Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20;
Received-SPF: Pass (protection.outlook.com: domain of amd.com designates
 165.204.84.17 as permitted sender) receiver=protection.outlook.com;
 client-ip=165.204.84.17; helo=SATLEXMB04.amd.com; pr=C
From:   Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>
To:     <x86@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
        <linux-mm@kvack.org>, <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>
CC:     <tglx@linutronix.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>,
        <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, <hpa@zytor.com>, <ardb@kernel.org>,
        <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <seanjc@google.com>, <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
        <jmattson@google.com>, <luto@kernel.org>,
        <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <slp@redhat.com>,
        <pgonda@google.com>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
        <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>, <rientjes@google.com>,
        <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>, <tobin@ibm.com>, <bp@alien8.de>,
        <michael.roth@amd.com>, <vbabka@suse.cz>, <kirill@shutemov.name>,
        <ak@linux.intel.com>, <tony.luck@intel.com>, <marcorr@google.com>,
        <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
        <alpergun@google.com>, <dgilbert@redhat.com>, <jarkko@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH Part2 v6 43/49] KVM: SVM: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB
Date:   Mon, 20 Jun 2022 23:13:57 +0000
Message-ID: <9e736fb6dc69bffe6c2414706323b88223fc0c5b.1655761627.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1655761627.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
References: <cover.1655761627.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Content-Type: text/plain
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 20 Jun 2022 23:14:08.5562
 (UTC)
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: 1d243474-27a0-428c-cfea-08da53129427
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d;Ip=[165.204.84.17];Helo=[SATLEXMB04.amd.com]
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: DM6NAM11FT047.eop-nam11.prod.protection.outlook.com
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Anonymous
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem
X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: SN1PR12MB2496
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED,
        DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE,
        RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2,SPF_HELO_PASS,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE
        autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on
        lindbergh.monkeyblade.net
Precedence: bulk
List-ID: <linux-crypto.vger.kernel.org>
X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

In preparation to support SEV-SNP AP Creation, use a variable that holds
the VMSA physical address rather than converting the virtual address.
This will allow SEV-SNP AP Creation to set the new physical address that
will be used should the vCPU reset path be taken.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 5 ++---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 9 ++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 +
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 089af21a4efe..d5584551f3dd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -3980,10 +3980,9 @@ void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 
 	/*
 	 * An SEV-ES guest requires a VMSA area that is a separate from the
-	 * VMCB page. Do not include the encryption mask on the VMSA physical
-	 * address since hardware will access it using the guest key.
+	 * VMCB page.
 	 */
-	svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
+	svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = svm->sev_es.vmsa_pa;
 
 	/* Can't intercept CR register access, HV can't modify CR registers */
 	svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 7742bc986afc..f7155abe7567 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1296,9 +1296,16 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	svm->vmcb01.pa = __sme_set(page_to_pfn(vmcb01_page) << PAGE_SHIFT);
 	svm_switch_vmcb(svm, &svm->vmcb01);
 
-	if (vmsa_page)
+	if (vmsa_page) {
 		svm->sev_es.vmsa = page_address(vmsa_page);
 
+		/*
+		 * Do not include the encryption mask on the VMSA physical
+		 * address since hardware will access it using the guest key.
+		 */
+		svm->sev_es.vmsa_pa = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
+	}
+
 	svm->guest_state_loaded = false;
 
 	return 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 3be24da1a743..46790bab07a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ struct svm_nested_state {
 struct vcpu_sev_es_state {
 	/* SEV-ES support */
 	struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa;
+	hpa_t vmsa_pa;
 	bool ghcb_in_use;
 	bool received_first_sipi;
 	unsigned int ap_reset_hold_type;
-- 
2.25.1