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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id b4-20020a056a00114400b00577c17000dasi19125321pfm.166.2023.01.12.13.05.36; Thu, 12 Jan 2023 13:06:21 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@google.com header.s=20210112 header.b=ObYOd2UT; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=google.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235195AbjALVE6 (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 12 Jan 2023 16:04:58 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41612 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S240855AbjALVDU (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Jan 2023 16:03:20 -0500 Received: from mail-io1-xd33.google.com (mail-io1-xd33.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::d33]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 695DB3D5F3 for ; Thu, 12 Jan 2023 12:47:33 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-io1-xd33.google.com with SMTP id r71so673031iod.2 for ; Thu, 12 Jan 2023 12:47:33 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20210112; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=Y33TCnC4aTVsOPz+eKs6ANS+v42Ifz3XrQ+jwhHqUTI=; b=ObYOd2UTQhbRFEokIARxDLMWIZ/pno5W+IFLwElvD2F6//NiJJoEpB18gOEPMVZNF2 S95GWvK80yfBIIrvAcKrUJLPCmVFsFbymPwzQxMhXeY8/XflVzhYSqOFCD/bl+MQBhXF dv5CELBCQytLVbNtDkxivMNgdwcZGNpIiQwWqfdq7svmRjM03vxVLuRYt+/gZGm21dA2 w8Xj3ZRntXkS7N9z83dzx9a5W1CNlosOWm3ckTaJLwfT85HwXa4xod5+TxMqzXjT5p/5 vfJfVzS/FaLpK/iehVsVhdsNhAc5IQdCbUPkvGBjalKJp4tpoqR9NYP2JuflaVSWvOJ6 de1A== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=Y33TCnC4aTVsOPz+eKs6ANS+v42Ifz3XrQ+jwhHqUTI=; b=pATi4jl1KRogTwRGtdlcOeDQac8N54sJtUTVPw+W5ZzjOT2T89DSm5j4NmnOgipAJQ QEoDpYTiS6VRn0OC6bvxCxmKiAiY87dlls9L96rCR1vv1csteaN9wO1/xlHzvsqzYTuw vRkMeEG8mBY3iUZsqbLleqnK3KwtjED/sXpWtpASOuCP3N+TrND5conudOqqSOqn0cDN qJX/Y2QjvxLBJJ5TvodJYfe7OO29ldISY+9YpXXYHS941KWAHBHhrG8FwXx8sot0uTow doqq2i0fvN71sxRZFerU9c6GxTSlAd0kHWBH4uF6kkoJNdpd8UP3N8vxva1Jh5Xtm7DX 5tgw== X-Gm-Message-State: AFqh2ko2q8dpwxOqxJYw4onhISPKxYqCaMJKDws+CGUfgWophPrN0gS8 1h/OAgQR8DXZsskh1oOcdqvzipKt+7zEUb5obhvMLg== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6638:388:b0:38a:89cc:20bc with SMTP id y8-20020a056638038800b0038a89cc20bcmr8097617jap.249.1673556452457; Thu, 12 Jan 2023 12:47:32 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20221214194056.161492-1-michael.roth@amd.com> <20221214194056.161492-30-michael.roth@amd.com> In-Reply-To: <20221214194056.161492-30-michael.roth@amd.com> From: Alper Gun Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2023 12:47:21 -0800 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v7 29/64] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command when SNP is enabled To: Michael Roth Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, jmattson@google.com, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com, pgonda@google.com, peterz@infradead.org, srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com, rientjes@google.com, dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com, bp@alien8.de, vbabka@suse.cz, kirill@shutemov.name, ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com, marcorr@google.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, ashish.kalra@amd.com, harald@profian.com, Brijesh Singh Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_MED, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF, ENV_AND_HDR_SPF_MATCH,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL,USER_IN_DEF_SPF_WL autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 11:54 AM Michael Roth wrote: > > From: Brijesh Singh > > The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the SNP firmware > is in the INIT state. When SNP is in INIT state, all the SEV-legacy > commands that cause the firmware to write to memory must be in the > firmware state before issuing the command.. > > A command buffer may contains a system physical address that the firmware > may write to. There are two cases that need to be handled: > > 1) system physical address points to a guest memory > 2) system physical address points to a host memory > > To handle the case #1, change the page state to the firmware in the RMP > table before issuing the command and restore the state to shared after the > command completes. > > For the case #2, use a bounce buffer to complete the request. > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth > --- > drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 370 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h | 12 ++ > 2 files changed, 372 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c > index 4c12e98a1219..5eb2e8f364d4 100644 > --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c > +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c > @@ -286,6 +286,30 @@ static int rmp_mark_pages_firmware(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, boo > return rc; > } > > +static int rmp_mark_pages_shared(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) > +{ > + /* Cbit maybe set in the paddr */ > + unsigned long pfn = __sme_clr(paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > + int rc, n = 0, i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < npages; i++, pfn++, n++) { > + rc = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K); > + if (rc) > + goto cleanup; > + } > + > + return 0; > + > +cleanup: > + /* > + * If failed to change the page state to shared, then its not safe > + * to release the page back to the system, leak it. > + */ > + snp_mark_pages_offline(pfn, npages - n); > + > + return rc; > +} > + > static struct page *__snp_alloc_firmware_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, bool locked) > { > unsigned long npages = 1ul << order, paddr; > @@ -487,12 +511,295 @@ static int sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(int cmd_id) > return sev_write_init_ex_file(); > } > > +static int alloc_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev) > +{ > + struct page *page; > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) { > + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i]; > + > + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map)); > + > + page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)); > + if (!page) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + map->host = page_address(page); > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static void free_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) { > + struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i]; > + > + if (map->host) { > + __free_pages(virt_to_page(map->host), get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)); > + memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map)); > + } > + } > +} > + > +static int map_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map) > +{ > + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > + > + map->active = false; > + > + if (!paddr || !len) > + return 0; > + > + map->paddr = *paddr; > + map->len = len; > + > + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then change the page state to firmwware. */ > + if (guest) { > + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(*paddr, npages, true)) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + goto done; > + } > + > + if (!map->host) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + /* Check if the pre-allocated buffer can be used to fullfil the request. */ > + if (len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Transition the pre-allocated buffer to the firmware state. */ > + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(map->host), npages, true)) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + /* Set the paddr to use pre-allocated firmware buffer */ > + *paddr = __psp_pa(map->host); > + > +done: > + map->active = true; > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int unmap_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map) > +{ > + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > + > + if (!map->active) > + return 0; > + > + /* If paddr points to a guest memory then restore the page state to hypervisor. */ > + if (guest) { > + if (snp_reclaim_pages(*paddr, npages, true)) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + goto done; > + } > + > + /* > + * Transition the pre-allocated buffer to hypervisor state before the access. > + * > + * This is because while changing the page state to firmware, the kernel unmaps > + * the pages from the direct map, and to restore the direct map the pages must > + * be transitioned back to the shared state. > + */ > + if (snp_reclaim_pages(__pa(map->host), npages, true)) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + /* Copy the response data firmware buffer to the callers buffer. */ > + memcpy(__va(__sme_clr(map->paddr)), map->host, min_t(size_t, len, map->len)); > + *paddr = map->paddr; > + > +done: > + map->active = false; > + return 0; > +} > + > +static bool sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(int cmd) > +{ > + switch (cmd) { > + case SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS: > + case SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS: > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START: > + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START: > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: > + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: > + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: > + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: > + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: > + return true; > + default: > + return false; > + } > +} > + > +#define prep_buffer(name, addr, len, guest, map) \ > + func(&((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->addr, ((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->len, guest, map) > + > +static int __snp_cmd_buf_copy(int cmd, void *cmd_buf, bool to_fw, int fw_err) > +{ > + int (*func)(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map); > + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; > + bool from_fw = !to_fw; > + > + /* > + * After the command is completed, change the command buffer memory to > + * hypervisor state. > + * > + * The immutable bit is automatically cleared by the firmware, so > + * no not need to reclaim the page. > + */ > + if (from_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) { > + if (rmp_mark_pages_shared(__pa(cmd_buf), 1)) > + return -EFAULT; If we return here, we will skip calling unmap_firmware_writeable and we will leak some pages in firmware state. > + > + /* No need to go further if firmware failed to execute command. */ > + if (fw_err) > + return 0; > + } > + > + if (to_fw) > + func = map_firmware_writeable; > + else > + func = unmap_firmware_writeable; > + > + /* > + * A command buffer may contains a system physical address. If the address > + * points to a host memory then use an intermediate firmware page otherwise > + * change the page state in the RMP table. > + */ > + switch (cmd) { > + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, pdh_cert_address, > + pdh_cert_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, cert_chain_address, > + cert_chain_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_GET_ID: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_get_id, address, len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pek_csr, address, len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_data, address, len, > + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa, address, len, > + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_measure, address, len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_secret, guest_address, guest_len, > + true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, false, > + &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, true, > + &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_attestation_report, address, len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_start, session_address, > + session_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, hdr_address, hdr_len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, trans_address, > + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, hdr_address, hdr_len, > + false, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, trans_address, > + trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_data, guest_address, > + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA: > + if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa, guest_address, > + guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0])) > + goto err; > + break; > + default: > + break; > + } > + > + /* The command