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References: <20221214194056.161492-1-michael.roth@amd.com> <20221214194056.161492-30-michael.roth@amd.com>
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In-Reply-To: <7f1a9568-a570-690e-4b74-22644a3e2094@amd.com>
From:   Alper Gun <alpergun@google.com>
Date:   Fri, 13 Jan 2023 14:42:54 -0800
Message-ID: <CABpDEu=7ePeDWO0j_QyL-qVn4EDteXAPteAz4N0_J=1COhLfLg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v7 29/64] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command
 when SNP is enabled
To:     "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc:     Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org,
        linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
        jroedel@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, hpa@zytor.com,
        ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com,
        vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, jmattson@google.com,
        luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com,
        pgonda@google.com, peterz@infradead.org,
        srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com, rientjes@google.com,
        dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com, bp@alien8.de,
        vbabka@suse.cz, kirill@shutemov.name, ak@linux.intel.com,
        tony.luck@intel.com, marcorr@google.com,
        sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, dgilbert@redhat.com,
        jarkko@kernel.org, harald@profian.com,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Precedence: bulk

On Fri, Jan 13, 2023 at 2:04 PM Kalra, Ashish <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote:
>
> Hello Alper,
>
> On 1/12/2023 2:47 PM, Alper Gun wrote:
> > On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 11:54 AM Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> >>
> >> The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the SNP firmware
> >> is in the INIT state. When SNP is in INIT state, all the SEV-legacy
> >> commands that cause the firmware to write to memory must be in the
> >> firmware state before issuing the command..
> >>
> >> A command buffer may contains a system physical address that the firmware
> >> may write to. There are two cases that need to be handled:
> >>
> >> 1) system physical address points to a guest memory
> >> 2) system physical address points to a host memory
> >>
> >> To handle the case #1, change the page state to the firmware in the RMP
> >> table before issuing the command and restore the state to shared after the
> >> command completes.
> >>
> >> For the case #2, use a bounce buffer to complete the request.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> >> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> >> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> >> ---
> >>   drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 370 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> >>   drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h |  12 ++
> >>   2 files changed, 372 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> >> index 4c12e98a1219..5eb2e8f364d4 100644
> >> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> >> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> >> @@ -286,6 +286,30 @@ static int rmp_mark_pages_firmware(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, boo
> >>          return rc;
> >>   }
> >>
> >> +static int rmp_mark_pages_shared(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages)
> >> +{
> >> +       /* Cbit maybe set in the paddr */
> >> +       unsigned long pfn = __sme_clr(paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> >> +       int rc, n = 0, i;
> >> +
> >> +       for (i = 0; i < npages; i++, pfn++, n++) {
> >> +               rc = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
> >> +               if (rc)
> >> +                       goto cleanup;
> >> +       }
> >> +
> >> +       return 0;
> >> +
> >> +cleanup:
> >> +       /*
> >> +        * If failed to change the page state to shared, then its not safe
> >> +        * to release the page back to the system, leak it.
> >> +        */
> >> +       snp_mark_pages_offline(pfn, npages - n);
> >> +
> >> +       return rc;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >>   static struct page *__snp_alloc_firmware_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, bool locked)
> >>   {
> >>          unsigned long npages = 1ul << order, paddr;
> >> @@ -487,12 +511,295 @@ static int sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(int cmd_id)
> >>          return sev_write_init_ex_file();
> >>   }
> >>
> >> +static int alloc_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev)
> >> +{
> >> +       struct page *page;
> >> +       int i;
> >> +
> >> +       for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) {
> >> +               struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i];
> >> +
> >> +               memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map));
> >> +
> >> +               page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE));
> >> +               if (!page)
> >> +                       return -ENOMEM;
> >> +
> >> +               map->host = page_address(page);
> >> +       }
> >> +
> >> +       return 0;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static void free_snp_host_map(struct sev_device *sev)
> >> +{
> >> +       int i;
> >> +
> >> +       for (i = 0; i < MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS; i++) {
> >> +               struct snp_host_map *map = &sev->snp_host_map[i];
> >> +
> >> +               if (map->host) {
> >> +                       __free_pages(virt_to_page(map->host), get_order(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE));
> >> +                       memset(map, 0, sizeof(*map));
> >> +               }
> >> +       }
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static int map_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map)
> >> +{
> >> +       unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> >> +
> >> +       map->active = false;
> >> +
> >> +       if (!paddr || !len)
> >> +               return 0;
> >> +
> >> +       map->paddr = *paddr;
> >> +       map->len = len;
> >> +
> >> +       /* If paddr points to a guest memory then change the page state to firmwware. */
> >> +       if (guest) {
> >> +               if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(*paddr, npages, true))
> >> +                       return -EFAULT;
> >> +
> >> +               goto done;
> >> +       }
> >> +
> >> +       if (!map->host)
> >> +               return -ENOMEM;
> >> +
> >> +       /* Check if the pre-allocated buffer can be used to fullfil the request. */
> >> +       if (len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
> >> +               return -EINVAL;
> >> +
> >> +       /* Transition the pre-allocated buffer to the firmware state. */
> >> +       if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(map->host), npages, true))
> >> +               return -EFAULT;
> >> +
> >> +       /* Set the paddr to use pre-allocated firmware buffer */
> >> +       *paddr = __psp_pa(map->host);
> >> +
> >> +done:
> >> +       map->active = true;
> >> +       return 0;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static int unmap_firmware_writeable(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map)
> >> +{
> >> +       unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> >> +
> >> +       if (!map->active)
> >> +               return 0;
> >> +
> >> +       /* If paddr points to a guest memory then restore the page state to hypervisor. */
> >> +       if (guest) {
> >> +               if (snp_reclaim_pages(*paddr, npages, true))
> >> +                       return -EFAULT;
> >> +
> >> +               goto done;
> >> +       }
> >> +
> >> +       /*
> >> +        * Transition the pre-allocated buffer to hypervisor state before the access.
> >> +        *
> >> +        * This is because while changing the page state to firmware, the kernel unmaps
> >> +        * the pages from the direct map, and to restore the direct map the pages must
> >> +        * be transitioned back to the shared state.
> >> +        */
> >> +       if (snp_reclaim_pages(__pa(map->host), npages, true))
> >> +               return -EFAULT;
> >> +
> >> +       /* Copy the response data firmware buffer to the callers buffer. */
> >> +       memcpy(__va(__sme_clr(map->paddr)), map->host, min_t(size_t, len, map->len));
> >> +       *paddr = map->paddr;
> >> +
> >> +done:
> >> +       map->active = false;
> >> +       return 0;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static bool sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(int cmd)
> >> +{
> >> +       switch (cmd) {
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS:
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS:
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START:
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START:
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_SEND_START:
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA:
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA:
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR:
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT:
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_GET_ID:
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT:
> >> +               return true;
> >> +       default:
> >> +               return false;
> >> +       }
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +#define prep_buffer(name, addr, len, guest, map) \
> >> +       func(&((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->addr, ((typeof(name *))cmd_buf)->len, guest, map)
> >> +
> >> +static int __snp_cmd_buf_copy(int cmd, void *cmd_buf, bool to_fw, int fw_err)
> >> +{
> >> +       int (*func)(u64 *paddr, u32 len, bool guest, struct snp_host_map *map);
> >> +       struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
> >> +       bool from_fw = !to_fw;
> >> +
> >> +       /*
> >> +        * After the command is completed, change the command buffer memory to
> >> +        * hypervisor state.
> >> +        *
> >> +        * The immutable bit is automatically cleared by the firmware, so
> >> +        * no not need to reclaim the page.
> >> +        */
> >> +       if (from_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) {
> >> +               if (rmp_mark_pages_shared(__pa(cmd_buf), 1))
> >> +                       return -EFAULT;
> >
> > If we return here, we will skip calling unmap_firmware_writeable and
> > we will leak some pages in firmware state.
>
> Do you mean those (guest) pages which were transitioned to firmware
> state as part of
> snp_aware_copy_to_firmware()->_snp_cmd_buf_copy()->map_firmware_writeable()?

yes, if we return here, these guest pages will be left in firmware state.
>
> >
> >> +
> >> +               /* No need to go further if firmware failed to execute command. */
> >> +               if (fw_err)
> >> +                       return 0;
Same thing also here, we are possibly leaving guest pages in the firmware state.

> >> +       }
> >> +
> >> +       if (to_fw)
> >> +               func = map_firmware_writeable;
> >> +       else
> >> +               func = unmap_firmware_writeable;
> >> +
> >> +       /*
> >> +        * A command buffer may contains a system physical address. If the address
> >> +        * points to a host memory then use an intermediate firmware page otherwise
> >> +        * change the page state in the RMP table.
