Received: by 2002:ac0:e34a:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id g10csp450943imn; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:17:02 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1vEXfxIsVDG93LdIJkMxgZatkOK8PGCHhARlAJiKvpw/N+HvqOpajOFMOSuQ4Js2uyrI0xv X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:7e85:b0:72e:dbe1:7203 with SMTP id qb5-20020a1709077e8500b0072edbe17203mr12591050ejc.349.1658816222418; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:17:02 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1658816222; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=G9gOvxSPRNa38UeHGQKEXDuHtaeuZ16K96SjhxbLPhot/qV7SWTy3JPF/eKrujeMb7 xGWVIu9wlwF1X47ypn71CKfRbP+DE7aUH8qtUjLj+0ly69Y8kr8h1n93ljaKC0NBIAIY BuGJy0/tdtgRnaMd6eB1+VDN3Rm5W+J7Wc/FSQoKrycnnv1MgstxNXwffHavKQkdWCmS Sq4leigBYgFVHbGm5OGsNgDtSrMyEMRFXmYW+j2UlBZ4qLHQki7izPcKXG2d6DyGTMbl G688XF/LxZVBR7sJpGJDVkAGTWl8qFlhMDVj6oc0dXCIFyrpthX3+tvrfu0fy8oE5Xix kS+A== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:dkim-signature; bh=TBHNm+itT6V1xI3RXoopTxPFiKyF8tS1Yze0w6IdsN4=; b=YP/E2OsQou/HZmF1qGH9Eb3NjA3u007G0NV1kr8sh68QRbEvACrgsyq9PWQFTbc/8+ w+cYHXsC84oZpmt/vap84QZUTTBcFNipL2lUiO5ENw8mLg8S0RNh7ZOmf5IB6wRKGRhQ UlhM3V3kZwxfMtNzuQNrGQfz+p97khbsdM9I/kJa94ZWZE6i89r6jOPGGYanDXiFrou3 WPuNKpYVOxTKAEsIpPMI8+2++F3xmERVwliQ15ZmoTvmSLIvED7gR6jFnTQG2gKWFM6o U0hNYdONm8Pki5neIsDiNAEBy36pJbHsuBWL0gjZHinHu/uDFFzt4oGgYiJ81tamLwdJ J4fQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@gmail.com header.s=20210112 header.b=k+AMX00N; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=gmail.com Return-Path: Received: from out1.vger.email (out1.vger.email. [2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id mp27-20020a1709071b1b00b0072aebe7b648si12695015ejc.4.2022.07.25.23.16.28; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:17:02 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@gmail.com header.s=20210112 header.b=k+AMX00N; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=gmail.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231989AbiGZGPm (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 26 Jul 2022 02:15:42 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57250 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229568AbiGZGPl (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Jul 2022 02:15:41 -0400 Received: from mail-ed1-x52e.google.com (mail-ed1-x52e.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::52e]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A529D644C; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:15:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ed1-x52e.google.com with SMTP id w5so4080824edd.13; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:15:39 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=TBHNm+itT6V1xI3RXoopTxPFiKyF8tS1Yze0w6IdsN4=; b=k+AMX00NMCvEsZLU04hfPEilwVL49sA0Fc5RLdObq+S6gwHoqzymc4+u5YDKblzIHi S8XFV7IIVmQXV/lnHuprMiitLidliDZ32wnQpKBC4CQVFeKcw6zxTSOZOGrykykHw43P 9/ULGLbKvNAzzf/gs3fm/wGTVlcvaTFe799ju8YGHnOQSefY899zVQYtQrd5vVj5eaZV 2aoqPCngiUgG5UjMGHR32Vrxbg1fdfD0JdfOrIFJf2U4Kiqb92KahhYd4lSVN9DTckCQ DuSGldqba7rrdU5lPhH54UseerARf6GxPFtDT/AcitP18GCwn58WyJINqWVV06PLahDC AO8w== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=TBHNm+itT6V1xI3RXoopTxPFiKyF8tS1Yze0w6IdsN4=; b=oGmFAmNpfDySnvFJCzWqUIpQj0I9ZPFZ5j0jreia1L8i2PXYJ5+Z4MUQSzJvxBAkYE q0aC19dDWjbpRx5EBnQUAq8bVtb7LIcNdltwZxMBJZD4ZxtBISN3/KMPvD2NSstdktXC vg87v63q4VxOibjpwakzV+bs4Jj6ciWrhTKHA4ApzOtzgq4hF+ajIFjjOH3d+dMukg+z DEnokZ+hfXcjvzwEPmWcdAKWFXQVtu0fDhvbtmk373jA/2FnmHDTxhyRDZi+OozVdyl1 t6SdBtGLgtkF90dqfgRHsckhyWETkt07OA4Eb8F+totVZ+8vwkinapRN2FAQ03/BfN86 L6Jg== X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora/lbK40nDBY/YXdV2XaT05N6Ys3x5yn4rtrS1nAJczPBHKinbDh tF0MebMrig0wXoMge0ao1Ns= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:48:b0:43a:caa8:756b with SMTP id f8-20020a056402004800b0043acaa8756bmr16407609edu.112.1658816138021; Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:15:38 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:2b68:36a:5a94:4ba1]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id l23-20020a056402345700b0043ba7df7a42sm8133067edc.26.2022.07.25.23.15.36 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 25 Jul 2022 23:15:37 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 00/26] tcp: Initial support for RFC5925 auth option Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2022 09:15:02 +0300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,FREEMAIL_FROM, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This is similar to TCP-MD5 in functionality but it's sufficiently different that packet formats and interfaces are incompatible. Compared to TCP-MD5 more algorithms are supported and multiple keys can be used on the same connection but there is still no negotiation mechanism. Expected use-case is protecting long-duration BGP/LDP connections between routers using