Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 27219C54EED for ; Thu, 26 Jan 2023 16:40:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231992AbjAZQkc (ORCPT ); Thu, 26 Jan 2023 11:40:32 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:51626 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231710AbjAZQkc (ORCPT ); Thu, 26 Jan 2023 11:40:32 -0500 Received: from mga03.intel.com (mga03.intel.com [134.134.136.65]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6DD8BDA; Thu, 26 Jan 2023 08:40:31 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1674751231; x=1706287231; h=message-id:date:mime-version:subject:to:cc:references: from:in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding; bh=jjE1KkJgMovuMdFd70jXi/i73o89qDzcwabqBZl3my8=; b=YL6gcJGhZqvQYHMzM3OCXMcNagRQ1rFTBONC4cCpeH4nAyKH96eAIUMQ 8hIQRi2oAnEl2SnvPBteR1ENOXBtr09MRxtyNJPGjNo0jU1mfpYByZROr vgGMbH37myJNoT4TI7IXE3jxI8pgYx845E7my7klAI5IpQx7qEya2y6CM Ca6r9bUUFG445+qQrxkazkiJRK8LKv6Ix0K1zlzB/JlDhZJVwuY9qSPqf +u32BOl7cq+N3rkNPXTixqosT2hEt4x428l3qi0rvwePpKRE92EFTLHhI bbY5IDgOtyEEiZ5wC9MCvpbJqE4QZ9u87FWU+0pM/0qMUqHe8QzEPhhhm g==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6500,9779,10602"; a="328966559" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.97,249,1669104000"; d="scan'208";a="328966559" Received: from orsmga008.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.65]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 26 Jan 2023 08:40:30 -0800 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6500,9779,10602"; a="693374746" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.97,249,1669104000"; d="scan'208";a="693374746" Received: from ernestom-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.212.255.13]) ([10.212.255.13]) by orsmga008-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 26 Jan 2023 08:40:29 -0800 Message-ID: <394c92e2-a9aa-37e1-7a34-d7569ac844fd@intel.com> Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2023 08:40:29 -0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/102.6.1 Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: enable Data Operand Independent Timing Mode Content-Language: en-US To: Jann Horn Cc: Eric Biggers , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , "H . Peter Anvin" , x86@kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra , Roxana Bradescu , Adam Langley , Ard Biesheuvel , "Jason A . Donenfeld" References: <20230125012801.362496-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> <14506678-918f-81e1-2c26-2b347ff50701@intel.com> From: Dave Hansen In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On 1/26/23 05:52, Jann Horn wrote: > On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 4:30 PM Dave Hansen wrote: >> Translating from Intel-speak: Intel thinks that DOITM purely a way to >> make the CPU run slower if you haven't already written code specifically >> to mitigate timing side channels. All pain, no gain. >> >> The kernel as a whole is not written that way. > > The kernel as a whole also doesn't really use the FPU registers for > anything other than checksumming and cryptography and stuff like that > (it's disabled in the compiler flags because the FPU registers > normally contain userspace state that must not be clobbered). The > instructions listed on that Intel help page are all weird PM* and VP* > arithmetic instructions that can't be generated from C code in the > kernel (except for weird subsystems in which every function is only > callable in kernel-FPU-enabled mode and the compiler is set to enable > FPU instruction generation, by which I mean amdgpu). Maybe I'm totally missing something, but I thought the scope here was the "non-data operand independent timing behavior for the listed instructions" referenced here: > https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/best-practices/data-operand-independent-timing-isa-guidance.html where the "listed instructions" is this list: > https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/resources/data-operand-independent-timing-instructions.html For example, that includes XOR with the 0x31 and 0x81 opcodes which there are plenty of in the kernel. That's a bit wider scope than the crazy instructions like VPLZCNTD. The crazy instructions list that I _think_ you were grepping for is the "Instructions That May Exhibit MCDT Behavior". That's also a fun one, but it is more narrow than the DOITM list.