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Message-ID: <17d1a498-6b27-c61b-787d-667abbbb955b@linux.alibaba.com>
Date:   Mon, 21 Feb 2022 10:43:39 +0800
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Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: asymmetric: enforce SM2 signature use pkey algo
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To:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc:     Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
        Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>,
        Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>,
        Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
References: <20220201003414.55380-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
 <20220207114327.7929-1-tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
 <YhLvtVT89tAjGnqw@kernel.org>
From:   Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
In-Reply-To: <YhLvtVT89tAjGnqw@kernel.org>
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Hi Jarkko,

On 2/21/22 9:49 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 07, 2022 at 07:43:27PM +0800, Tianjia Zhang wrote:
>> The signature verification of SM2 needs to add the Za value and
>> recalculate sig->digest, which requires the detection of the pkey_algo
>> in public_key_verify_signature(). As Eric Biggers said, the pkey_algo
>> field in sig is attacker-controlled and should be use pkey->pkey_algo
>> instead of sig->pkey_algo, and secondly, if sig->pkey_algo is NULL, it
>> will also cause signature verification failure.
>>
>> The software_key_determine_akcipher() already forces the algorithms
>> are matched, so the SM3 algorithm is enforced in the SM2 signature,
>> although this has been checked, we still avoid using any algorithm
>> information in the signature as input.
>>
>> Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
>> ---
>>   crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 6 +++---
>>   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
>> index a603ee8afdb8..ea9a5501f87e 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
>> @@ -309,7 +309,8 @@ static int cert_sig_digest_update(const struct public_key_signature *sig,
>>   	if (ret)
>>   		return ret;
>>   
>> -	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
>> +	/* SM2 signatures always use the SM3 hash algorithm */
>> +	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sm3", 0, 0);
> 
> Why not simply fail when sig->hash_algo != "sm3"?
> 
> BR, Jarkko

This series of Eric's patch 2/2 has done this check.

Best regards,
Tianjia