Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 449D1C38142 for ; Wed, 1 Feb 2023 18:22:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229935AbjBASWf (ORCPT ); Wed, 1 Feb 2023 13:22:35 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57880 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231540AbjBASWe (ORCPT ); Wed, 1 Feb 2023 13:22:34 -0500 Received: from mail.skyhub.de (mail.skyhub.de [5.9.137.197]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 63FD57BE7F; Wed, 1 Feb 2023 10:22:33 -0800 (PST) Received: from zn.tnic (p5de8e9fe.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [93.232.233.254]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.skyhub.de (SuperMail on ZX Spectrum 128k) with ESMTPSA id C97791EC0426; Wed, 1 Feb 2023 19:22:31 +0100 (CET) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=alien8.de; s=dkim; t=1675275751; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:in-reply-to:in-reply-to: references:references; bh=LK1P/CMLNeISz/c0nlGst2RWi/0NZ0o/BpvrK0rFx2Q=; b=OFXvmyKPcyconiHwMNrgQAUNOb0dhANdfQjhsK1+Kr8nj9iA+ITBUH/1kjILD7uoP/A/d9 G3Jihf+k44XEUC+K34HG/rOGRbCMHMbFe0JMSFsqVnG2UGxr1YUgSM2sL+g+LqvF1lO6NK poXHV6aglKBiEyXYXfKUQsOYwEpKe+s= Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 19:22:31 +0100 From: Borislav Petkov To: Michael Roth Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, jmattson@google.com, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com, pgonda@google.com, peterz@infradead.org, srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com, rientjes@google.com, dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com, vbabka@suse.cz, kirill@shutemov.name, ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com, marcorr@google.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, alpergun@google.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, ashish.kalra@amd.com, harald@profian.com, Nikunj A Dadhania Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v7 11/64] KVM: SEV: Support private pages in LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA Message-ID: References: <20221214194056.161492-1-michael.roth@amd.com> <20221214194056.161492-12-michael.roth@amd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20221214194056.161492-12-michael.roth@amd.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 01:40:03PM -0600, Michael Roth wrote: > From: Nikunj A Dadhania > > Pre-boot guest payload needs to be encrypted and VMM has copied it "has to have copied it over" I presume? > over to the private-fd. Add support to get the pfn from the memfile fd > for encrypting the payload in-place. Why is that a good thing? I guess with UPM you're supposed to get the PFN of that encrypted guest payload from that memslot. IOW, such commit messages are too laconic for my taste and you could try to explain more why this is happening instead of me having to "reverse-deduce" what you're doing from the code... Thx. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette