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Message-ID: <9645e3f7-a569-b72a-2516-d75959040336@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Fri, 26 Aug 2022 11:13:41 -0400
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: asymmetric: Fix ECDSA use via keyctl uapi
Content-Language: en-US
To:     Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc:     keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
References: <20220826145119.9375-1-denkenz@gmail.com>
From:   Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
In-Reply-To: <20220826145119.9375-1-denkenz@gmail.com>
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On 8/26/22 10:51, Denis Kenzior wrote:
> When support for ECDSA keys was added, constraints for data & signature
> sizes were never updated.  This makes it impossible to use such keys via
> keyctl API from userspace.
> 
> Update constraint on max_data_size to 64 bytes in order to support
> SHA512-based signatures. Also update the signature length constraints
> per ECDSA signature encoding described in RFC 5480.
> 
> Fixes: 299f561a6693 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys")
> Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>

Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> 
> Version History:
> 
>    v2: Update patch description according to Jarkko's comments.  No
>    functional code changes.
> 
>   crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
>   1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> index 2f8352e88860..eca5671ad3f2 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> @@ -186,8 +186,28 @@ static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
>   
>   	len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
>   	info->key_size = len * 8;
> -	info->max_data_size = len;
> -	info->max_sig_size = len;
> +
> +	if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) {
> +		/*
> +		 * ECDSA key sizes are much smaller than RSA, and thus could
> +		 * operate on (hashed) inputs that are larger than key size.
> +		 * For example SHA384-hashed input used with secp256r1
> +		 * based keys.  Set max_data_size to be at least as large as
> +		 * the largest supported hash size (SHA512)
> +		 */
> +		info->max_data_size = 64;
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * Verify takes ECDSA-Sig (described in RFC 5480) as input,
> +		 * which is actually 2 'key_size'-bit integers encoded in
> +		 * ASN.1.  Account for the ASN.1 encoding overhead here.
> +		 */
> +		info->max_sig_size = 2 * (len + 3) + 2;
> +	} else {
> +		info->max_data_size = len;
> +		info->max_sig_size = len;
> +	}
> +
>   	info->max_enc_size = len;
>   	info->max_dec_size = len;
>   	info->supported_ops = (KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT |