNBE6HMP0BEADIMA3XYkQfF3dwHlj58Yjsc4E5y5G67cfbt8dvaUq2fx1lR0K9h1bOI6fC oAiUXvGAOxPDsB/P6UEOISPpLl5IuYsSwAeZGkdQ5g6m1xq7AlDJQZddhr/1DC/nMVa/2BoY 2UnKuZuSBu7lgOE193+7Uks3416N2hTkyKUSNkduyoZ9F5twiBhxPJwPtn/wnch6n5RsoXsb ygOEDxLEsSk/7eyFycjE+btUtAWZtx+HseyaGfqkZK0Z9bT1lsaHecmB203xShwCPT49Blxz VOab8668QpaEOdLGhtvrVYVK7x4skyT3nGWcgDCl5/Vp3TWA4K+IofwvXzX2ON/Mj7aQwf5W iC+3nWC7q0uxKwwsddJ0Nu+dpA/UORQWa1NiAftEoSpk5+nUUi0WE+5DRm0H+TXKBWMGNCFn c6+EKg5zQaa8KqymHcOrSXNPmzJuXvDQ8uj2J8XuzCZfK4uy1+YdIr0yyEMI7mdh4KX50LO1 pmowEqDh7dLShTOif/7UtQYrzYq9cPnjU2ZW4qd5Qz2joSGTG9eCXLz5PRe5SqHxv6ljk8mb ApNuY7bOXO/A7T2j5RwXIlcmssqIjBcxsRRoIbpCwWWGjkYjzYCjgsNFL6rt4OL11OUF37wL QcTl7fbCGv53KfKPdYD5hcbguLKi/aCccJK18ZwNjFhqr4MliQARAQABzShEYXZpZCBDaHJp c3RvcGhlciBIYW5zZW4gPGRhdmVAc3I3MS5uZXQ+wsF7BBMBAgAlAhsDBgsJCAcDAgYVCAIJ CgsEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAUCTo3k0QIZAQAKCRBoNZUwcMmSsMO2D/421Xg8pimb9mPzM5N7khT0 2MCnaGssU1T59YPE25kYdx2HntwdO0JA27Wn9xx5zYijOe6B21ufrvsyv42auCO85+oFJWfE K2R/IpLle09GDx5tcEmMAHX6KSxpHmGuJmUPibHVbfep2aCh9lKaDqQR07gXXWK5/yU1Dx0r VVFRaHTasp9fZ9AmY4K9/BSA3VkQ8v3OrxNty3OdsrmTTzO91YszpdbjjEFZK53zXy6tUD2d e1i0kBBS6NLAAsqEtneplz88T/v7MpLmpY30N9gQU3QyRC50jJ7LU9RazMjUQY1WohVsR56d ORqFxS8ChhyJs7BI34vQusYHDTp6PnZHUppb9WIzjeWlC7Jc8lSBDlEWodmqQQgp5+6AfhTD kDv1a+W5+ncq+Uo63WHRiCPuyt4di4/0zo28RVcjtzlGBZtmz2EIC3vUfmoZbO/Gn6EKbYAn rzz3iU/JWV8DwQ+sZSGu0HmvYMt6t5SmqWQo/hyHtA7uF5Wxtu1lCgolSQw4t49ZuOyOnQi5 f8R3nE7lpVCSF1TT+h8kMvFPv3VG7KunyjHr3sEptYxQs4VRxqeirSuyBv1TyxT+LdTm6j4a mulOWf+YtFRAgIYyyN5YOepDEBv4LUM8Tz98lZiNMlFyRMNrsLV6Pv6SxhrMxbT6TNVS5D+6 UorTLotDZKp5+M7BTQRUY85qARAAsgMW71BIXRgxjYNCYQ3Xs8k3TfAvQRbHccky50h99TUY sqdULbsb3KhmY29raw1bgmyM0a4DGS1YKN7qazCDsdQlxIJp9t2YYdBKXVRzPCCsfWe1dK/q 66UVhRPP8EGZ4CmFYuPTxqGY+dGRInxCeap/xzbKdvmPm01Iw3YFjAE4PQ4hTMr/H76KoDbD cq62U50oKC83ca/PRRh2QqEqACvIH4BR7jueAZSPEDnzwxvVgzyeuhwqHY05QRK/wsKuhq7s UuYtmN92Fasbxbw2tbVLZfoidklikvZAmotg0dwcFTjSRGEg0Gr3p/xBzJWNavFZZ95Rj7Et db0lCt0HDSY5q4GMR+SrFbH+jzUY/ZqfGdZCBqo0cdPPp58krVgtIGR+ja2Mkva6ah94/oQN lnCOw3udS+Eb/aRcM6detZr7XOngvxsWolBrhwTQFT9D2NH6ryAuvKd6yyAFt3/e7r+HHtkU kOy27D7IpjngqP+b4EumELI/NxPgIqT69PQmo9IZaI/oRaKorYnDaZrMXViqDrFdD37XELwQ gmLoSm2VfbOYY7fap/AhPOgOYOSqg3/Nxcapv71yoBzRRxOc4FxmZ65mn+q3rEM27yRztBW9 AnCKIc66T2i92HqXCw6AgoBJRjBkI3QnEkPgohQkZdAb8o9WGVKpfmZKbYBo4pEAEQEAAcLB XwQYAQIACQUCVGPOagIbDAAKCRBoNZUwcMmSsJeCEACCh7P/aaOLKWQxcnw47p4phIVR6pVL e4IEdR7Jf7ZL00s3vKSNT+nRqdl1ugJx9Ymsp8kXKMk9GSfmZpuMQB9c6io1qZc6nW/3TtvK pNGz7KPPtaDzvKA4S5tfrWPnDr7n15AU5vsIZvgMjU42gkbemkjJwP0B1RkifIK60yQqAAlT YZ14P0dIPdIPIlfEPiAWcg5BtLQU4Wg3cNQdpWrCJ1E3m/RIlXy/2Y3YOVVohfSy+4kvvYU3 lXUdPb04UPw4VWwjcVZPg7cgR7Izion61bGHqVqURgSALt2yvHl7cr68NYoFkzbNsGsye9ft M9ozM23JSgMkRylPSXTeh5JIK9pz2+etco3AfLCKtaRVysjvpysukmWMTrx8QnI5Nn5MOlJj 1Ov4/50JY9pXzgIDVSrgy6LYSMc4vKZ3QfCY7ipLRORyalFDF3j5AGCMRENJjHPD6O7bl3Xo 4DzMID+8eucbXxKiNEbs21IqBZbbKdY1GkcEGTE7AnkA3Y6YB7I/j9mQ3hCgm5muJuhM/2Fr OPsw5tV/LmQ5GXH0JQ/TZXWygyRFyyI2FqNTx4WHqUn3yFj8rwTAU1tluRUYyeLy0ayUlKBH ybj0N71vWO936MqP6haFERzuPAIpxj2ezwu0xb1GjTk4ynna6h5GjnKgdfOWoRtoWndMZxbA z5cecg== Message-ID: Date: Thu, 15 Jul 2021 12:08:29 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.10.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On 7/15/21 11:56 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote: >>>> + /* Retry if another processor is modifying the RMP entry. */ >>>> + do { >>>> + /* Binutils version 2.36 supports the PSMASH mnemonic. */ >>>> + asm volatile(".byte 0xF3, 0x0F, 0x01, 0xFF" >>>> + : "=a"(ret) >>>> + : "a"(spa) >>>> + : "memory", "cc"); >>>> + } while (ret == FAIL_INUSE); >>> Should there be some retry limit here for safety? Or do we know that >>> we'll never be stuck in this loop? Ditto for the loop in rmpupdate. >> It's probably fine to just leave this. While you could *theoretically* >> lose this race forever, it's unlikely to happen in practice. If it >> does, you'll get an easy-to-understand softlockup backtrace which should >> point here pretty quickly. > But should failure here even be tolerated? The TDX cases spin on flows that are > _not_ due to (direct) contenion, e.g. a pending interrupt while flushing the > cache or lack of randomness when generating a key. In this case, there are two > CPUs racing to modify the RMP entry, which implies that the final state of the > RMP entry is not deterministic. I was envisioning that two different CPUs could try to smash two *different* 4k physical pages, but collide since they share a 2M page. But, in patch 33, this is called via: > + write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock); > + > + switch (op) { > + case SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED: > + rc = snp_make_page_shared(vcpu, gpa, pfn, level); ... Which should make collisions impossible. Did I miss another call-site?