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Date:   Tue, 24 Oct 2023 10:04:18 -0700
From:   Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To:     Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
        Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>,
        Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
CC:     Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
        "Alex Williamson" <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
        <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>,
        <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
        <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
        <linuxarm@huawei.com>, David Box <david.e.box@intel.com>,
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        "Li, Ming" <ming4.li@intel.com>, Zhi Wang <zhi.a.wang@intel.com>,
        Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>,
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        "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
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        Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 12/12] PCI/CMA: Grant guests exclusive control of
 authentication
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Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
[..]
> To own IDE, the guest will have to have exclusive access to the portion 
> of RC responsible for the IDE keys. Which is doable but requires passing 
> through both RC and the device and probably everything between these 
> two.  It is going to be quite different "host-native" and 
> "guest-native". How IDE keys are going to be programmed into the RC on 
> Intel?

I do not think the guest can "own IDE" in any meaningful. It is always
going to be a PF level policy coordinated either by the host or the
platform-TSM, and as far as I can see all end user interest currently
lies in the platform-TSM case.

Now, there is definitely value in considering how a guest can maximize
security in the absence of a platform-TSM in the code design, but that
does not diminish the need for a path for the guest to coordinate the
life-cycle through the platform-TSM. Otherwise, as you mention, passing
through the host-bridge resources and the VF has challenges.