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Subject: Re: [RFCv3 05/15] tcp: authopt: Add crypto initialization
To:     Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc:     Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>,
        Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>,
        David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
        Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.co.jp>,
        Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
        Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>,
        Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@arista.com>,
        Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>,
        Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>,
        Ivan Delalande <colona@arista.com>,
        Priyaranjan Jha <priyarjha@google.com>,
        Menglong Dong <dong.menglong@zte.com.cn>,
        netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
        "open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE" 
        <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
        "open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK" 
        <linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
References: <cover.1629840814.git.cdleonard@gmail.com>
 <abb720b34b9eef1cc52ef68017334e27a2af83c6.1629840814.git.cdleonard@gmail.com>
 <30f73293-ea03-d18f-d923-0cf499d4b208@gmail.com>
 <27e56f61-3267-de50-0d49-5fcfc59af93c@gmail.com>
 <CANn89iJPyQpJTxrDMGszEOrgKwaEdYz1xaRK7vKbS4qj9tV23g@mail.gmail.com>
From:   Leonard Crestez <cdleonard@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <9ee51fc2-0b7e-4dc5-881b-9f6d671347ea@gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 25 Aug 2021 21:56:17 +0300
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On 8/25/21 8:55 PM, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 25, 2021 at 9:35 AM Leonard Crestez <cdleonard@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 25.08.2021 02:34, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>>> On 8/24/21 2:34 PM, Leonard Crestez wrote:
>>>> The crypto_shash API is used in order to compute packet signatures. The
>>>> API comes with several unfortunate limitations:
>>>>
>>>> 1) Allocating a crypto_shash can sleep and must be done in user context.
>>>> 2) Packet signatures must be computed in softirq context
>>>> 3) Packet signatures use dynamic "traffic keys" which require exclusive
>>>> access to crypto_shash for crypto_setkey.
>>>>
>>>> The solution is to allocate one crypto_shash for each possible cpu for
>>>> each algorithm at setsockopt time. The per-cpu tfm is then borrowed from
>>>> softirq context, signatures are computed and the tfm is returned.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I could not see the per-cpu stuff that you mention in the changelog.
>>
>> That's a little embarrasing, I forgot to implement the actual per-cpu
>> stuff. tcp_authopt_alg_imp.tfm is meant to be an array up to NR_CPUS and
>> tcp_authopt_alg_get_tfm needs no locking other than preempt_disable
>> (which should already be the case).
> 
> Well, do not use arrays of NR_CPUS and instead use normal per_cpu
> accessors (as in __tcp_alloc_md5sig_pool)
> 
>>
>> The reference counting would still only happen from very few places:
>> setsockopt, close and openreq. This would only impact request/response
>> traffic and relatively little.
> 
> What I meant is that __tcp_alloc_md5sig_pool() allocates stuff one time,
> we do not care about tcp_md5sig_pool_populated going back to false.
> 
> Otherwise, a single user application constantly allocating a socket,
> enabling MD5 (or authopt), then closing the socket would incur
> a big cost on hosts with a lot of cpus.

Allocating only once would definitely simply things.

I don't know if this might end up tying hardware resources forever if 
some accelerators are in play but for this feature software-only crypto 
is perfectly fine.

--
Regards,
Leonard