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Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 13:44:40 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>, x86@kernel.org,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 04/26] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization
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On Tue, Jan 09, 2024 at 01:29:06PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> At least three issues I see with that:
> 
> - the allocation can fail so it is a lot more convenient when the
>   firmware prepares it
> 
> - the RMP_BASE and RMP_END writes need to be verified they actially did
>   set up the RMP range because if they haven't, you might as well
>   throw SNP security out of the window. In general, letting the kernel
>   do the RMP allocation needs to be verified very very thoroughly.
> 
> - a future feature might make this more complicated

- What do you do if you boot on a system which has the RMP already
  allocated in the BIOS?

- How do you detect that it is the L1 kernel that must allocate the RMP?

- Why can't you use the BIOS allocated RMP in your scenario too instead
  of the L1 kernel allocating it?

- ...

I might think of more.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette