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From:   Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
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Subject: [PATCH RFC v9 07/51] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support
Date:   Sun, 11 Jun 2023 23:25:15 -0500
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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>

The memory integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). The RMP is a single data
structure shared across the system that contains one entry for every 4K
page of DRAM that may be used by SEV-SNP VMs. APM2 section 15.36 details
a number of steps needed to detect/enable SEV-SNP and RMP table support
on the host:

 - Detect SEV-SNP support based on CPUID bit
 - Initialize the RMP table memory reported by the RMP base/end MSR
   registers and configure IOMMU to be compatible with RMP access
   restrictions
 - Set the MtrrFixDramModEn bit in SYSCFG MSR
 - Set the SecureNestedPagingEn and VMPLEn bits in the SYSCFG MSR
 - Configure IOMMU

RMP table entry format is non-architectural and it can vary by
processor. It is defined by the PPR. Restrict SNP support to CPU
models/families which are compatible with the current RMP table entry
format to guard against any undefined behavior when running on other
system types. Future models/support will handle this through an
architectural mechanism to allow for broader compatibility.

SNP host code depends on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV config flag, which may be
enabled even when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT isn't set, so update the
SNP-specific IOMMU helpers used here to rely on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
instead of CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.

Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
[mdr: rework commit message to be clearer about what patch does, squash
      in early_rmptable_check() handling from Tom]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/coco/Makefile                   |   1 +
 arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile               |   3 +
 arch/x86/coco/sev/host.c                 | 212 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |   8 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h         |  11 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h               |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c                |  19 ++
 drivers/iommu/amd/init.c                 |   2 +-
 include/linux/amd-iommu.h                |   2 +-
 9 files changed, 256 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/coco/sev/host.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/Makefile b/arch/x86/coco/Makefile
index 6aa52e719bf5..6a7d876130e2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/Makefile
@@ -6,3 +6,4 @@ CFLAGS_core.o		+= -fno-stack-protector
 obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM) += core.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST)	+= tdx/
+obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV)	+= sev/
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile b/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..27c0500d75c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+obj-y += host.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/host.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/host.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6907ce887b23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/host.c
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AMD SVM-SEV Host Support.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/mm_types.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/cpumask.h>
+#include <linux/iommu.h>
+#include <linux/amd-iommu.h>
+
+#include <asm/sev.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/svm.h>
+#include <asm/smp.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/cpuid.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+#include <asm/iommu.h>
+
+/*
+ * The first 16KB from the RMP_BASE is used by the processor for the
+ * bookkeeping, the range needs to be added during the RMP entry lookup.
+ */
+#define RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ	0x4000
+
+static unsigned long rmptable_start __ro_after_init;
+static unsigned long rmptable_end __ro_after_init;
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"SEV-SNP: " fmt
+
+static int __mfd_enable(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	u64 val;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
+		return 0;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+
+	val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __init void mfd_enable(void *arg)
+{
+	__mfd_enable(smp_processor_id());
+}
+
+static int __snp_enable(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	u64 val;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
+		return 0;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+
+	val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN;
+	val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __init void snp_enable(void *arg)
+{
+	__snp_enable(smp_processor_id());
+}
+
+bool snp_get_rmptable_info(u64 *start, u64 *len)
+{
+	u64 max_rmp_pfn, calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz, rmp_base, rmp_end;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE, rmp_base);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_END, rmp_end);
+
+	if (!rmp_base || !rmp_end) {
+		pr_err("Memory for the RMP table has not been reserved by BIOS\n");
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	rmp_sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate the amount the memory that must be reserved by the BIOS to
+	 * address the whole RAM, including the bookkeeping area. The RMP itself
+	 * must also be covered.
+	 */
+	max_rmp_pfn = max_pfn;
+	if (PHYS_PFN(rmp_end) > max_pfn)
+		max_rmp_pfn = PHYS_PFN(rmp_end);
+
+	calc_rmp_sz = (max_rmp_pfn << 4) + RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ;
+
+	if (calc_rmp_sz > rmp_sz) {
+		pr_err("Memory reserved for the RMP table does not cover full system RAM (expected 0x%llx got 0x%llx)\n",
+		       calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	*start = rmp_base;
+	*len = rmp_sz;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static __init int __snp_rmptable_init(void)
+{
+	u64 rmp_base, sz;
+	void *start;
+	u64 val;
+
+	if (!snp_get_rmptable_info(&rmp_base, &sz))
+		return 1;
+
+	pr_info("RMP table physical address [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n",
+		rmp_base, rmp_base + sz - 1);
+
+	start = memremap(rmp_base, sz, MEMREMAP_WB);
+	if (!start) {
+		pr_err("Failed to map RMP table addr 0x%llx size 0x%llx\n", rmp_base, sz);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen in case of
+	 * kexec boot.
+	 */
+	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+	if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
+		goto skip_enable;
+
+	/* Initialize the RMP table to zero */
+	memset(start, 0, sz);
+
+	/* Flush the caches to ensure that data is written before SNP is enabled. */
+	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+
+	/* MFDM must be enabled on all the CPUs prior to enabling SNP. */
+	on_each_cpu(mfd_enable, NULL, 1);
+
+	/* Enable SNP on all CPUs. */
+	on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1);
+
+skip_enable:
+	rmptable_start = (unsigned long)start;
+	rmptable_end = rmptable_start + sz - 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
+{
+	int family, model;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
+		return 0;
+
+	family = boot_cpu_data.x86;
+	model  = boot_cpu_data.x86_model;
+
+	/*
+	 * RMP table entry format is not architectural and it can vary by processor and
+	 * is defined by the per-processor PPR. Restrict SNP support on the known CPU
+	 * model and family for which the RMP table entry format is currently defined for.
+	 */
+	if (!(family == 0x19 && model <= 0xaf) && !(family == 0x1a && model <= 0xf))
+		goto nosnp;
+
+	if (amd_iommu_snp_enable())
+		goto nosnp;
+
+	if (__snp_rmptable_init())
+		goto nosnp;
+
+	cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "x86/rmptable_init:online", __snp_enable, NULL);
+
+	return 0;
+
+nosnp:
+	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
+	return -ENOSYS;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This must be called after the PCI subsystem. This is because amd_iommu_snp_enable()
+ * is called to ensure the IOMMU supports the SEV-SNP feature, which can only be
+ * called after subsys_initcall().
+ *
+ * NOTE: IOMMU is enforced by SNP to ensure that hypervisor cannot program DMA
+ * directly into guest private memory. In case of SNP, the IOMMU ensures that
+ * the page(s) used for DMA are hypervisor owned.
+ */
+fs_initcall(snp_rmptable_init);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 5dfa4fb76f4b..0a9938aea305 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -99,6 +99,12 @@
 # define DISABLE_TDX_GUEST	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST & 31))
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
+# define DISABLE_SEV_SNP	0
+#else
+# define DISABLE_SEV_SNP	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP & 31))
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Make sure to add features to the correct mask
  */
@@ -123,7 +129,7 @@
 			 DISABLE_ENQCMD)
 #define DISABLED_MASK17	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK18	0
-#define DISABLED_MASK19	0
+#define DISABLED_MASK19	(DISABLE_SEV_SNP)
 #define DISABLED_MASK20	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21)
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index ad35355ee43e..db0f3a041930 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -574,6 +574,8 @@
 #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED		BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT)
 #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT)
 #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE		0xc0010132
+#define MSR_AMD64_RMP_END		0xc0010133
 
