From: James Morris Subject: Re: 2.6.25-rc8-mm1 - BUG in fs/jbd/transaction.c Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2008 09:54:27 +1000 (EST) Message-ID: References: <20080401213214.8fbb6d6b.akpm@linux-foundation.org> <6495.1207163569@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> <20080402192715.GA32454@unused.rdu.redhat.com> <20080402123905.386c56f8.akpm@linux-foundation.org> <1207246695.27710.292.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <1207313165.27710.337.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Cc: Andrew Morton , Josef Bacik , Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu, sct@redhat.com, jack@suse.cz, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com To: Stephen Smalley Return-path: Received: from namei.org ([69.55.235.186]:55103 "EHLO us.intercode.com.au" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753536AbYDFX42 (ORCPT ); Sun, 6 Apr 2008 19:56:28 -0400 In-Reply-To: <1207313165.27710.337.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Sender: linux-ext4-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Fri, 4 Apr 2008, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > On Fri, 2008-04-04 at 10:02 +1100, James Morris wrote: > > On Thu, 3 Apr 2008, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > > > > > Try this patch, it will keep us from re-entering the fs when we aren't supposed > > > > > to. cc'ing Eric Paris since he's the only selinux guy I know :). I don't think > > > > Please see the MAINTAINERS file. > > > > > > > any of the other allocations in here need to be fixed, but I didn't look too > > > > > carefully. > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik > > > > Thanks, I'll push this to Linus, but note that further analysis is > > required. > > Please review. Looks good to me. > > More cases where SELinux must not re-enter the fs code. > Called from the d_instantiate security hook. > > Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley > > --- > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 ++++--- > security/selinux/include/security.h | 3 ++- > security/selinux/ss/services.c | 12 +++++++----- > 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index 41a049f..95b51b6 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -1143,7 +1143,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent > } > > len = INITCONTEXTLEN; > - context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); > + context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS); > if (!context) { > rc = -ENOMEM; > dput(dentry); > @@ -1161,7 +1161,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent > } > kfree(context); > len = rc; > - context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); > + context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS); > if (!context) { > rc = -ENOMEM; > dput(dentry); > @@ -1185,7 +1185,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent > rc = 0; > } else { > rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid, > - sbsec->def_sid); > + sbsec->def_sid, > + GFP_NOFS); > if (rc) { > printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) " > "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h > index f7d2f03..44e12ec 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h > +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h > @@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, > int security_context_to_sid(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, > u32 *out_sid); > > -int security_context_to_sid_default(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid); > +int security_context_to_sid_default(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, > + u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags); > > int security_get_user_sids(u32 callsid, char *username, > u32 **sids, u32 *nel); > diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c > index f374186..3f2bad2 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c > +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c > @@ -680,7 +680,8 @@ out: > > } > > -static int security_context_to_sid_core(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, u32 def_sid) > +static int security_context_to_sid_core(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, > + u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags) > { > char *scontext2; > struct context context; > @@ -709,7 +710,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *s > null suffix to the copy to avoid problems with the existing > attr package, which doesn't view the null terminator as part > of the attribute value. */ > - scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1,GFP_KERNEL); > + scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1, gfp_flags); > if (!scontext2) { > rc = -ENOMEM; > goto out; > @@ -809,7 +810,7 @@ out: > int security_context_to_sid(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid) > { > return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len, > - sid, SECSID_NULL); > + sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL); > } > > /** > @@ -829,10 +830,11 @@ int security_context_to_sid(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid) > * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient > * memory is available, or 0 on success. > */ > -int security_context_to_sid_default(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, u32 def_sid) > +int security_context_to_sid_default(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, > + u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags) > { > return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len, > - sid, def_sid); > + sid, def_sid, gfp_flags); > } > > static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context( > > -- James Morris