Date:   Thu, 25 Nov 2021 11:05:52 +0100
From:   Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
To:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc:     Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
        Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>, x86@kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org,
        linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
        Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
        Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
        Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, tony.luck@intel.com,
        marcorr@google.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 v5 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP)
 Hypervisor Support
Message-ID: <YZ9gAMHdEo6nQ6a0@suse.de>
References: <20210820155918.7518-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
 <CAMkAt6o0ySn1=iLYsH0LCnNARrUbfaS0cvtxB__y_d+Q6DUzfA@mail.gmail.com>
 <daf5066b-e89b-d377-ed8a-9338f1a04c0d@amd.com>
 <d673f082-9023-dafb-e42e-eab32a3ddd0c@intel.com>
 <f15597a0-e7e0-0a57-39fd-20715abddc7f@amd.com>
 <5f3b3aab-9ec2-c489-eefd-9136874762ee@intel.com>
 <d83e6668-bec4-8d1f-7f8a-085829146846@amd.com>
 <38282b0c-7eb5-6a91-df19-2f4cfa8549ce@intel.com>
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On Wed, Nov 24, 2021 at 09:48:14AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> That covers things like copy_from_user().  It does not account for
> things where kernel mappings are used, like where a
> get_user_pages()/kmap() is in play.

The kmap case is guarded by KVM code, which locks the page first so that
the guest can't change the page state, then checks the page state, and
if it is shared does the kmap and the access.

This should turn an RMP fault in the kernel which is not covered in the
uaccess exception table into a fatal error.

Regards,

-- 
J?rg R?del
jroedel@suse.de

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