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From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ebiggers@kernel.org,
	luto@kernel.org,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
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	bernie.keany@intel.com,
	charishma1.gairuboyina@intel.com,
	chang.seok.bae@intel.com,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v9a 11/14] x86/cpu/keylocker: Check Register File Data Sampling mitigation
Date: Sun,  7 Apr 2024 16:04:43 -0700
Message-Id: <20240407230443.912306-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <20240329062057.kt5dkoffbkkxdt7x@desk>
References: <20240329062057.kt5dkoffbkkxdt7x@desk>
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The Register File Data Sampling vulnerability may allow malicious
userspace programs to infer stale kernel register data, potentially
exposing sensitive key values, including AES keys.

To address this vulnerability, a microcode update needs to be applied to
the CPU, which modifies the VERW instruction to flush the affected CPU
buffers.

Reference the 'rfds_mitigation' variable to check the mitigation status.
Do not enable Key Locker on CPUs affected by the vulnerability but
lacking mitigation.

Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
---
Changes from v9:
* Remove the helper function and simplify the code by directly reading
  the status variable. (Pawan Gupta)

Note that this code change aligns with mitigation guidance, which
recommends:
  "Software loading Key Locker keys using LOADIWKEY should execute a VERW
   to clear registers before transitioning to untrusted code to prevent
   later software from inferring the loaded key."

For more information, refer to Intel's guidance on Register File Data
Sampling:
  https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/register-file-data-sampling.html
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 8 ++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       | 8 +-------
 arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c      | 3 +++
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 74eaa3a2b85b..b823163f4786 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -728,6 +728,14 @@ enum mitigation_info {
 
 extern bool gds_ucode_mitigated(enum mitigation_info mitg);
 
+enum rfds_mitigations {
+	RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW,
+	RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+};
+
+extern enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation;
+
 /*
  * Make previous memory operations globally visible before
  * a WRMSR.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 80f6e70619cb..a2ba1a0ef872 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -483,14 +483,8 @@ early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline);
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"Register File Data Sampling: " fmt
 
-enum rfds_mitigations {
-	RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
-	RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW,
-	RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
-};
-
 /* Default mitigation for Register File Data Sampling */
-static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
 	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 
 static const char * const rfds_strings[] = {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c b/arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c
index 23cf4a235f11..09876693414c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c
@@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ static bool __init secure_keylocker(void)
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS) && !gds_ucode_mitigated(MITG_LOCKED))
 		return false;
 
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS) && rfds_mitigation != RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW)
+		return false;
+
 	return true;
 }
 
-- 
2.40.1