Received: by 2002:a05:6a10:c604:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id y4csp4333787pxt; Wed, 11 Aug 2021 03:44:16 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwyr7ik7lsTxHxrZApai1BUyTkeG7SqBkRSCcevQUkEpT0Gpea52FvEkyr+AfyO3amyCedH X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:3cf2:: with SMTP id d18mr2979824ejh.437.1628678655918; Wed, 11 Aug 2021 03:44:15 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1628678655; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=wurxHM+sCfOoYDdngWmW4b8APlqZeb7PNvMNZWiEdT3bvD85UVR5iKA7LTVhkbPB+Y Md3pY2jFLPnrK5qsimaeNDdW9aUZXSpHy1xxN10a/rlSqIIZHL8OHp+6zXAjj49j6owI 0te8vnXpwIQHEu0zA2HKjIjEYcT/RWWIyFfGYTdsx9pvjuY26cAxFswWIWl2pTIFz453 aKC6D8Ntw2bz1XLECEEnxf14KfLirpktLATF1o9JpMsli/0VShZtNsQaeY7Cud0bpxeA scz+I/Zv8VJJCjjZ/y/0j6mWXKZ+liVciIYpn3odu90mIjE5a7+cLASUZdl5nNBoiXPY Cw7g== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :references:in-reply-to:message-id:subject:reply-to:cc:from:to:date; bh=R7fdky6j7Kq7850tqm10aFTTYYmW2vn1nIwzsqX1zDQ=; b=ucAVlm03kctMQiBMQp93Pyem0+cd7HH0BnyYmdkHJs3r3NZSFYTGF1t9bIlxt4pqVD AVZAPmaHM+4BMZDtrgmA6jK7cz6abJbZ3JYGl1oP3vX5jwr+A7SQ4hvnpJxJcybhutuJ 0Kan02wBiB5pQiZABGGBBmpY7ECXnlJTA1stfx2aHqlN2MxTP6NE/IRyhPzEADOswpBm kzhw8A/NF5+A2VjfMjYGrXa0bgwcNUqibmHnOTserjvQ/FqfhtLpXHfY9I8Tx6cElYAi sDlqbEiUDGiz0Q9L6SnraKzKsGKL7pSBRvTPIWfyo95LhlOOrGw8Hh5Qr6YUVlL9L0s3 dTnw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id x8si4746875edd.516.2021.08.11.03.43.45; Wed, 11 Aug 2021 03:44:15 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S236863AbhHKKoE convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 11 Aug 2021 06:44:04 -0400 Received: from mail-0201.mail-europe.com ([51.77.79.158]:34795 "EHLO mail-0201.mail-europe.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S236830AbhHKKoE (ORCPT ); Wed, 11 Aug 2021 06:44:04 -0400 Date: Wed, 11 Aug 2021 10:43:01 +0000 Authentication-Results: mail-4316.protonmail.ch; dkim=none To: Ahmad Fatoum From: David Gstir Cc: =?utf-8?Q?Horia_Geant=C4=83?= , Aymen Sghaier , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , kernel@pengutronix.de, James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , James Morris , Eric Biggers , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Udit Agarwal , Jan Luebbe , Richard Weinberger , Franck LENORMAND , Sumit Garg , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Reply-To: David Gstir Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator Message-ID: <85A1078F-B8E1-4E5F-A59A-23BDFB750C83@sigma-star.at> In-Reply-To: <7cc83edd-dc39-ee7e-d18c-30b2492247ea@pengutronix.de> References: <4078060ab2e44114af8204b4defea4f3d4b9e285.1626885907.git-series.a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> <796E18E6-1329-40D6-B12F-4CE6C90DD988@sigma-star.at> <7cc83edd-dc39-ee7e-d18c-30b2492247ea@pengutronix.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.0 required=10.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED shortcircuit=no autolearn=disabled version=3.4.4 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on mailout.protonmail.ch Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Hi Ahmad, > On 11.08.2021, at 12:22, Ahmad Fatoum wrote: > >> Since you already assert that MAX_BLOB_SIZE <= CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN >> in security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c, this will never >> be an issue for CAAM-based trusted-keys though. > I omitted checks in code, which are verified at compile-time. > Would you prefer a runtime check to be added as well? I’d say the compile-time check suffices, unless this is intended to be used outside of trusted-keys. But I don’t think this is very likely… Cheers, David