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Date:   Tue, 3 Oct 2023 16:28:32 +0100
From:   Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
To:     Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/12] PCI/CMA: Expose in sysfs whether devices are
 authenticated
Message-ID: <20231003162832.0000317c@Huawei.com>
In-Reply-To: <821682573e57e0384162f365652171e5ee1e6611.1695921657.git.lukas@wunner.de>
References: <cover.1695921656.git.lukas@wunner.de>
        <821682573e57e0384162f365652171e5ee1e6611.1695921657.git.lukas@wunner.de>
Organization: Huawei Technologies Research and Development (UK) Ltd.
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On Thu, 28 Sep 2023 19:32:41 +0200
Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> wrote:

> The PCI core has just been amended to authenticate CMA-capable devices
> on enumeration and store the result in an "authenticated" bit in struct
> pci_dev->spdm_state.
> 
> Expose the bit to user space through an eponymous sysfs attribute.
> 
> Allow user space to trigger reauthentication (e.g. after it has updated
> the CMA keyring) by writing to the sysfs attribute.

Ah.  That answers the question I asked in previous patch review ;)
Maybe add a comment to the cma_init code to say that's why it fails with
side effects (leaves the spdm_state around).

> 
> Subject to further discussion, a future commit might add a user-defined
> policy to forbid driver binding to devices which failed authentication,
> similar to the "authorized" attribute for USB.
> 
> Alternatively, authentication success might be signaled to user space
> through a uevent, whereupon it may bind a (blacklisted) driver.
> A uevent signaling authentication failure might similarly cause user
> space to unbind or outright remove the potentially malicious device.
> 
> Traffic from devices which failed authentication could also be filtered
> through ACS I/O Request Blocking Enable (PCIe r6.1 sec 7.7.11.3) or
> through Link Disable (PCIe r6.1 sec 7.5.3.7).  Unlike an IOMMU, that
> will not only protect the host, but also prevent malicious peer-to-peer
> traffic to other devices.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Seems good to me, though I agree with Ilpo that it would be good to mention
the DOE init fail in the patch description as that's a bit subtle.

One trivial comment inline.

Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
 
> ---
>  Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci | 27 +++++++++
>  drivers/pci/Kconfig                     |  3 +
>  drivers/pci/Makefile                    |  1 +
>  drivers/pci/cma-sysfs.c                 | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  drivers/pci/cma.c                       |  2 +
>  drivers/pci/doe.c                       |  2 +
>  drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c                 |  3 +
>  drivers/pci/pci.h                       |  1 +
>  include/linux/pci.h                     |  2 +
>  9 files changed, 114 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 drivers/pci/cma-sysfs.c
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci
> index ecf47559f495..2ea9b8deffcc 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci
> @@ -500,3 +500,30 @@ Description:
>  		console drivers from the device.  Raw users of pci-sysfs
>  		resourceN attributes must be terminated prior to resizing.
>  		Success of the resizing operation is not guaranteed.
> +
> +What:		/sys/bus/pci/devices/.../authenticated
> +Date:		September 2023
> +Contact:	Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
> +Description:
> +		This file contains 1 if the device authenticated successfully
> +		with CMA-SPDM (PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31).  It contains 0 if the
> +		device failed authentication (and may thus be malicious).
> +
> +		Writing anything to this file causes reauthentication.
> +		That may be opportune after updating the .cma keyring.
> +
> +		The file is not visible if authentication is unsupported
> +		by the device.
> +
> +		If the kernel could not determine whether authentication is
> +		supported because memory was low or DOE communication with
> +		the device was not working, the file is visible but accessing
> +		it fails with error code ENOTTY.
> +
> +		This prevents downgrade attacks where an attacker consumes
> +		memory or disturbs DOE communication in order to create the
> +		appearance that a device does not support authentication.
> +
> +		The reason why authentication support could not be determined
> +		is apparent from "dmesg".  To probe for authentication support
> +		again, exercise the "remove" and "rescan" attributes.
> diff --git a/drivers/pci/Kconfig b/drivers/pci/Kconfig
> index c9aa5253ac1f..51df3be3438e 100644
> --- a/drivers/pci/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/pci/Kconfig
> @@ -129,6 +129,9 @@ config PCI_CMA
>  	  A PCI DOE mailbox is used as transport for DMTF SPDM based
>  	  attestation, measurement and secure channel establishment.
>  
> +config PCI_CMA_SYSFS
> +	def_bool PCI_CMA && SYSFS
> +
>  config PCI_DOE
>  	bool
>  
> diff --git a/drivers/pci/Makefile b/drivers/pci/Makefile
> index a18812b8832b..612ae724cd2d 100644
> --- a/drivers/pci/Makefile
> +++ b/drivers/pci/Makefile
> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_DOE)		+= doe.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_DYNAMIC_OF_NODES) += of_property.o
>  
>  obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_CMA)		+= cma.o cma-x509.o cma.asn1.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_CMA_SYSFS)	+= cma-sysfs.o
>  $(obj)/cma-x509.o:		$(obj)/cma.asn1.h
>  $(obj)/cma.asn1.o:		$(obj)/cma.asn1.c $(obj)/cma.asn1.h
>  
> diff --git a/drivers/pci/cma-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/cma-sysfs.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..b2d45f96601a
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/pci/cma-sysfs.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Component Measurement and Authentication (CMA-SPDM, PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31)
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2023 Intel Corporation
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/pci.h>
> +#include <linux/spdm.h>
> +#include <linux/sysfs.h>
> +
> +#include "pci.h"
> +
> +static ssize_t authenticated_store(struct device *dev,
> +				   struct device_attribute *attr,
> +				   const char *buf, size_t count)
> +{
> +	struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev);
> +	ssize_t rc;
> +
> +	if (!pdev->cma_capable &&
> +	    (pdev->cma_init_failed || pdev->doe_init_failed))
> +		return -ENOTTY;
> +
> +	rc = pci_cma_reauthenticate(pdev);
> +	if (rc)
> +		return rc;

> +
> +	return count;
> +}
> +
> +static ssize_t authenticated_show(struct device *dev,
> +				  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> +	struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev);
> +
> +	if (!pdev->cma_capable &&
> +	    (pdev->cma_init_failed || pdev->doe_init_failed))
> +		return -ENOTTY;
> +
> +	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%u\n", spdm_authenticated(pdev->spdm_state));
> +}
> +static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(authenticated);
> +
> +static struct attribute *pci_cma_attrs[] = {
> +	&dev_attr_authenticated.attr,
> +	NULL
> +};
> +
> +static umode_t pci_cma_attrs_are_visible(struct kobject *kobj,
> +					 struct attribute *a, int n)
> +{
> +	struct device *dev = kobj_to_dev(kobj);
> +	struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * If CMA or DOE initialization failed, CMA attributes must be visible
> +	 * and return an error on access.  This prevents downgrade attacks
> +	 * where an attacker disturbs memory allocation or DOE communication
> +	 * in order to create the appearance that CMA is unsupported.
> +	 * The attacker may achieve that by simply hogging memory.
> +	 */
> +	if (!pdev->cma_capable &&
> +	    !pdev->cma_init_failed && !pdev->doe_init_failed)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	return a->mode;
> +}
> +
> +const struct attribute_group pci_cma_attr_group = {
> +	.attrs  = pci_cma_attrs,

I'd go with a single space here as the double doesn't make
it any more readable.


> +	.is_visible = pci_cma_attrs_are_visible,
> +};