pre-shared keys. The goal of this series is to allow routers using the Linux TCP stack to interoperate with vendors such as Cisco and Juniper. The current code is largely feature complete and well-tested and changes are relatively small compared to previous version. I should have reposted this series earlier but was distracted by other things. I'd welcome any advice for how to push this upstream. Only up to patch 13 is required for a minimal implementation, the rest are additional features and tests. Maybe I could try posting reduced versions? I've recently been talking with Phillip Paeps who is working on an BSD implementation of the same standard and he suggested sharing ABI in order to make userspace compatibility easier. The current ABI is entirely made up by me alone. One option would be to use PF_KEY because in FreeBSD PF_KEY is also used for MD5, in a somewhat convoluted way. I'm not very familiar with PF_KEY but perhaps a shim could be implemented inside linux PF_KEY support to make some keys be handled in an entirely different way, using tcp_authopt instead of xfrm. Does this make sense to anyone else? A key difference versus MD5 is that keys are global rather than per-socket. Older versions had per-socket keys but in practice applications want to always use a consistent set of keys for communication with a specific peer and keeping those keys in sync from userspace is difficult and prone to races. Other vendors supporting TCP-AO implement a notion of a "key chain" roughly similar to what is described in RFC8177. The current ABI is sufficient to do the same but it requires a bunch of userspace work to add and delete keys at the appropriate time or mark them as "NOSEND" and "NORECV". Userspace also has to insert a "dummy" key when all other keys are expired in order to prevent unsigned traffic going through. This feature might be considerably easier to use from userspace if validity times were added in the kernel for each key. Here are some known flaws and limitations: * Crypto API is used with buffers on the stack and inside struct sock, this might not work on all arches. I'm currently only testing x64 VMs * Interaction with FASTOPEN not tested and unlikely to work because sequence number assumptions for syn/ack. * No way to limit keys on a per-port basis (used to be implicit with per-socket keys). * Not clear if crypto_ahash_setkey might sleep. If some implementation do that then maybe they could be excluded through alloc flags. * Traffic key is not cached (reducing performance) * No caching or hashing for key lookups so this will scale poorly with many keys * Overlaping MKTs can be configured despite what RFC5925 says * Current key can be deleted. RFC says this shouldn't be allowed but enforcing this belongs at an admin shell rather than in the kernel. * If multiple keys are valid for a destination the kernel picks one in an unpredictable manner (this can be overridden). There is relatively little code sharing with the TCP_MD5SIG feature and earlier versions shared even less. Unlike MD5 the AO feature is kept separate from the rest of the TCP code and reusing code would require many unrelated cleanup changes. I'm not convinced that "authopt" is particularly good naming convention, this name is a personal invention that does not appear anywhere else. The RFC calls this "tcp-ao". Perhaps TCP_AOSIG would be a better name and it would also make the close connection to TCP_MD5SIG more visible? Some testing support is included in nettest and fcnal-test.sh, similar to the current level of tcp-md5 testing. A more elaborate test suite using pytest and scapy is available out of tree: https://github.com/cdleonard/tcp-authopt-test There is an automatic system that runs that test suite in vagrant in gitlab-ci: https://gitlab.com/cdleonard/vagrantcpao Changes for frr (obsolete): https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/pull/9442 That PR was made early for ABI feedback, it has many issues. Changes for yabgp (obsolete): https://github.com/cdleonard/yabgp/commits/tcp_authopt This was used for interoperability testing with cisco. Changes since PATCH v5: * Rebased on recent net-next, including recent changes refactoring md5 * Use to skb_drop_reason * Fix using sock_kmalloc for key alloc but regular kfree for free. Use kmalloc because keys are global * Fix mentioning non-existent copy_from_sockopt in doc for _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant * If no valid keys are available for a destination then report a socket error instead of sending unsigned traffic * Remove several noop implementations which are always called from ifdef * Fix build issues in all scenarios, including -Werror at every point. * Split "tcp: Refactor tcp_inbound_md5_hash into tcp_inbound_sig_hash" into a separate commit. * Add TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_ACTIVE to distinguish between "keys configured for socket" and "connection authenticated". A listen socket with authentication enabled will return other sockets with authentication enabled on accept() but if no key is configured for the peer then authentication will be inactive. * Add support for TCP_REPAIR_AUTHOPT new sockopts which loads/saves the AO-specific information. