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Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5 11/20] tcp: ipv4: Add AO signing for skb-less replies Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 14:12:57 +0200 Message-Id: <2990eee1b03b038709a8dfeee9fb915655b074b5.1643026076.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org The code in tcp_v4_send_ack and tcp_v4_send_reset does not allocate a full skb so special handling is required for tcp-authopt handling. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 3 +- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 7a2e15dd80ba..d924a73a17c1 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -955,10 +955,11 @@ static int tcp_v4_authopt_get_traffic_key_noskb(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key u8 *traffic_key) { int err; struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool; struct tcp_v4_authopt_context_data data; + char traffic_key_context_header[7] = "\x01TCP-AO"; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(data) != 22); pool = tcp_authopt_get_kdf_pool(key); if (IS_ERR(pool)) @@ -971,11 +972,11 @@ static int tcp_v4_authopt_get_traffic_key_noskb(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key if (err) goto out; // RFC5926 section 3.1.1.1 // Separate to keep alignment semi-sane - err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, "\x01TCP-AO", 7); + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, traffic_key_context_header, 7); if (err) return err; data.saddr = saddr; data.daddr = daddr; data.sport = sport; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index 5a7fe973bc4e..e35463a378e7 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -644,10 +644,50 @@ void tcp_v4_send_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) __tcp_v4_send_check(skb, inet->inet_saddr, inet->inet_daddr); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_v4_send_check); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +/** tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply - Insert TCPOPT_AUTHOPT if required + * + * returns number of bytes (always aligned to 4) or zero + */ +static int tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply(const struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + __be32 *optptr, + struct tcphdr *th) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info; + u8 rnextkeyid; + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) + info = tcp_twsk(sk)->tw_authopt_info; + else + info = rcu_dereference_check(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + if (!info) + return 0; + key_info = __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, info, sk, &rnextkeyid); + if (!key_info) + return 0; + *optptr = htonl((TCPOPT_AUTHOPT << 24) | + (TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT << 16) | + (key_info->send_id << 8) | + (rnextkeyid)); + /* must update doff before signature computation */ + th->doff += TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT / 4; + tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply((char *)(optptr + 1), + info, + key_info, + ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, + ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, + th); + + return TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT; +} +#endif + /* * This routine will send an RST to the other tcp. * * Someone asks: why I NEVER use socket parameters (TOS, TTL etc.) * for reset. @@ -659,10 +699,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_v4_send_check); * Exception: precedence violation. We do not implement it in any case. */ #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG #define OPTION_BYTES TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED +#elif defined(OPTION_BYTES_TCP_AUTHOPT) +#define OPTION_BYTES TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT #else #define OPTION_BYTES sizeof(__be32) #endif static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -712,12 +754,29 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) memset(&arg, 0, sizeof(arg)); arg.iov[0].iov_base = (unsigned char *)&rep; arg.iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(rep.th); net = sk ? sock_net(sk) : dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev); -#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) rcu_read_lock(); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + /* Unlike TCP-MD5 the signatures for TCP-AO depend on initial sequence + * numbers so we can only handle established and time-wait sockets. + */ + if (tcp_authopt_needed && sk && + sk->sk_state != TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV && + sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) { + int tcp_authopt_ret = tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply(sk, skb, rep.opt, &rep.th); + + if (tcp_authopt_ret) { + arg.iov[0].iov_len += tcp_authopt_ret; + goto skip_md5sig; + } + } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG hash_location = tcp_parse_md5sig_option(th); if (sk && sk_fullsock(sk)) { const union tcp_md5_addr *addr; int l3index; @@ -755,11 +814,10 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) addr = (union tcp_md5_addr *)&ip_hdr(skb)->saddr; key = tcp_md5_do_lookup(sk1, l3index, addr, AF_INET); if (!key) goto out; - genhash = tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb(newhash, key, NULL, skb); if (genhash || memcmp(hash_location, newhash, 16) != 0) goto out; } @@ -775,10 +833,13 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) tcp_v4_md5_hash_hdr((__u8 *) &rep.opt[1], key, ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, &rep.th); } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +skip_md5sig: #endif /* Can't co-exist with TCPMD5, hence check rep.opt[0] */ if (rep.opt[0] == 0) { __be32 mrst = mptcp_reset_option(skb); @@ -828,12 +889,14 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) ctl_sk->sk_mark = 0; __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_OUTSEGS); __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_OUTRSTS); local_bh_enable(); -#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) out: +#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) rcu_read_unlock(); #endif } /* The code following below sending ACKs in SYN-RECV and TIME-WAIT states @@ -850,10 +913,12 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_ack(const struct sock *sk, struct { struct tcphdr th; __be32 opt[(TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED >> 2) #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG + (TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED >> 2) +#elif defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + + (TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT >> 2) #endif ]; } rep; struct net *net = sock_net(sk); struct ip_reply_arg arg; @@ -881,10 +946,23 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_ack(const struct sock *sk, rep.th.seq = htonl(seq); rep.th.ack_seq = htonl(ack); rep.th.ack = 1; rep.th.window = htons(win); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + int aoret, offset = (tsecr) ? 3 : 0; + + aoret = tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply(sk, skb, &rep.opt[offset], &rep.th); + if (aoret) { + arg.iov[0].iov_len += aoret; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG + key = NULL; +#endif + } + } +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG if (key) { int offset = (tsecr) ? 3 : 0; rep.opt[offset++] = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | -- 2.25.1