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From:   Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
To:     Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc:     "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
        Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>, jann@thejh.net,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld via Libc-alpha" <libc-alpha@sourceware.org>,
        linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Michael@phoronix.com
Subject: Re: arc4random - are you sure we want these?
References: <YtwgTySJyky0OcgG@zx2c4.com> <Ytwg8YEJn+76h5g9@zx2c4.com>
        <87bktdsdrk.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com> <Yt54x7uWnsL3eZSx@zx2c4.com>
        <87v8rlqscj.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com> <Yt6eHfnlEN8ViWrA@zx2c4.com>
        <20220725160652.GG7074@brightrain.aerifal.cx>
Date:   Mon, 25 Jul 2022 18:43:05 +0200
In-Reply-To: <20220725160652.GG7074@brightrain.aerifal.cx> (Rich Felker's
        message of "Mon, 25 Jul 2022 12:06:53 -0400")
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* Rich Felker:

> AT_RANDOM is unusable as a fallback here because it's equivalent to
> GRND_INSECURE. It's silently broken at early boot time. In musl we're
> likely going to end up using the legacy SYS_sysctl on pre-getrandom
> kernels even though it spammed syslog just because it seems to be the
> only way to get blocking secure entropy on those kernels.

Even pre-getrandom, sysctl was rarely enabled in kernel configurations
if I recall correctly.  I doubt it is an option to avoid process
termination with old kernels/seccomp filters.

Thanks,
Florian