 /* SNP feature bits enabled by the hypervisor */
 #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM			BIT_ULL(3)
@@ -675,7 +677,14 @@
 #define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM2			0xc001001d
 #define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG		0xc0010010
 #define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT	23
-#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT		BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT		24
+#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN		BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT	25
+#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN		BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM_BIT		19
+#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM			BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM_BIT)
+
 #define MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG		0xc0010055
 /* C1E active bits in int pending message */
 #define K8_INTP_C1E_ACTIVE_MASK		0x18000000
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index ebc271bb6d8e..d34c46db7dd1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void);
 bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp);
 void __init __noreturn snp_abort(void);
 int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, unsigned long *fw_err);
+bool snp_get_rmptable_info(u64 *start, u64 *len);
 #else
 static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
 static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
@@ -221,6 +222,7 @@ static inline int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *in
 {
 	return -ENOTTY;
 }
+static inline bool snp_get_rmptable_info(u64 *start, u64 *len) { return false; }
 #endif
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index a79774181f22..1493ddf89fdf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <asm/delay.h>
 #include <asm/debugreg.h>
 #include <asm/resctrl.h>
+#include <asm/sev.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 # include <asm/mmconfig.h>
@@ -546,6 +547,20 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	resctrl_cpu_detect(c);
 }
 
+static bool early_rmptable_check(void)
+{
+	u64 rmp_base, rmp_size;
+
+	/*
+	 * For early BSP initialization, max_pfn won't be set up yet, wait until
+	 * it is set before performing the RMP table calculations.
+	 */
+	if (!max_pfn)
+		return true;
+
+	return snp_get_rmptable_info(&rmp_base, &rmp_size);
+}
+
 static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u64 msr;
@@ -587,6 +602,9 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		if (!(msr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK))
 			goto clear_sev;
 
+		if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP) && !early_rmptable_check())
+			goto clear_snp;
+
 		return;
 
 clear_all:
@@ -594,6 +612,7 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 clear_sev:
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
+clear_snp:
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
 	}
 }
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
index 19a46b9f7357..33ea62d93540 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
@@ -3665,7 +3665,7 @@ int amd_iommu_pc_set_reg(struct amd_iommu *iommu, u8 bank, u8 cntr, u8 fxn, u64
 	return iommu_pc_get_set_reg(iommu, bank, cntr, fxn, value, true);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 int amd_iommu_snp_enable(void)
 {
 	/*
diff --git a/include/linux/amd-iommu.h b/include/linux/amd-iommu.h
index 953e6f12fa1c..8f0cde2d451c 100644
--- a/include/linux/amd-iommu.h
+++ b/include/linux/amd-iommu.h
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ int amd_iommu_pc_get_reg(struct amd_iommu *iommu, u8 bank, u8 cntr, u8 fxn,
 		u64 *value);
 struct amd_iommu *get_amd_iommu(unsigned int idx);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 int amd_iommu_snp_enable(void);
 #endif
 
-- 
2.25.1