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Miller" , Vladis Dronov , Stephan Mueller , "linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] crypto: xts - restrict key lengths to approved values in FIPS mode References: <20221108142025.13461-1-nstange@suse.de> <20221108142025.13461-2-nstange@suse.de> Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2022 11:06:17 +0100 In-Reply-To: (Robert Elliott's message of "Tue, 8 Nov 2022 20:34:10 +0000") Message-ID: <8735asfnmu.fsf@suse.de> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/28.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.4 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org "Elliott, Robert (Servers)" writes: >> diff --git a/include/crypto/xts.h b/include/crypto/xts.h > ... >> @@ -35,6 +35,13 @@ static inline int xts_verify_key(struct crypto_skciph= er >> *tfm, >> if (keylen % 2) >> return -EINVAL; >>=20 >> + /* >> + * In FIPS mode only a combined key length of either 256 or >> + * 512 bits is allowed, c.f. FIPS 140-3 IG C.I. >> + */ >> + if (fips_enabled && keylen !=3D 32 && keylen !=3D 64) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + >> /* ensure that the AES and tweak key are not identical */ >> if ((fips_enabled || (crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) & >> CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS)) && >> -- >> 2.38.0 > > There's another function in the same file called xts_check_key()=20 > that is used by some of the hardware drivers: Right, thanks for spotting. AFAICT, xts_check_key() is the older of the two variants, xts_verify_key() had been introduced with commit f1c131b45410 ("crypto: xts - Convert to skcipher"). There had initially only been a single call from generic crypto/xts.c and the main difference to xts_check_key() had been that it took a crypto_skcipher for its tfm argument rather than a plain crypto_tfm as xts_check_key() did. It seems that over time, xts crypto drivers adopted the newer xts_verify_key() variant then. > > arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c: * xts_check_key verifies the key length = is not odd and makes > [that references it in the comment but actually calls xts_verify_key in = the code] > drivers/crypto/axis/artpec6_crypto.c: ret =3D xts_check_key(&cipher->ba= se, key, keylen); > drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_algs.c: err =3D xts_check_key(tfm, key, k= eylen); > drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_skcipher.c: ret =3D xts_check_key(tfm= , key, keylen); > drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c: xts_check_key(tfm, key, keyle= n)) { > drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_algs.c: ret =3D xts_check= _key(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), key, keylen); > drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx2/otx2_cptvf_algs.c: ret =3D xts_check= _key(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), key, keylen); > drivers/crypto/atmel-aes.c: err =3D xts_check_key(crypto_skcipher_tfm= (tfm), key, keylen); > > It already has one check qualified by fips_enabled: > > /* ensure that the AES and tweak key are not identical */ > if (fips_enabled && !crypto_memneq(key, key + (keylen / 2), keyle= n / 2)) > return -EINVAL; > > Should that implement the same key length restrictions? From a quick glance, all of the above drivers merely convert some crypto_skcipher to a crypto_tfm before passing it to xts_check_key(). So I think these should all be made to call xts_verify_key() directly instead, the former xts_check_key() could then get dropped. But that's more of a cleanup IMO and would probably deserve a separate patch series on its own. Thanks! Nicolai --=20 SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Frankenstra=C3=9Fe 146, 90461 N=C3=BC= rnberg, Germany GF: Ivo Totev, Andrew Myers, Andrew McDonald, Boudien Moerman (HRB 36809, AG N=C3=BCrnberg)