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Date:   Fri, 21 Oct 2022 16:12:15 -0500
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Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 v6 42/49] KVM: SVM: Provide support for
 SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
Content-Language: en-US
To:     Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, x86@kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org,
        linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de,
        hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
        seanjc@google.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com,
        luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com,
        pgonda@google.com, peterz@infradead.org,
        srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com, rientjes@google.com,
        dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com, bp@alien8.de,
        michael.roth@amd.com, vbabka@suse.cz, kirill@shutemov.name,
        ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com, marcorr@google.com,
        sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, alpergun@google.com,
        dgilbert@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org
References: <cover.1655761627.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
 <5d05799fc61994684aa2b2ddb8c5b326a3279e25.1655761627.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
 <27a90573-53cd-846a-e09f-c22c649db60a@amd.com>
From:   "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
In-Reply-To: <27a90573-53cd-846a-e09f-c22c649db60a@amd.com>
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Hello Tom,

On 10/21/2022 2:06 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 6/20/22 18:13, Ashish Kalra wrote:
>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>>
>> Version 2 of GHCB specification added the support for two SNP Guest
>> Request Message NAE events. The events allows for an SEV-SNP guest to
>> make request to the SEV-SNP firmware through hypervisor using the
>> SNP_GUEST_REQUEST API define in the SEV-SNP firmware specification.
>>
>> The SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST is similar to SNP_GUEST_REQUEST with the
>> difference of an additional certificate blob that can be passed through
>> the SNP_SET_CONFIG ioctl defined in the CCP driver. The CCP driver
>> provides snp_guest_ext_guest_request() that is used by the KVM to get
>> both the report and certificate data at once.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 196 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |   2 +
>>   2 files changed, 192 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> index 7fc0fad87054..089af21a4efe 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> 
>> +static void snp_handle_ext_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm, gpa_t 
>> req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
>> +{
>> +    struct sev_data_snp_guest_request req = {0};
>> +    struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
>> +    struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>> +    unsigned long data_npages;
>> +    struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
>> +    unsigned long rc, err;
>> +    u64 data_gpa;
>> +
>> +    if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
>> +        rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST;
>> +        goto e_fail;
>> +    }
>> +
>> +    sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>> +
>> +    data_gpa = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
>> +    data_npages = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
>> +
>> +    if (!IS_ALIGNED(data_gpa, PAGE_SIZE)) {
>> +        rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>> +        goto e_fail;
>> +    }
>> +
>> +    /* Verify that requested blob will fit in certificate buffer */
>> +    if ((data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT) > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) {
> 
> Not sure this is a valid check...  Isn't it OK if the guest has supplied 
> more room than is required? If the guest supplies 8 pages and the 
> hypervisor only needs to copy 1 page of data (or the 
> SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE number of pages) that shouldn't be an error. I 
> think this check can go, right?
> 

Agreed.

The check should probably be
  if ((data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT) < SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)

and that check already exists in:

snp_guest_ext_guest_request(...)
{
...
...
    /*
          * Check if there is enough space to copy the certificate 
chain. Otherwise
          * return ERROR code defined in the GHCB specification.
          */
         expected_npages = sev->snp_certs_len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
         if (*npages < expected_npages) {
                 *npages = expected_npages;
                 *fw_err = SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN;
                 return -EINVAL;
         }
...

Thanks,
Ashish

> Thanks,
> Tom
> 
>> +        rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM;
>> +        goto e_fail;
>> +    }
>> +
>> +    mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>> +
>> +    rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &req, req_gpa, resp_gpa);
>> +    if (rc)
>> +        goto unlock;
>> +
>> +    rc = snp_guest_ext_guest_request(&req, (unsigned 
>> long)sev->snp_certs_data,
>> +                     &data_npages, &err);
>> +    if (rc) {
>> +        /*
>> +         * If buffer length is small then return the expected
>> +         * length in rbx.
>> +         */
>> +        if (err == SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN)
>> +            vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX] = data_npages;
>> +
>> +        /* pass the firmware error code */
>> +        rc = err;
>> +        goto cleanup;
>> +    }
>> +
>> +    /* Copy the certificate blob in the guest memory */
>> +    if (data_npages &&
>> +        kvm_write_guest(kvm, data_gpa, sev->snp_certs_data, 
>> data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT))
>> +        rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>> +
>> +cleanup:
>> +    snp_cleanup_guest_buf(&req, &rc);
>> +
>> +unlock:
>> +    mutex_unlock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>> +
>> +e_fail:
>> +    svm_set_ghcb_sw_exit_info_2(vcpu, rc);
>> +}
>> +