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/cover.1643026076.git.cdleonard@gmail.com/ Changes since PATCH v4: * Move the traffic_key context_bytes header to stack. If it's a constant string then ahash can fail unexpectedly. * Fix allowing unsigned traffic if all keys are marked norecv. * Fix crashing in __tcp_authopt_alg_init on failure. * Try to respect the rnextkeyid from SYN on SYNACK (new patch) * Fix incorrect check for TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL in __tcp_authopt_select_key * Improve docs on __tcp_authopt_select_key * Fix build with CONFIG_PROC_FS=n (kernel build robot) * Fix build with CONFIG_IPV6=n (kernel build robot) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/cover.1640273966.git.cdleonard@gmail.com/ Changes since PATCH v3: * Made keys global (per-netns rather than per-sock). * Add /proc/net/tcp_authopt with a table of keys (not sockets). * Fix part of the shash/ahash conversion having slipped from patch 3 to patch 5 * Fix tcp_parse_sig_options assigning NULL incorrectly when both MD5 and AO are disabled (kernel build robot) * Fix sparse endianness warnings in prefix match (kernel build robot) * Fix several incorrect RCU annotations reported by sparse (kernel build robot) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/cover.1638962992.git.cdleonard@gmail.com/ Changes since PATCH v2: * Protect tcp_authopt_alg_get/put_tfm with local_bh_disable instead of preempt_disable. This caused signature corruption when send path executing with BH enabled was interrupted by recv. * Fix accepted keyids not configured locally as "unexpected". If any key is configured that matches the peer then traffic MUST be signed. * Fix issues related to sne rollover during handshake itself. (Francesco) * Implement and test prefixlen (David) * Replace shash with ahash and reuse some of the MD5 code (Dmitry) * Parse md5+ao options only once in the same function (Dmitry) * Pass tcp_authopt_info into inbound check path, this avoids second rcu dereference for same packet. * Pass tcp_request_socket into inbound check path instead of just listen socket. This is required for SNE rollover during handshake and clearifies ISN handling. * Do not allow disabling via sysctl after enabling once, this is difficult to support well (David) * Verbose check for sysctl_tcp_authopt (Dmitry) * Use netif_index_is_l3_master (David) * Cleanup ipvx_addr_match (David) * Add a #define tcp_authopt_needed to wrap static key usage because it looks nicer. * Replace rcu_read_lock with rcu_dereference_protected in SNE updates (Eric) * Remove test suite Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/cover.1635784253.git.cdleonard@gmail.com/ Changes since PATCH v1: * Implement Sequence Number Extension * Implement l3index for vrf: TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX as equivalent of TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_IFINDEX * Expand TCP-AO tests in fcnal-test.sh to near-parity with md5. * Show addr/port on failure similar to md5 * Remove tox dependency from test suite (create venv directly) * Switch default pytest output format to TAP (kselftest standard) * Fix _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant stack corruption on short sockopts. This was covered in test but error was invisible without STACKPROTECTOR=y * Fix sysctl_tcp_authopt check in tcp_get_authopt_val before memset. This was harmless because error code is checked in getsockopt anyway. * Fix dropping md5 packets on all sockets with AO enabled * Fix checking (key->recv_id & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) instead of key->flags in tcp_authopt_key_match_exact * Fix PATCH 1/19 not compiling due to missing "int err" declaration * Add ratelimited message for AO and MD5 both present * Export all symbols required by CONFIG_IPV6=m (again) * Fix compilation with CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT=y CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG=n * Fix checkpatch issues * Pass -rrequirements.txt to tox to avoid dependency variation. