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Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 17:21:42 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>, x86@kernel.org,
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	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 04/26] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization
 support
Message-ID: <20240105162142.GEZZgslgQCQYI7twat@fat_crate.local>
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 <f60c5fe0-9909-468d-8160-34d5bae39305@linux.microsoft.com>
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In-Reply-To: <20240105160916.GDZZgprE8T6xbbHJ9E@fat_crate.local>

On Fri, Jan 05, 2024 at 05:09:16PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 04, 2024 at 12:05:27PM +0100, Jeremi Piotrowski wrote:
> > Is there a really good reason to perform the snp_probe_smptable_info() check at this
> > point (instead of in snp_rmptable_init). snp_rmptable_init will also clear the cap
> > on failure, and bsp_init_amd() runs too early to allow for the kernel to allocate the
> > rmptable itself. I pointed out in the previous review that kernel allocation of rmptable
> > is necessary in SNP-host capable VMs in Azure.
> 
> What does that even mean?
> 
> That function is doing some calculations after reading two MSRs. What
> can possibly go wrong?!

That could be one reason perhaps:

"It needs to be called early enough to allow for AutoIBRS to not be disabled
just because SNP is supported. By calling it where it is currently called, the
SNP feature can be cleared if, even though supported, SNP can't be used,
allowing AutoIBRS to be used as a more performant Spectre mitigation."

https://lore.kernel.org/r/8ec38db1-5ccf-4684-bc0d-d48579ebf0d0@amd.com

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette