Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-crypto+bounces-3688-linux.lists.archive=gmail.com@vger.kernel.org designates 139.178.88.99 as permitted sender) client-ip=139.178.88.99;
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 17:01:13 -0700
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
To: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	ebiggers@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, mingo@kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, ardb@kernel.org, elliott@hpe.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, bernie.keany@intel.com,
	charishma1.gairuboyina@intel.com,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9a 10/14] x86/cpu/keylocker: Check Gather Data Sampling
 mitigation
Message-ID: <20240419000113.2tjvyigx7nlyymrw@desk>
References: <20240329065742.fc5of75e776y2g4b@desk>
 <20240407230432.912290-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Precedence: bulk
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <20240407230432.912290-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com>

On Sun, Apr 07, 2024 at 04:04:32PM -0700, Chang S. Bae wrote:
> Gather Data Sampling is a transient execution side channel issue in some
> CPU models. The stale data in registers is not guaranteed as secure when
> this vulnerability is not addressed.
> 
> In the Key Locker usage during AES transformations, the temporary storage
> of the original key in registers poses a risk. The key material can be
> staled in some implementations, leading to susceptibility to leakage of
> the AES key.
> 
> To mitigate this vulnerability, a qualified microcode image must be
> applied. Add code to ensure that the mitigation is installed and securely
> locked. Disable the feature, otherwise.
> 
> Expand gds_ucode_mitigated() to examine the lock state.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
> Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> Changes from v9:
> * Removed MSR reads and utilized the helper function. (Pawan Gupta)
> 
> Alternatively, 'gds_mitigation' can be exported and referenced directly.
> Using 'gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED' may also be
> readable. However, it was opted to expand gds_ucode_mitigated() for
> consistency, as it is already established.
> 
> Note that this approach aligns with Intel's guidance, as the bugs.c code
> checks the following MSR bits:
>   "Intel recommends that system software does not enable Key Locker (by
>    setting CR4.KL) unless the GDS mitigation is enabled
>    (IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_DIS] (bit 4) is 0) and locked
>    (IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL [GDS_MITG_LOCK](bit 5) is 1)."
> 
> For more information, refer to Intel's technical documentation on Gather
> Data Sampling:
>   https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/gather-data-sampling.html
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h |  7 ++++++-
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       |  5 ++++-
>  arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c      | 12 ++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c               |  2 +-
>  4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> index 811548f131f4..74eaa3a2b85b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> @@ -721,7 +721,12 @@ enum mds_mitigations {
>  	MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV,
>  };
>  
> -extern bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void);
> +enum mitigation_info {
> +	MITG_FULL,
> +	MITG_LOCKED,
> +};
> +
> +extern bool gds_ucode_mitigated(enum mitigation_info mitg);
>  
>  /*
>   * Make previous memory operations globally visible before
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index e7ba936d798b..80f6e70619cb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -752,8 +752,11 @@ static const char * const gds_strings[] = {
>  	[GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR]	= "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status",
>  };
>  
> -bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void)
> +bool gds_ucode_mitigated(enum mitigation_info mitg)
>  {
> +	if (mitg == MITG_LOCKED)
> +		return gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED;
> +
>  	return (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL ||
>  		gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED);
>  }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c b/arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c
> index 1e81d0704eea..23cf4a235f11 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c
> @@ -113,6 +113,15 @@ void restore_keylocker(void)
>  	valid_wrapping_key = false;
>  }
>  
> +/* Check if Key Locker is secure enough to be used. */
> +static bool __init secure_keylocker(void)
> +{
> +	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS) && !gds_ucode_mitigated(MITG_LOCKED))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	return true;
> +}
> +
>  static int __init init_keylocker(void)
>  {
>  	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> @@ -126,6 +135,9 @@ static int __init init_keylocker(void)
>  		goto clear_cap;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (!secure_keylocker())
> +		goto clear_cap;
> +
>  	cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_KEYLOCKER);
>  
>  	/* AESKLE depends on CR4.KEYLOCKER */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 47d9f03b7778..4ab50e95fdb5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -1675,7 +1675,7 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
>  		 */
>  	}
>  
> -	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS) || gds_ucode_mitigated())
> +	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS) || gds_ucode_mitigated(MITG_FULL))
>  		data |= ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO;
>  
>  	return data;

Repurposing gds_ucode_mitigated() to check for the locked state is
adding a bit of a churn. We can introduce gds_mitigation_locked()
instead.

Is below looking okay:

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 811548f131f4..8ba96e8a8754 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -722,6 +722,7 @@ enum mds_mitigations {
 };
 
 extern bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void);
+extern bool gds_mitigation_locked(void);
 
 /*
  * Make previous memory operations globally visible before
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index ca295b0c1eee..a7ec26988ddb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -753,6 +753,11 @@ bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gds_ucode_mitigated);
 
+bool gds_mitigation_locked(void)
+{
+	return gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED;
+}
+
 void update_gds_msr(void)
 {
 	u64 mcu_ctrl_after;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c b/arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c
index 1b57e11d93ad..c40e72f482b1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c
@@ -112,6 +112,15 @@ void restore_keylocker(void)
 	valid_wrapping_key = false;
 }
 
+/* Check if Key Locker is secure enough to be used. */
+static bool __init secure_keylocker(void)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS) && !gds_mitigation_locked())
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static int __init init_keylocker(void)
 {
 	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
@@ -125,6 +134,9 @@ static int __init init_keylocker(void)
 		goto clear_cap;
 	}
 
+	if (!secure_keylocker())
+		goto clear_cap;
+
 	cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_KEYLOCKER);
 
 	/* AESKLE depends on CR4.KEYLOCKER */