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From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
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Subject: [PATCH v11 16/35] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command
Date: Sat, 30 Dec 2023 11:23:32 -0600
Message-ID: <20231230172351.574091-17-michael.roth@amd.com>
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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>

KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START begins the launch process for an SEV-SNP guest.
The command initializes a cryptographic digest context used to construct
the measurement of the guest. If the guest is expected to be migrated,
the command also binds a migration agent (MA) to the guest.

For more information see the SEV-SNP specification.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
[mdr: hold sev_deactivate_lock when calling SEV_CMD_SNP_DECOMMISSION]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
 .../virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst    |  24 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c                        | 144 +++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h                        |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                      |  10 ++
 4 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
index b1a19c9a577a..b1beb2fe8766 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -461,6 +461,30 @@ The flags bitmap is defined as::
 If the specified flags is not supported then return -EOPNOTSUPP, and the supported
 flags are returned.
 
+19. KVM_SNP_LAUNCH_START
+------------------------
+
+The KVM_SNP_LAUNCH_START command is used for creating the memory encryption
+context for the SEV-SNP guest. To create the encryption context, user must
+provide a guest policy, migration agent (if any) and guest OS visible
+workarounds value as defined SEV-SNP specification.
+
+Parameters (in): struct  kvm_snp_launch_start
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start {
+                __u64 policy;           /* Guest policy to use. */
+                __u64 ma_uaddr;         /* userspace address of migration agent */
+                __u8 ma_en;             /* 1 if the migration agent is enabled */
+                __u8 imi_en;            /* set IMI to 1. */
+                __u8 gosvw[16];         /* guest OS visible workarounds */
+        };
+
+See the SEV-SNP specification for further detail on the launch input.
+
 References
 ==========
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 43b8ae7b74f8..e2f4d4bc125c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <asm/trapnr.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
 #include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/sev.h>
 
 #include "mmu.h"
 #include "x86.h"
@@ -72,6 +73,10 @@ static bool sev_snp_enabled;
 #define AP_RESET_HOLD_NAE_EVENT		1
 #define AP_RESET_HOLD_MSR_PROTO		2
 
+/* As defined by SEV-SNP Firmware ABI, under "Guest Policy". */
+#define SNP_POLICY_MASK_SMT		BIT_ULL(16)
+#define SNP_POLICY_MASK_SINGLE_SOCKET	BIT_ULL(20)
+
 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock);
@@ -82,6 +87,8 @@ static unsigned int nr_asids;
 static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
 static unsigned long *sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap;
 
+static int snp_decommission_context(struct kvm *kvm);
+
 struct enc_region {
 	struct list_head list;
 	unsigned long npages;
@@ -107,12 +114,17 @@ static int sev_flush_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
 	down_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
 
 	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
-	ret = sev_guest_df_flush(&error);
+
+	if (sev_snp_enabled)
+		ret = sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_SNP_DF_FLUSH, NULL, &error);
+	else
+		ret = sev_guest_df_flush(&error);
 
 	up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
 
 	if (ret)
-		pr_err("SEV: DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n", ret, error);
+		pr_err("SEV%s: DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n",
+		       sev_snp_enabled ? "-SNP" : "", ret, error);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1890,6 +1902,94 @@ int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * The guest context contains all the information, keys and metadata
+ * associated with the guest that the firmware tracks to implement SEV
+ * and SNP features. The firmware stores the guest context in hypervisor
+ * provide page via the SNP_GCTX_CREATE command.
+ */
+static void *snp_context_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct sev_data_snp_addr data = {};
+	void *context;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* Allocate memory for context page */
+	context = snp_alloc_firmware_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!context)
+		return NULL;
+
+	data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(context);
+	rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_GCTX_CREATE, &data, &argp->error);
+	if (rc) {
+		snp_free_firmware_page(context);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return context;
+}
+
+static int snp_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, int *error)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_snp_activate data = {0};
+
+	data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
+	data.asid   = sev_get_asid(kvm);
+	return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SNP_ACTIVATE, &data, error);
+}
+
+static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_snp_launch_start start = {0};
+	struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start params;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!sev_snp_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/* Don't allow userspace to allocate memory for more than 1 SNP context. */
+	if (sev->snp_context)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	sev->snp_context = snp_context_create(kvm, argp);
+	if (!sev->snp_context)
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (params.policy & SNP_POLICY_MASK_SINGLE_SOCKET) {
+		pr_warn("SEV-SNP hypervisor does not support limiting guests to a single socket.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!(params.policy & SNP_POLICY_MASK_SMT)) {
+		pr_warn("SEV-SNP hypervisor does not support limiting guests to a single SMT thread.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	start.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
+	start.policy = params.policy;
+	memcpy(start.gosvw, params.gosvw, sizeof(params.gosvw));
+	rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_START, &start, &argp->error);
+	if (rc)
+		goto e_free_context;
+
+	sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
+	rc = snp_bind_asid(kvm, &argp->error);
+	if (rc)
+		goto e_free_context;
+
+	return 0;
+
+e_free_context:
+	snp_decommission_context(kvm);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
 int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -1980,6 +2080,9 @@ int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 	case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH:
 		r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
 		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START:
+		r = snp_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
 	default:
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
@@ -2172,6 +2275,33 @@ int sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int snp_decommission_context(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_snp_addr data = {};
+	int ret;
+
+	/* If context is not created then do nothing */
+	if (!sev->snp_context)
+		return 0;
+
+	data.gctx_paddr = __sme_pa(sev->snp_context);
+	down_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
+	ret = sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_SNP_DECOMMISSION, &data, NULL);
+	if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "failed to release guest context")) {
+		up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
+
+	/* free the context page now */
+	snp_free_firmware_page(sev->snp_context);
+	sev->snp_context = NULL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
@@ -2213,7 +2343,15 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 		}
 	}
 
-	sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
+	if (sev_snp_guest(kvm)) {
+		if (snp_decommission_context(kvm)) {
+			WARN_ONCE(1, "Failed to free SNP guest context, leaking asid!\n");
+			return;
+		}
+	} else {
+		sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
+	}
+
 	sev_asid_free(sev);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 07a9eb5b6ce5..9c633173b779 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
 	struct misc_cg *misc_cg; /* For misc cgroup accounting */
 	atomic_t migration_in_progress;
 	u64 snp_init_flags;
+	void *snp_context;      /* SNP guest context page */
 };
 
 struct kvm_svm {
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 73702e9b9d76..9fe36408d55b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1871,6 +1871,7 @@ enum sev_cmd_id {
 
 	/* SNP specific commands */
 	KVM_SEV_SNP_INIT,
+	KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START,
 
 	KVM_SEV_NR_MAX,
 };
@@ -1978,6 +1979,15 @@ struct kvm_snp_init {
 	__u64 flags;
 };
 
+struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start {
+	__u64 policy;
+	__u64 ma_uaddr;
+	__u8 ma_en;
+	__u8 imi_en;
+	__u8 gosvw[16];
+	__u8 pad[6];
+};
+
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU	(1 << 0)
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3		(1 << 1)
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX	(1 << 2)
-- 
2.25.1