From: Austin S Hemmelgarn Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 21/48] ext4: Add richacl feature flag Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2015 08:33:54 -0400 Message-ID: <562634B2.30209@gmail.com> References: <1445008706-15115-1-git-send-email-agruenba@redhat.com> <1445008706-15115-22-git-send-email-agruenba@redhat.com> <5621346E.5000500@gmail.com> <5624ED40.7040206@gmail.com> <5625182C.3050007@gmail.com> <56253A35.4070309@gmail.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===============1381062868233193127==" Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, Linux NFS Mailing List , Theodore Ts'o , Linux API , Trond Myklebust , LKML , xfs@oss.sgi.com, "J. Bruce Fields" , Andreas Dilger , Alexander Viro , linux-fsdevel , Jeff Layton , linux-ext4 , Anna Schumaker , "Aneesh Kumar K.V" To: Andreas Gruenbacher Return-path: In-Reply-To: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: xfs-bounces@oss.sgi.com Sender: xfs-bounces@oss.sgi.com List-Id: linux-ext4.vger.kernel.org This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format. --===============1381062868233193127== Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha-512; boundary="------------ms040606010009020500030007" This is a cryptographically signed message in MIME format. --------------ms040606010009020500030007 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=gbk; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 2015-10-19 16:20, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote: > On Mon, Oct 19, 2015 at 8:45 PM, Austin S Hemmelgarn > wrote: >> On 2015-10-19 13:33, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote: >>> Please spare me with all that nonsense. Compared to mount options, >>> filesystem feature flags in this case simplify things (you don't have= >>> to specify whether a filesystem contains POSIX ACLs or richacls), and= >>> they prevent administrator errors: when a filesystem mounts, it is >>> safe to use; when it doesn't, it is not. That's all there is to it. >> >> You're ignoring what I'm actually saying. I've said absolutely nothing= >> about needing to use mount options at all, and I'm not arguing against= using >> filesystem feature flags, I'm arguing for using them sensibly in a way= that >> does not present a false sense of security. > > We could be on a multi-user system, and the user mounting the > filesystem may not be the only user on the system. When a filesystem > can be mounted read-only, it should be safe to use read-only. It is > not safe in general to use such a filesystem read-only, so an > incompatible feature flag which prevents such unsafe mounting is more > approporiate than a read-only incompatible feature flag. Except that mounting a filesystem that wasn't created on the system=20 mounting it always has that exact same risk, because (AFAIK) all=20 Linux/BSD/Other UNIX filesystems store GID's and UID's as numbers, not=20 names. Perfect example of this, take a minimal install of some Linux=20 distribution, install a couple of packages that add new UID's, and mount = the root filesystem on a completely different distribution (say mount a=20 Debian root filesystem on a Gentoo box), any of the new UID's from the=20 first system will almost certainly not map to the same user on the=20 second system (in fact, you can also do this with two Gentoo systems=20 where the packages were installed in different orders). This is a=20 really basic security risk that any seasoned sysadmin should know, and=20 most new ones find out about rather quickly. Also, based on established context of _every_ other feature with an=20 incompat feature flag in both ext4 and XFS, 'safe' means that you can=20 get the correct file contents off of the filesystem,and don't run the=20 risk of crashing the system, not that you have no risk of compromising=20 security. > Mounting a filesystem read-only doesn't mean that the filesystem