> >> +        */
> >> +       switch (cmd) {
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT:
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, pdh_cert_address,
> >> +                               pdh_cert_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export, cert_chain_address,
> >> +                               cert_chain_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               break;
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_GET_ID:
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_get_id, address, len,
> >> +                               false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               break;
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR:
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_pek_csr, address, len,
> >> +                               false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               break;
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_data, address, len,
> >> +                               true, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               break;
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA:
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa, address, len,
> >> +                               true, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               break;
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_measure, address, len,
> >> +                               false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               break;
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET:
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_launch_secret, guest_address, guest_len,
> >> +                               true, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               break;
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT:
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, false,
> >> +                               &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               break;
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT:
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_dbg, dst_addr, len, true,
> >> +                               &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               break;
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT:
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_attestation_report, address, len,
> >> +                               false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               break;
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_SEND_START:
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_start, session_address,
> >> +                               session_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               break;
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA:
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, hdr_address, hdr_len,
> >> +                               false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_data, trans_address,
> >> +                               trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               break;
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA:
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, hdr_address, hdr_len,
> >> +                               false, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa, trans_address,
> >> +                               trans_len, false, &sev->snp_host_map[1]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               break;
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA:
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_data, guest_address,
> >> +                               guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               break;
> >> +       case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA:
> >> +               if (prep_buffer(struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa, guest_address,
> >> +                               guest_len, true, &sev->snp_host_map[0]))
> >> +                       goto err;
> >> +               break;
> >> +       default:
> >> +               break;
> >> +       }
> >> +
> >> +       /* The command buffer need to be in the firmware state. */
> >> +       if (to_fw && sev_legacy_cmd_buf_writable(cmd)) {
> >> +               if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(cmd_buf), 1, true))
> >> +                       return -EFAULT;
> >
> > This function moves two separate pages to firmware state. First
> > calling map_firmware_writeable and second calling
> > rmp_mark_pages_firmware for cmd_buf.
> > In case rmp_mark_pages_firmware fails for cmd_buf, the page which has
> > already moved to firmware state in map_firmware_writeable should be
> > reclaimed.
> > This is a problem especially if we leak a guest owned page in firmware
> > state. Since this is used only by legacy SEV VMs, these leaked pages
> > will never be reclaimed back when destroying these VMs.
> >
>
> Yes, this looks to be an inherent issue with the original patch, as you
> mentioned there are two pages - guest owned page and the HV cmd_buf, and
> failure to transition the cmd_buf back to HV/shared state has no
> corresponding recovery/reclaim for the transitioned guest page.
>
> Thanks,
> Ashish
>
> >>
> >> +       }
> >> +
> >> +       return 0;
> >> +
> >> +err:
> >> +       return -EINVAL;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static inline bool need_firmware_copy(int cmd)
> >> +{
> >> +       struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
> >> +
> >> +       /* After SNP is INIT'ed, the behavior of legacy SEV command is changed. */
> >> +       return ((cmd < SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT) && sev->snp_initialized) ? true : false;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static int snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(int cmd, void *data)
> >> +{
> >> +       return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, true, 0);
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static int snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(int cmd, void *data, int fw_err)
> >> +{
> >> +       return __snp_cmd_buf_copy(cmd, data, false, fw_err);
> >> +}
> >> +
> >>   static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
> >>   {
> >>          struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
> >>          struct sev_device *sev;
> >>          unsigned int phys_lsb, phys_msb;
> >>          unsigned int reg, ret = 0;
> >> +       void *cmd_buf;
> >>          int buf_len;
> >>
> >>          if (!psp || !psp->sev_data)
> >> @@ -512,12 +819,28 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
> >>           * work for some memory, e.g. vmalloc'd addresses, and @data may not be
> >>           * physically contiguous.
> >>           */
> >> -       if (data)
> >> -               memcpy(sev->cmd_buf, data, buf_len);
> >> +       if (data) {
> >> +               if (sev->cmd_buf_active > 2)
> >> +                       return -EBUSY;
> >> +
> >> +               cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf_active ? sev->cmd_buf_backup : sev->cmd_buf;
> >> +
> >> +               memcpy(cmd_buf, data, buf_len);
> >> +               sev->cmd_buf_active++;
> >> +
> >> +               /*
> >> +                * The behavior of the SEV-legacy commands is altered when the
> >> +                * SNP firmware is in the INIT state.
> >> +                */
> >> +               if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) && snp_aware_copy_to_firmware(cmd, sev->cmd_buf))
> >> +                       return -EFAULT;
> >> +       } else {
> >> +               cmd_buf = sev->cmd_buf;
> >> +       }
> >>
> >>          /* Get the physical address of the command buffer */
> >> -       phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0;
> >> -       phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(sev->cmd_buf)) : 0;
> >> +       phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0;
> >> +       phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(cmd_buf)) : 0;
> >>
> >>          dev_dbg(sev->dev, "sev command id %#x buffer 0x%08x%08x timeout %us\n",
> >>                  cmd, phys_msb, phys_lsb, psp_timeout);
> >> @@ -560,15 +883,24 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
> >>                  ret = sev_write_init_ex_file_if_required(cmd);
> >>          }
> >>
> >> -       print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data,
> >> -                            buf_len, false);
> >> -
> >>          /*
> >>           * Copy potential output from the PSP back to data.  Do this even on
> >>           * failure in case the caller wants to glean something from the error.