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/cover.1632240523.git.cdleonard@gmail.com/ Changes since RFCv3: * Implement TCP_AUTHOPT handling for timewait and reset replies. Write tests to execute these paths by injecting packets with scapy * Handle combining md5 and authopt: if both are configured use authopt. * Fix locking issues around send_key, introduced in on of the later patches. * Handle IPv4-mapped-IPv6 addresses: it used to be that an ipv4 SYN sent to an ipv6 socket with TCP-AO triggered WARN * Implement un-namespaced sysctl disabled this feature by default * Allocate new key before removing any old one in setsockopt (Dmitry) * Remove tcp_authopt_key_info.local_id because it's no longer used (Dmitry) * Propagate errors from TCP_AUTHOPT getsockopt (Dmitry) * Fix no-longer-correct TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL docs (Dmitry) * Simplify crypto allocation (Eric) * Use kzmalloc instead of __GFP_ZERO (Eric) * Add static_key_false tcp_authopt_needed (Eric) * Clear authopt_info copied from oldsk in __tcp_authopt_openreq (Eric) * Replace memcmp in ipv4 and ipv6 addr comparisons (Eric) * Export symbols for CONFIG_IPV6=m (kernel test robot) * Mark more functions static (kernel test robot) * Fix build with CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST=y (kernel test robot) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/cover.1629840814.git.cdleonard@gmail.com/ Changes since RFCv2: * Removed local_id from ABI and match on send_id/recv_id/addr * Add all relevant out-of-tree tests to tools/testing/selftests * Return an error instead of ignoring unknown flags, hopefully this makes it easier to extend. * Check sk_family before __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create in tcp_set_authopt_key * Use sock_owned_by_me instead of WARN_ON(!lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)) * Fix some intermediate build failures reported by kbuild robot * Improve documentation Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/cover.1628544649.git.cdleonard@gmail.com/ Changes since RFC: * Split into per-topic commits for ease of review. The intermediate commits compile with a few "unused function" warnings and don't do anything useful by themselves. * Add ABI documention including kernel-doc on uapi * Fix lockdep warnings from crypto by creating pools with one shash for each cpu * Accept short options to setsockopt by padding with zeros; this approach allows increasing the size of the structs in the future. * Support for aes-128-cmac-96 * Support for binding addresses to keys in a way similar to old tcp_md5 * Add support for retrieving received keyid/rnextkeyid and controling the keyid/rnextkeyid being sent. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/01383a8751e97ef826ef2adf93bfde3a08195a43.1626693859.git.cdleonard@gmail.com/ Leonard Crestez (26): tcp: authopt: Initial support and key management tcp: authopt: Remove more unused noops docs: Add user documentation for tcp_authopt tcp: authopt: Add crypto initialization tcp: Refactor tcp_sig_hash_skb_data for AO tcp: authopt: Compute packet signatures tcp: Refactor tcp_inbound_md5_hash into tcp_inbound_sig_hash tcp: authopt: Hook into tcp core tcp: authopt: Disable via sysctl by default tcp: authopt: Implement Sequence Number Extension tcp: ipv6: Add AO signing for tcp_v6_send_response tcp: authopt: Add support for signing skb-less replies tcp: ipv4: Add AO signing for skb-less replies tcp: authopt: Add key selection controls tcp: authopt: Add initial l3index support tcp: authopt: Add NOSEND/NORECV flags tcp: authopt: Add prefixlen support tcp: authopt: Add /proc/net/tcp_authopt listing all keys selftests: nettest: Rename md5_prefix to key_addr_prefix selftests: nettest: Initial tcp_authopt support selftests: net/fcnal: Initial tcp_authopt support tcp: authopt: Try to respect rnextkeyid from SYN on SYNACK tcp: authopt: tcp_authopt_lookup_send: Add anykey output param tcp: authopt: Initial support for TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_ACTIVE tcp: authopt: If no keys are valid for send report an error tcp: authopt: Initial implementation of TCP_REPAIR_AUTHOPT Documentation/networking/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst | 6 + Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 88 + include/linux/tcp.h | 15 + include/net/dropreason.h | 16 + include/net/net_namespace.h | 4 + include/net/netns/tcp_authopt.h | 12 + include/net/tcp.h | 55 +- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 264 +++ include/uapi/linux/snmp.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 165 ++ net/ipv4/Kconfig | 14 + net/ipv4/Makefile | 1 + net/ipv4/proc.c | 1 + net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 39 + net/ipv4/tcp.c | 126 +- net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 1952 +++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 53 +- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 100 +- net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 12 + net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 106 +- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 70 +- tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh | 329 +++- tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c | 204 ++- 24 files changed, 3546 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst create mode 100644 include/net/netns/tcp_authopt.h create mode 100644 include/net/tcp_authopt.h create mode 100644 net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c -- 2.25.1