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From:   Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To:     keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc:     linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
        Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>,
        Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>,
        Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>,
        Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] Fix bugs in public_key_verify_signature()
Date:   Mon, 31 Jan 2022 16:34:12 -0800
Message-Id: <20220201003414.55380-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Precedence: bulk

This patchset fixes some bugs in public_key_verify_signature() where it
could be tricked into using the wrong algorithm, as was discussed at
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20211202215507.298415-1-zohar@linux.ibm.com/T/#t

I'd appreciate it if the people who care about each of the supported
public key algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, ECRDSA, and SM2) would test this
patchset to make sure it still works for their use case(s).  I've tested
that X.509 and PKCS#7 with RSA still work.

Note, I have *not* included a fix for SM2 being implemented incorrectly.
That is another bug that I pointed out in the above thread.  I think
that bug is for the people who actually care about SM2.

This applies to v5.17-rc2.

Eric Biggers (2):
  KEYS: asymmetric: enforce that sig algo matches key algo
  KEYS: asymmetric: properly validate hash_algo and encoding

 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c    |   6 --
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c      | 126 ++++++++++++++++-------
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c |   6 --
 3 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)


base-commit: 26291c54e111ff6ba87a164d85d4a4e134b7315c
-- 
2.35.1