is > being recovered, it is perfectly legal to mount a filesystem read-only > for other reasons. I don't want to give people using read-only > filesystems the false sense that everything is okay. Yes, and this is why any sane filesystem will spit a warning out through = dmesg when a mount is forced read-only because of incompatible features. = If someone is actively mounting such a filesystem read-only (that is,=20 they've specified 'ro' in the mount options), then it's relatively safe=20 for the kernel to assume they are doing so for some very specific reason = and/or already know about the data safety implications. > >> Making it an incompatible flag will likely cause headaches for some >> legitimate users, > > Indeed. It will also make it less likely for users to accidentally > shoot themselves in the foot. If someone knows better, they can clear > the feature flag. Except there will be a lot of people who think they know better but=20 really don't. Such people will do this anyway, and by modifying the=20 filesystem run a bigger risk of shooting themselves in the foot (because = they'll almost certainly mount the filesystem read-write, and then end=20 up turning on richacls again). You're not removing the gun, you're just = hiding a potentially bigger one somewhere else. It's a separate issue entirely however whether or not you absolutely=20 need to know that the richacls have the correct syntax in a recovery=20 situation. Fsck doesn't parse SELinux labels, (AFAIK) doesn't parse=20 filecaps attributes (bad filecaps syntax will only make things have=20 fewer privileges, but it will cause user visible brokenness), (again,=20 AFAIK) doesn't validate POSIX ACL's, and absolutely doesn't check IMA or = EVM hashes. IMA and EVM hashes being wrong _will_ cause almost any=20 system actually using them they way they are intended to fail to boot,=20 and incorrect SELinux labeling will make many systems not boot=20 correctly, and both situations are much worse for a significant majority = of users than a (security leak due to a bad ACL. > > When recovering a broken system that contains richacl filesystems, you > really want to have richacl support in the rescue system as well. > Otherwise, you won't be able to fsck those filesystems. While it's something that 'should' be the case, there are probably quite = a few people who will not realize this until they're already in a=20 situation that they need to recover data. On top of that some people=20 will likely assume that they just need richacl support in userspace for=20 their recovery environment. > >> and at most delay competent hackers by a few seconds to a >> few minutes, and script kiddies by a few hours, and is really no bette= r than >> security by obscurity (and from a purely logistical standpoint, that's= _all_ >> it is) in that it actively tries to hide the fact that someone having = read >> access to the storage the filesystem is on can bypass the ACL's. >> >> To reiterate, if someone can call mount() on a filesystem, and mount()= does >> not return -EPERM, then even if mount() returns a different error, the= y >> still have the ability to completely bypass all permissions and ACL's = in >> that filesystem, because they have the ability to read the entire file= system >> directly. >> >> The _only_ way to properly protect against people bypassing the ACL's = is to >> use full disk encryption and lock down root access on the system, and = even >> that can't completely prevent it from happening. > > That's all completely beside the point. I'm not talking about > preventing attacks at all, just basic administrative workflows. While that may be the case, there will be people who assume that because = it's an incompat feature, their ACL's will _always_ be enforced. Such=20 people should admittedly not be allowed to run systems with any real=20 world security requirements, but that mentality is something that still=20 