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Date:   Wed, 2 Feb 2022 22:15:24 -0500
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] KEYS: Double max_size to make keyctl pkey_verify work
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To:     Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc:     linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
References: <20220202065906.2598366-1-vt@altlinux.org>
From:   Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
In-Reply-To: <20220202065906.2598366-1-vt@altlinux.org>
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On 2/2/22 01:59, Vitaly Chikunov wrote:
> Rarely used `keyctl pkey_verify' can verify raw signatures, but was
> failing, because ECDSA/EC-RDSA signature sizes are twice key sizes which
> does not pass in/out sizes check in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2.
> This in turn because these values cannot be distinguished by a single
> `max_size' callback return value.
> Also, `keyctl pkey_query` displays incorrect `max_sig_size' about these
> algorithms.
>
> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
> ---
>   crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
>   1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> index 4fefb219bfdc..3ffbab07ed2a 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> @@ -143,8 +143,19 @@ static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
>   
>   	len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
>   	info->key_size = len * 8;
> -	info->max_data_size = len;
> -	info->max_sig_size = len;
> +	if (strcmp(alg_name, "ecrdsa") == 0 ||
> +	    strncmp(alg_name, "ecdsa-", 6) == 0) {
> +		/*
> +		 * For these algos sig size is twice key size.
> +		 * keyctl uses max_sig_size as minimum input size, and
> +		 * max_data_size as minimum output size for a signature.
> +		 */
> +		info->max_data_size = len * 2;
> +		info->max_sig_size = len * 2;
I don't know about the data size but following my tests this is not 
enough for ECDSA signature size. In ECDSA case the r and s components of 
the signature are encode in asn.1, not 'raw'. So there are 2 bytes at 
the beginning for sequence identifier , 2 bytes asn.1 for the r 
component, 1 additional 0-byte to make the r component always a positive 
number, then the r component, then 2 bytes asn.1 for the s component, 1 
addition 0-byte to make the s component a positive number, then the s 
component. Phew.

info->max_sig_size = 2 + (2 + 1 + len) * 2;

so for NIST P384 it's: 2 + (2+1+48) * 2 = 104

Then it works for me as well.


> +	} else {
> +		info->max_data_size = len;
> +		info->max_sig_size = len;
> +	}
>   	info->max_enc_size = len;
>   	info->max_dec_size = len;
>   	info->supported_ops = (KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT |