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Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To:     Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
        Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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        scott.branden@broadcom.com, weiyongjun1@huawei.com,
        nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com, ardb@kernel.org,
        Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
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        "konrad.wilk@oracle.com" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
        Patrick Uiterwijk <patrick@puiterwijk.org>
Date:   Wed, 01 Sep 2021 07:36:58 +0300
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On Wed, 2021-09-01 at 07:34 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Fri, 2021-08-27 at 16:44 -0400, Nayna wrote:
> > On 8/25/21 6:27 PM, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > On Thu, 2021-08-26 at 01:21 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > On Tue, 2021-08-24 at 10:34 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > > > > > > Jarkko, I think the emphasis should not be on "machine" fro=
m
> > > > > > > > Machine Owner Key (MOK), but on "owner".  Whereas Nayna is
> > > > > > > > focusing more on the "_ca" aspect of the name.   Perhaps
> > > > > > > > consider naming it "system_owner_ca" or something along tho=
se
> > > > > > > > lines.
> > > > > > > What do you gain such overly long identifier? Makes no sense.
> > > > > > > What is "ca aspect of the name" anyway?
> > > > > > As I mentioned previously, the main usage of this new keyring i=
s
> > > > > > that it should contain only CA keys which can be later used to
> > > > > > vouch for user keys loaded onto secondary or IMA keyring at
> > > > > > runtime. Having ca in the  name like .xxxx_ca, would make the
> > > > > > keyring name self-describing. Since you preferred .system, we c=
an
> > > > > > call it .system_ca.
> > > > > Sounds good to me.  Jarkko?
> > > > >=20
> > > > > thanks,
> > > > >=20
> > > > > Mimi
> > > > I just wonder what you exactly gain with "_ca"?
> > > Remember, a CA cert is a self signed cert with the CA:TRUE basic
> > > constraint.  Pretty much no secure boot key satisfies this (secure bo=
ot
> > > chose deliberately NOT to use CA certificates, so they're all some ty=
pe
> > > of intermediate or leaf), so the design seems to be only to pick out
> > > the CA certificates you put in the MOK keyring.  Adding the _ca suffi=
x
> > > may deflect some of the "why aren't all my MOK certificates in the
> > > keyring" emails ...
> >=20
> > My understanding is the .system_ca keyring should not be restricted onl=
y=20
> > to self-signed CAs (Root CA). Any cert that can qualify as Root or=20
> > Intermediate CA with Basic Constraints CA:TRUE should be allowed. In=
=20
> > fact, the intermediate CA certificates closest to the leaf nodes would=
=20
> > be best.
> >=20
> > Thanks for bringing up that adding the _ca suffix may deflect some of=
=20
> > the "why aren't all my MOK certificates in the keyring" emails.
>=20
> What the heck is the pragamatic gain of adding such a suffix? Makes
> zero sense

If this series needs both "system" and "system_ca" keyrings, then
there would be some sanity in this.

Also, I still *fully* lack understanding of the use of word system.

Why MOK is not SOK then??

/Jarkko