> >>           */
> >> -       if (data)
> >> -               memcpy(data, sev->cmd_buf, buf_len);
> >> +       if (data) {
> >> +               /*
> >> +                * Restore the page state after the command completes.
> >> +                */
> >> +               if (need_firmware_copy(cmd) &&
> >> +                   snp_aware_copy_from_firmware(cmd, cmd_buf, ret))
> >> +                       return -EFAULT;
> >> +
> >> +               memcpy(data, cmd_buf, buf_len);
> >> +               sev->cmd_buf_active--;
> >> +       }
> >> +
> >> +       print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data,
> >> +                            buf_len, false);
> >>
> >>          return ret;
> >>   }
> >> @@ -1579,10 +1911,12 @@ int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp)
> >>          if (!sev)
> >>                  goto e_err;
> >>
> >> -       sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
> >> +       sev->cmd_buf = (void *)devm_get_free_pages(dev, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
> >>          if (!sev->cmd_buf)
> >>                  goto e_sev;
> >>
> >> +       sev->cmd_buf_backup = (uint8_t *)sev->cmd_buf + PAGE_SIZE;
> >> +
> >>          psp->sev_data = sev;
> >>
> >>          sev->dev = dev;
> >> @@ -1648,6 +1982,12 @@ static void sev_firmware_shutdown(struct sev_device *sev)
> >>                  snp_range_list = NULL;
> >>          }
> >>
> >> +       /*
> >> +        * The host map need to clear the immutable bit so it must be free'd before the
> >> +        * SNP firmware shutdown.
> >> +        */
> >> +       free_snp_host_map(sev);
> >> +
> >>          sev_snp_shutdown(&error);
> >>   }
> >>
> >> @@ -1722,6 +2062,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void)
> >>                                  dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP: failed to INIT error %#x\n", error);
> >>                          }
> >>                  }
> >> +
> >> +               /*
> >> +                * Allocate the intermediate buffers used for the legacy command handling.
> >> +                */
> >> +               if (alloc_snp_host_map(sev)) {
> >> +                       dev_notice(sev->dev, "Failed to alloc host map (disabling legacy SEV)\n");
> >> +                       goto skip_legacy;
> >> +               }
> >>          }
> >>
> >>          /* Obtain the TMR memory area for SEV-ES use */
> >> @@ -1739,12 +2087,14 @@ void sev_pci_init(void)
> >>                  dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV: failed to INIT error %#x, rc %d\n",
> >>                          error, rc);
> >>
> >> +skip_legacy:
> >>          dev_info(sev->dev, "SEV%s API:%d.%d build:%d\n", sev->snp_initialized ?
> >>                  "-SNP" : "", sev->api_major, sev->api_minor, sev->build);
> >>
> >>          return;
> >>
> >>   err:
> >> +       free_snp_host_map(sev);
> >>          psp_master->sev_data = NULL;
> >>   }
> >>
> >> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h
> >> index 34767657beb5..19d79f9d4212 100644
> >> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h
> >> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h
> >> @@ -29,11 +29,20 @@
> >>   #define SEV_CMDRESP_CMD_SHIFT          16
> >>   #define SEV_CMDRESP_IOC                        BIT(0)
> >>
> >> +#define MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS          2
> >> +
> >>   struct sev_misc_dev {
> >>          struct kref refcount;
> >>          struct miscdevice misc;
> >>   };
> >>
> >> +struct snp_host_map {
> >> +       u64 paddr;
> >> +       u32 len;
> >> +       void *host;
> >> +       bool active;
> >> +};
> >> +
> >>   struct sev_device {
> >>          struct device *dev;
> >>          struct psp_device *psp;
> >> @@ -52,8 +61,11 @@ struct sev_device {
> >>          u8 build;
> >>
> >>          void *cmd_buf;
> >> +       void *cmd_buf_backup;
> >> +       int cmd_buf_active;
> >>
> >>          bool snp_initialized;
> >> +       struct snp_host_map snp_host_map[MAX_SNP_HOST_MAP_BUFS];
> >>   };
> >>
> >>   int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp);
> >> --
> >> 2.25.1
> >>