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Date:   Wed, 14 Sep 2022 16:15:28 +0000
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To:     Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Cc:     Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>, x86 <x86@kernel.org>,
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        Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy 
        <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>, jarkko@profian.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 v5 39/45] KVM: SVM: Introduce ops for the post gfn
 map and unmap
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On Wed, Sep 14, 2022, Marc Orr wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 14, 2022 at 9:05 AM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Sep 08, 2022, Michael Roth wrote:
> > > On Fri, Oct 15, 2021 at 05:16:28PM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > So in the context of this interim solution, we're trying to look for a
> > > solution that's simple enough that it can be used reliably, without
> > > introducing too much additional complexity into KVM. There is one
> > > approach that seems to fit that bill, that Brijesh attempted in an
> > > earlier version of this series (I'm not sure what exactly was the
> > > catalyst to changing the approach, as I wasn't really in the loop at
> > > the time, but AIUI there weren't any showstoppers there, but please
> > > correct me if I'm missing anything):
> > >
> > >  - if the host is writing to a page that it thinks is supposed to be
> > >    shared, and the guest switches it to private, we get an RMP fault
> > >    (actually, we will get a !PRESENT fault, since as of v5 we now
> > >    remove the mapping from the directmap as part of conversion)
> > >  - in the host #PF handler, if we see that the page is marked private
> > >    in the RMP table, simply switch it back to shared
> > >  - if this was a bug on the part of the host, then the guest will see
> >
> > As discussed off-list, attempting to fix up RMP violations in the host #PF handler
> > is not a viable approach.  There was also extensive discussion on-list a while back:
> >
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/8a244d34-2b10-4cf8-894a-1bf12b59cf92@www.fastmail.com
> 
> I mentioned this during Mike's talk at the micro-conference: For pages
> mapped in by the kernel can we disallow them to be converted to
> private?

In theory, yes.  Do we want to do something like this?  No.  kmap() does something
vaguely similar for 32-bit PAE/PSE kernels, but that's a lot of complexity and
overhead to take on.  And this issue goes far beyond a kmap(); when the kernel gup()s
a page, the kernel expects the pfn to be available, no exceptions (pun intended).

> Note, userspace accesses are already handled by UPM.

I'm confused by the UPM comment.  Isn't the gist of this thread about the ability
to merge SNP _without_ UPM?  Or am I out in left field?

> In pseudo-code, I'm thinking something like this:
> 
> kmap_helper() {
>   // And all other interfaces where the kernel can map a GPA
>   // into the kernel page tables
>   mapped_into_kernel_mem_set[hpa] = true;
> }
> 
> kunmap_helper() {
>   // And all other interfaces where the kernel can unmap a GPA
>   // into the kernel page tables
>   mapped_into_kernel_mem_set[hpa] = false;
> 
>   // Except it's not this simple because we probably need ref counting
>   // for multiple mappings. Sigh. But you get the idea.

A few issues off the top of my head:

  - It's not just refcounting, there would also likely need to be locking to
    guarantee sane behavior.
  - kmap() isn't allowed to fail and RMPUPDATE isn't strictly guaranteed to succeed,
    which is problematic if the kernel attempts to kmap() a page that's already
    private, especially for kmap_atomic(), which isn't allowed to sleep.
  - Not all kernel code is well behaved and bounces through kmap(); undoubtedly
    some of the 1200+ users of page_address() will be problematic.
    
    $ git grep page_address | wc -l
    1267
  - It's not sufficient for TDX.  Merging something this complicated when we know
    we still need UPM would be irresponsible from a maintenance perspective.
  - KVM would need to support two separate APIs for SNP, which I very much don't
    want to do.