Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 15D8BC636D6 for ; Fri, 10 Feb 2023 03:46:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230517AbjBJDqM (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Feb 2023 22:46:12 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41898 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230154AbjBJDqL (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Feb 2023 22:46:11 -0500 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 381A355E5A; Thu, 9 Feb 2023 19:46:10 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A007A61C2C; Fri, 10 Feb 2023 03:46:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A3F6EC433EF; Fri, 10 Feb 2023 03:46:08 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1676000769; bh=SdTCzJ5SE1wCc+dKpUCyb30OZnXseVrJzbdbPDI3zQk=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=IRp4xwgxfql92gzCSbtGbF/CtWcEoMqBUsP8NaEbxEUcjMnF4mn8hC4DXhRSXuBs/ /YYmXWIQ3akhM3EPMt64l0Tv3Xnp750VKOGESXtsX55GpDc85xvHai5ZP/vLNWkLry MF0F9vPnvYGwLis+L1bDxQsA3N9pUZxAb3HRIu0DaRbOX/e2nnmYt2Vo/sMxO8blUW jTAR+vHfEXt3c2VLncGCtBbYiqY9yl3wBOiH/GZMz+iESZe94cUtsyWEF6rQGpdGEl RjqCeG2ert/ykC47aFzigrNvE7QTEGM79BiZMZlsCPgW6ptu3EtPdzIsmffe2WkXyk vjSRwxOgtdEAQ== Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2023 05:46:06 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Eric Snowberg Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, pvorel@suse.cz, tadeusz.struk@intel.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com, erpalmer@linux.vnet.ibm.com, coxu@redhat.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 3/6] KEYS: X.509: Parse Basic Constraints for CA Message-ID: References: <20230207025958.974056-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> <20230207025958.974056-4-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20230207025958.974056-4-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Feb 06, 2023 at 09:59:55PM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote: > Parse the X.509 Basic Constraints. The basic constraints extension > identifies whether the subject of the certificate is a CA. > > BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { > cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, > pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } > > If the CA is true, store it in the public_key. This will be used > in a follow on patch that requires knowing if the public key is a CA. > > Link: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.9 > Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg > --- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ > include/crypto/public_key.h | 2 ++ > 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c > index 7a9b084e2043..77547d4bd94d 100644 > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c > @@ -586,6 +586,28 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen, > return 0; > } > > + if (ctx->last_oid == OID_basicConstraints) { > + /* > + * Get hold of the basicConstraints > + * v[1] is the encoding size > + * (Expect 0x2 or greater, making it 1 or more bytes) > + * v[2] is the encoding type > + * (Expect an ASN1_BOOL for the CA) > + * v[3] is the contents of the ASN1_BOOL > + * (Expect 1 if the CA is TRUE) > + * vlen should match the entire extension size > + */ > + if (v[0] != (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ)) > + return -EBADMSG; > + if (vlen < 2) > + return -EBADMSG; > + if (v[1] != vlen - 2) > + return -EBADMSG; > + if (vlen >= 4 && v[1] != 0 && v[2] == ASN1_BOOL && v[3] == 1) > + ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_CA; > + return 0; > + } > + > return 0; > } > > diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h > index 6d61695e1cde..c401762850f2 100644 > --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h > +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h > @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ struct public_key { > bool key_is_private; > const char *id_type; > const char *pkey_algo; > + unsigned long key_eflags; /* key extension flags */ > +#define KEY_EFLAG_CA 0 /* set if the CA basic constraints is set */ > }; > > extern void public_key_free(struct public_key *key); > -- > 2.27.0 > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen BR, Jarkko