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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id r17si9673382iog.96.2021.08.06.14.37.21; Fri, 06 Aug 2021 14:37:33 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S244085AbhHFPMq (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 6 Aug 2021 11:12:46 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:40684 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S244233AbhHFPMm (ORCPT ); Fri, 6 Aug 2021 11:12:42 -0400 Received: from metis.ext.pengutronix.de (metis.ext.pengutronix.de [IPv6:2001:67c:670:201:290:27ff:fe1d:cc33]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E21B3C06179C for ; Fri, 6 Aug 2021 08:12:26 -0700 (PDT) Received: from gallifrey.ext.pengutronix.de ([2001:67c:670:201:5054:ff:fe8d:eefb] helo=[IPv6:::1]) by metis.ext.pengutronix.de with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1mC1WK-0006yw-ON; Fri, 06 Aug 2021 17:12:24 +0200 Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys From: Ahmad Fatoum To: Jarkko Sakkinen , =?UTF-8?Q?Horia_Geant=c4=83?= , Mimi Zohar , Aymen Sghaier , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , James Bottomley Cc: Jan Luebbe , Udit Agarwal , Sumit Garg , David Gstir , Eric Biggers , Franck LENORMAND , Richard Weinberger , James Morris , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kernel@pengutronix.de, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Steffen Trumtrar , "Serge E. Hallyn" References: Message-ID: Date: Fri, 6 Aug 2021 17:12:19 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.12.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2001:67c:670:201:5054:ff:fe8d:eefb X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: a.fatoum@pengutronix.de X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on metis.ext.pengutronix.de); SAEximRunCond expanded to false X-PTX-Original-Recipient: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Dear trusted key maintainers, On 21.07.21 18:48, Ahmad Fatoum wrote: > Series applies on top of > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210721160258.7024-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de/T/#u > > v2 -> v3: > - Split off first Kconfig preparation patch. It fixes a regression, > so sent that out, so it can be applied separately (Sumit) > - Split off second key import patch. I'll send that out separately > as it's a development aid and not required within the CAAM series > - add MAINTAINERS entry Gentle ping. I'd appreciate feedback on this series. Cheers, Ahmad > > v1 -> v2: > - Added new commit to make trusted key Kconfig option independent > of TPM and added new Kconfig file for trusted keys > - Add new commit for importing existing key material > - Allow users to force use of kernel RNG (Jarkko) > - Enforce maximum keymod size (Horia) > - Use append_seq_(in|out)_ptr_intlen instead of append_seq_(in|out)_ptr > (Horia) > - Make blobifier handle private to CAAM glue code file (Horia) > - Extend trusted keys documentation for CAAM > - Rebased and updated original cover letter: > > The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core > built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP. > > Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique > never-disclosed device-specific key. > > There has been multiple discussions on how to represent this within the kernel: > > The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core > built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP. > > Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique > never-disclosed device-specific key. There has been multiple > discussions on how to represent this within the kernel: > > - [RFC] crypto: caam - add red blobifier > Steffen implemented[1] a PoC sysfs driver to start a discussion on how to > best integrate the blob mechanism. > Mimi suggested that it could be used to implement trusted keys. > Trusted keys back then were a TPM-only feature. > > - security/keys/secure_key: Adds the secure key support based on CAAM. > Udit added[2] a new "secure" key type with the CAAM as backend. The key > material stays within the kernel only. > Mimi and James agreed that this needs a generic interface, not specific > to CAAM. Mimi suggested trusted keys. Jan noted that this could serve as > basis for TEE-backed keys. > > - [RFC] drivers: crypto: caam: key: Add caam_tk key type > Franck added[3] a new "caam_tk" key type based on Udit's work. This time > it uses CAAM "black blobs" instead of "red blobs", so key material stays > within the CAAM and isn't exposed to kernel in plaintext. > James voiced the opinion that there should be just one user-facing generic > wrap/unwrap key type with multiple possible handlers. > David suggested trusted keys. > > - Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support > Sumit reworked[4] trusted keys to support multiple possible backends with > one chosen at boot time and added a new TEE backend along with TPM. > This now sits in Jarkko's master branch to be sent out for v5.13 > > This patch series builds on top of Sumit's rework to have the CAAM as yet another > trusted key backend. > > The CAAM bits are based on Steffen's initial patch from 2015. His work had been > used in the field for some years now, so I preferred not to deviate too much from it. > > This series has been tested with dmcrypt[5] on an i.MX6DL. > > Looking forward to your feedback. > > Cheers, > Ahmad > > [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/1447082306-19946-2-git-send-email-s.trumtrar@pengutronix.de/ > [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20180723111432.26830-1-udit.agarwal@nxp.com/ > [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1551456599-10603-2-git-send-email-franck.lenormand@nxp.com/ > [4]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1604419306-26105-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org/ > [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210122084321.24012-2-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de/ > > --- > To: Jarkko Sakkinen > To: "Horia Geantă" > To: Mimi Zohar > To: Aymen Sghaier > To: Herbert Xu > To: "David S. Miller" > To: James Bottomley > Cc: David Howells > Cc: James Morris > Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" > Cc: Steffen Trumtrar > Cc: Udit Agarwal > Cc: Jan Luebbe > Cc: David Gstir > Cc: Eric Biggers > Cc: Richard Weinberger > Cc: Franck LENORMAND > Cc: Sumit Garg > Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org > Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org > > Ahmad Fatoum (4): > KEYS: trusted: allow users to use kernel RNG for key material > KEYS: trusted: allow trust sources to use kernel RNG for key material > crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator > KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys > > Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +- > Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 60 +++- > MAINTAINERS | 9 +- > drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig | 3 +- > drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile | 1 +- > drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c | 230 +++++++++++++++- > include/keys/trusted-type.h | 2 +- > include/keys/trusted_caam.h | 11 +- > include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h | 56 ++++- > security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 11 +- > security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 +- > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 74 +++++- > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 23 +- > 13 files changed, 477 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c > create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_caam.h > create mode 100644 include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h > create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c > > base-commit: 97408d81ed533b953326c580ff2c3f1948b3fcee > -- Pengutronix e.K. | | Steuerwalder Str. 21 | http://www.pengutronix.de/ | 31137 Hildesheim, Germany | Phone: +49-5121-206917-0 | Amtsgericht Hildesheim, HRA 2686 | Fax: +49-5121-206917-5555 |