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Date:   Tue, 9 May 2023 18:21:44 -0700
From:   Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To:     Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 06/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch
 early measurements
Message-ID: <20230510012144.GA1851@quark.localdomain>
References: <20230504145023.835096-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com>
 <20230504145023.835096-7-ross.philipson@oracle.com>
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On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:15PM +0000, Ross Philipson wrote:
> From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
> 
> The SHA algorithms are necessary to measure configuration information into
> the TPM as early as possible before using the values. This implementation
> uses the established approach of #including the SHA libraries directly in
> the code since the compressed kernel is not uncompressed at this point.
> 
> The SHA code here has its origins in the code from the main kernel:
> 
> commit c4d5b9ffa31f ("crypto: sha1 - implement base layer for SHA-1")
> 
> That code could not be pulled directly into the setup portion of the
> compressed kernel because of other dependencies it pulls in. The result
> is this is a modified copy of that code that still leverages the core
> SHA algorithms.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>

SHA-1 is insecure.  Why are you still using SHA-1?  Don't TPMs support SHA-2
now?

And if you absolutely MUST use SHA-1 despite it being insecure, please at least
don't obfuscate it by calling it simply "SHA".

- Eric