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        marcorr@google.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH Part2 v5 24/45] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command
Date:   Fri, 20 Aug 2021 10:58:57 -0500
Message-Id: <20210820155918.7518-25-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
In-Reply-To: <20210820155918.7518-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
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KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START begins the launch process for an SEV-SNP guest.
The command initializes a cryptographic digest context used to construct
the measurement of the guest. If the guest is expected to be migrated,
the command also binds a migration agent (MA) to the guest.

For more information see the SEV-SNP specification.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst        |  24 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c                        | 116 +++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h                        |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                      |  10 ++
 4 files changed, 148 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
index 7b1d32fb99a8..937af3447954 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -454,6 +454,30 @@ The flags bitmap is defined as::
 If the specified flags is not supported then return -EOPNOTSUPP, and the supported
 flags are returned.
 
+19. KVM_SNP_LAUNCH_START
+------------------------
+
+The KVM_SNP_LAUNCH_START command is used for creating the memory encryption
+context for the SEV-SNP guest. To create the encryption context, user must
+provide a guest policy, migration agent (if any) and guest OS visible
+workarounds value as defined SEV-SNP specification.
+
+Parameters (in): struct  kvm_snp_launch_start
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start {
+                __u64 policy;           /* Guest policy to use. */
+                __u64 ma_uaddr;         /* userspace address of migration agent */
+                __u8 ma_en;             /* 1 if the migtation agent is enabled */
+                __u8 imi_en;            /* set IMI to 1. */
+                __u8 gosvw[16];         /* guest OS visible workarounds */
+        };
+
+See the SEV-SNP specification for further detail on the launch input.
+
 References
 ==========
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 93da463545ef..dbf04a52b23d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 
 #include <asm/pkru.h>
 #include <asm/trapnr.h>
+#include <asm/sev.h>
 
 #include "x86.h"
 #include "svm.h"
@@ -74,6 +75,8 @@ static unsigned long sev_me_mask;
 static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
 static unsigned long *sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap;
 
+static int snp_decommission_context(struct kvm *kvm);
+
 struct enc_region {
 	struct list_head list;
 	unsigned long npages;
@@ -85,7 +88,7 @@ struct enc_region {
 /* Called with the sev_bitmap_lock held, or on shutdown  */
 static int sev_flush_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
 {
-	int ret, pos, error = 0;
+	int ret, pos, error = 0, ret_snp = 0, error_snp = 0;
 
 	/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
 	pos = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, max_asid, min_asid);
@@ -101,12 +104,18 @@ static int sev_flush_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
 	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
 	ret = sev_guest_df_flush(&error);
 
+	if (sev_snp_enabled)
+		ret_snp = snp_guest_df_flush(&error_snp);
+
 	up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
 
 	if (ret)
 		pr_err("SEV: DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n", ret, error);
 
-	return ret;
+	if (ret_snp)
+		pr_err("SEV: SNP_DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n", ret_snp, error_snp);
+
+	return ret || ret_snp;
 }
 
 static inline bool is_mirroring_enc_context(struct kvm *kvm)
@@ -1543,6 +1552,74 @@ static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
 }
 
+static void *snp_context_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct sev_data_snp_gctx_create data = {};
+	void *context;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* Allocate memory for context page */
+	context = snp_alloc_firmware_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!context)
+		return NULL;
+
+	data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(context);
+	rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_GCTX_CREATE, &data, &argp->error);
+	if (rc) {
+		snp_free_firmware_page(context);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return context;
+}
+
+static int snp_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, int *error)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_snp_activate data = {0};
+
+	data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
+	data.asid   = sev_get_asid(kvm);
+	return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SNP_ACTIVATE, &data, error);
+}
+
+static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_snp_launch_start start = {0};
+	struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start params;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!sev_snp_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	sev->snp_context = snp_context_create(kvm, argp);
+	if (!sev->snp_context)
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	start.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
+	start.policy = params.policy;
+	memcpy(start.gosvw, params.gosvw, sizeof(params.gosvw));
+	rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_START, &start, &argp->error);
+	if (rc)
+		goto e_free_context;
+
+	sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
+	rc = snp_bind_asid(kvm, &argp->error);
+	if (rc)
+		goto e_free_context;
+
+	return 0;
+
+e_free_context:
+	snp_decommission_context(kvm);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
 int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -1632,6 +1709,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 	case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH:
 		r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
 		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START:
+		r = snp_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
 	default:
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
@@ -1825,6 +1905,28 @@ int svm_vm_copy_asid_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int snp_decommission_context(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_snp_decommission data = {};
+	int ret;
+
+	/* If context is not created then do nothing */
+	if (!sev->snp_context)
+		return 0;
+
+	data.gctx_paddr = __sme_pa(sev->snp_context);
+	ret = snp_guest_decommission(&data, NULL);
+	if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "failed to release guest context"))
+		return ret;
+
+	/* free the context page now */
+	snp_free_firmware_page(sev->snp_context);
+	sev->snp_context = NULL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
@@ -1863,7 +1965,15 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 
 	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
 
-	sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
+	if (sev_snp_guest(kvm)) {
+		if (snp_decommission_context(kvm)) {
+			WARN_ONCE(1, "Failed to free SNP guest context, leaking asid!\n");
+			return;
+		}
+	} else {
+		sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
+	}
+
 	sev_asid_free(sev);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 57c3c404b0b3..85417c44812d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
 	struct kvm *enc_context_owner; /* Owner of copied encryption context */
 	struct misc_cg *misc_cg; /* For misc cgroup accounting */
 	u64 snp_init_flags;
+	void *snp_context;      /* SNP guest context page */
 };
 
 struct kvm_svm {
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 944e2bf601fe..e6416e58cd9a 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1714,6 +1714,7 @@ enum sev_cmd_id {
 
 	/* SNP specific commands */
 	KVM_SEV_SNP_INIT,
+	KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START,
 
 	KVM_SEV_NR_MAX,
 };
@@ -1821,6 +1822,15 @@ struct kvm_snp_init {
 	__u64 flags;
 };
 
+struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start {
+	__u64 policy;
+	__u64 ma_uaddr;
+	__u8 ma_en;
+	__u8 imi_en;
+	__u8 gosvw[16];
+	__u8 pad[6];
+};
+
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU	(1 << 0)
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3		(1 << 1)
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX	(1 << 2)
-- 
2.17.1