buffer need to be in the firmware state. */ > + if (to_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) { > + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(cmd_buf), 1, true)) > + return -EFAULT; This function moves two separate pages to firmware state. First calling map_firmware_writeable and second calling rmp_mark_pages_firmware for cmd_buf. In case rmp_mark_pages_firmware fails for cmd_buf, the page which has already moved to firmware state in map_firmware_writeable should be reclaimed. This is a problem especially if we leak a guest owned page in firmware state. Since this is used only by legacy SEV VMs, these leaked pages will never be reclaimed back when destroying these VMs. > > + } > + > + return 0; > + > +err: > + return -EINVAL; > +} > + > +static inline bool need_firmware_copy(int cmd) > +{ > + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; > + > + /* After SNP is INIT'ed, the behavior of legacy SEV command is changed. */ > + return ((cmd < SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT) && sev->snp_initialized) ? true : false; > +} > + > +static int snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(int cmd, void *data) > +{ > + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, true, 0); > +} > + > +static int snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(int cmd, void *data, int fw_err) > +{ > + return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, false, fw_err); > +} > + > static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) > { > struct psp_device *psp = psp_master; > struct sev_device *sev; > unsigned int phys_lsb, phys_msb; > unsigned int reg, ret = 0; > + void *cmd_buf; > int buf_len; > > if (!psp || !psp->sev_data) > @@ -512,12 +819,28 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) > * work for some memory, e.g. vmalloc'd addresses, and @data may not be > * physically contiguous. > */ > - if (data) > - memcpy(sev->cmd_buf, data, buf_len); > + if (data) { > + if (sev->cmd_buf_active > 2) > + return -EBUSY; > + > + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf_active ? sev->cmd_buf_backup : sev->cmd_buf; > + > + memcpy(cmd_buf, data, buf_len); > + sev->cmd_buf_active++; > + > + /* > + * The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the > + * SNP firmware is in the INIT state. > + */ > + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(cmd, sev->cmd_buf)) > + return -EFAULT; > + } else { > + cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf; > + } > > /* Get the physical address of the command buffer */ > - phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0; > - phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0; > + phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0; > + phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0; > > dev_dbg(sev->dev, "sev command id %#x buffer 0x%08x%08x timeout %us\n", > cmd, phys_msb, phys_lsb, psp_timeout); > @@ -560,15 +883,24 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret) > ret = sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(cmd); > } > > - print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data, > - buf_len, false); > - > /* > * Copy potential output from the PSP back to data. Do this even on > * failure in case the caller wants to glean something from the error. > */ > - if (data) > - memcpy(data, sev->cmd_buf, buf_len); > + if (data) { > + /* > + * Restore the page state after the command completes. > + */ > + if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && > + snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(cmd, cmd_buf, ret)) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + memcpy(data, cmd_buf, buf_len); > + sev->cmd_buf_active--; > + } > + > + print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data, > + buf_len, false); > > return ret; > } > @@ -1579,10 +1911,12 @@ int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp) > if (!sev) > goto e_err; > > - sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 0); > + sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 1); > if (!sev->cmd_buf) > goto e_sev; > > + sev->cmd_buf_backup = (uint8_t *)sev->cmd_buf + PAGE_SIZE; > + > psp->sev_data = sev; > > sev->dev = dev; > @@ -1648,6 +1982,12 @@ static void sev_firmware_shutdown(struct sev_device *sev) > snp_range_list = NULL; > } > > + /* > + * The host map need to clear the immutable bit so it must be free'd before the > + * SNP firmware shutdown. > + */ > + free_snp_host_map(sev); > + > sev_snp_shutdown(&error); > } > > @@ -1722,6 +2062,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) > dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP: failed to INIT error %#x\n", error); > } > } > + > + /* > + * Allocate the intermediate buffers used for the legacy command handling. > + */ > + if (alloc_snp_host_map(sev)) { > + dev_notice(sev->dev, "Failed to alloc host map (disabling legacy SEV)\n"); > + goto skip_legacy; > + } > } > > /* Obtain the TMR memory area for SEV-ES use */ > @@ -1739,12 +2087,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void) > dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV: failed to INIT error %#x, rc %d\n", > error, rc); > > +skip_legacy: > dev_info(sev->dev, "SEV%s API:%d.%d build:%d\n", sev->snp_initialized ? > "-SNP" : "", sev->api_major, sev->api_minor, sev->build); > > return; > > err: > + free_snp_host_map(sev); > psp_master->sev_data = NULL; > } > > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h > index 34767657beb5..19d79f9d4212 100644 > --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h > +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h > @@ -29,11 +29,20 @@ > #define SEV_CMDRESP_CMD_SHIFT 16 > #define SEV_CMDRESP_IOC BIT(0) > > +#define MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS 2 > + > struct sev_misc_dev { > struct kref refcount; > struct miscdevice misc; > }; > > +struct snp_host_map { > + u64 paddr; > + u32 len; > + void *host; > + bool active; > +}; > + > struct sev_device { > struct device *dev; > struct psp_device *psp; > @@ -52,8 +61,11 @@ struct sev_device { > u8 build; > > void *cmd_buf; > + void *cmd_buf_backup; > + int cmd_buf_active; > > bool snp_initialized; > + struct snp_host_map snp_host_map[MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS]; > }; > > int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp); > -- > 2.25.1 >