needs to be considered, and this is arguably making it easier for them=20 to shoot themselves in the foot. --------------ms040606010009020500030007 Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAqCAMIACAQExDzANBglghkgBZQMEAgMFADCABgkqhkiG9w0BBwEAAKCC Brgwgga0MIIEnKADAgECAgMRLfgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQENBQAweTEQMA4GA1UEChMHUm9vdCBD QTEeMBwGA1UECxMVaHR0cDovL3d3dy5jYWNlcnQub3JnMSIwIAYDVQQDExlDQSBDZXJ0IFNp Z25pbmcgQXV0aG9yaXR5MSEwHwYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhJzdXBwb3J0QGNhY2VydC5vcmcwHhcN MTUwOTIxMTEzNTEzWhcNMTYwMzE5MTEzNTEzWjBjMRgwFgYDVQQDEw9DQWNlcnQgV29UIFVz ZXIxIzAhBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWFGFoZmVycm9pbjdAZ21haWwuY29tMSIwIAYJKoZIhvcNAQkB FhNhaGVtbWVsZ0BvaGlvZ3QuY29tMIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEA nQ/81tq0QBQi5w316VsVNfjg6kVVIMx760TuwA1MUaNQgQ3NyUl+UyFtjhpkNwwChjgAqfGd LIMTHAdObcwGfzO5uI2o1a8MHVQna8FRsU3QGouysIOGQlX8jFYXMKPEdnlt0GoQcd+BtESr pivbGWUEkPs1CwM6WOrs+09bAJP3qzKIr0VxervFrzrC5Dg9Rf18r9WXHElBuWHg4GYHNJ2V Ab8iKc10h44FnqxZK8RDN8ts/xX93i9bIBmHnFfyNRfiOUtNVeynJbf6kVtdHP+CRBkXCNRZ qyQT7gbTGD24P92PS2UTmDfplSBcWcTn65o3xWfesbf02jF6PL3BCrVnDRI4RgYxG3zFBJuG qvMoEODLhHKSXPAyQhwZINigZNdw5G1NqjXqUw+lIqdQvoPijK9J3eijiakh9u2bjWOMaleI SMRR6XsdM2O5qun1dqOrCgRkM0XSNtBQ2JjY7CycIx+qifJWsRaYWZz0aQU4ZrtAI7gVhO9h pyNaAGjvm7PdjEBiXq57e4QcgpwzvNlv8pG1c/hnt0msfDWNJtl3b6elhQ2Pz4w/QnWifZ8E BrFEmjeeJa2dqjE3giPVWrsH+lOvQQONsYJOuVb8b0zao4vrWeGmW2q2e3pdv0Axzm/60cJQ haZUv8+JdX9ZzqxOm5w5eUQSclt84u+D+hsCAwEAAaOCAVkwggFVMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAw VgYJYIZIAYb4QgENBEkWR1RvIGdldCB5b3VyIG93biBjZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBmb3IgRlJFRSBo ZWFkIG92ZXIgdG8gaHR0cDovL3d3dy5DQWNlcnQub3JnMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIDqDBABgNV HSUEOTA3BggrBgEFBQcDBAYIKwYBBQUHAwIGCisGAQQBgjcKAwQGCisGAQQBgjcKAwMGCWCG SAGG+EIEATAyBggrBgEFBQcBAQQmMCQwIgYIKwYBBQUHMAGGFmh0dHA6Ly9vY3NwLmNhY2Vy dC5vcmcwMQYDVR0fBCowKDAmoCSgIoYgaHR0cDovL2NybC5jYWNlcnQub3JnL3Jldm9rZS5j cmwwNAYDVR0RBC0wK4EUYWhmZXJyb2luN0BnbWFpbC5jb22BE2FoZW1tZWxnQG9oaW9ndC5j b20wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQENBQADggIBADMnxtSLiIunh/TQcjnRdf63yf2D8jMtYUm4yDoCF++J jCXbPQBGrpCEHztlNSGIkF3PH7ohKZvlqF4XePWxpY9dkr/pNyCF1PRkwxUURqvuHXbu8Lwn 8D3U2HeOEU3KmrfEo65DcbanJCMTTW7+mU9lZICPP7ZA9/zB+L0Gm1UNFZ6AU50N/86vjQfY WgkCd6dZD4rQ5y8L+d/lRbJW7ZGEQw1bSFVTRpkxxDTOwXH4/GpQfnfqTAtQuJ1CsKT12e+H NSD/RUWGTr289dA3P4nunBlz7qfvKamxPymHeBEUcuICKkL9/OZrnuYnGROFwcdvfjGE5iLB kjp/ttrY4aaVW5EsLASNgiRmA6mbgEAMlw3RwVx0sVelbiIAJg9Twzk4Ct6U9uBKiJ8S0sS2 8RCSyTmCRhJs0vvva5W9QUFGmp5kyFQEoSfBRJlbZfGX2ehI2Hi3U2/PMUm2ONuQG1E+a0AP u7I0NJc/Xil7rqR0gdbfkbWp0a+8dAvaM6J00aIcNo+HkcQkUgtfrw+C2Oyl3q8IjivGXZqT 5UdGUb2KujLjqjG91Dun3/RJ/qgQlotH7WkVBs7YJVTCxfkdN36rToPcnMYOI30FWa0Q06gn F6gUv9/mo6riv3A5bem/BdbgaJoPnWQD9D8wSyci9G4LKC+HQAMdLmGoeZfpJzKHMYIE0TCC BM0CAQEwgYAweTEQMA4GA1UEChMHUm9vdCBDQTEeMBwGA1UECxMVaHR0cDovL3d3dy5jYWNl cnQub3JnMSIwIAYDVQQDExlDQSBDZXJ0IFNpZ25pbmcgQXV0aG9yaXR5MSEwHwYJKoZIhvcN AQkBFhJzdXBwb3J0QGNhY2VydC5vcmcCAxEt+DANBglghkgBZQMEAgMFAKCCAiEwGAYJKoZI hvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMTUxMDIwMTIzMzU0WjBPBgkq hkiG9w0BCQQxQgRAj1L+Syg4dbUYi2qcwmE+jNm5rTyYPrSY5Ob8jRK38O9LlayAfHOj9jb8 SEf1wFoaPsAGxvubcBrHDkkKizb5cjBsBgkqhkiG9w0BCQ8xXzBdMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQBKjAL BglghkgBZQMEAQIwCgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwDgYIKoZIhvcNAwICAgCAMA0GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgFA MAcGBSsOAwIHMA0GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgEoMIGRBgkrBgEEAYI3EAQxgYMwgYAweTEQMA4GA1UE ChMHUm9vdCBDQTEeMBwGA1UECxMVaHR0cDovL3d3dy5jYWNlcnQub3JnMSIwIAYDVQQDExlD QSBDZXJ0IFNpZ25pbmcgQXV0aG9yaXR5MSEwHwYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhJzdXBwb3J0QGNhY2Vy dC5vcmcCAxEt+DCBkwYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAgsxgYOggYAweTEQMA4GA1UEChMHUm9vdCBDQTEe MBwGA1UECxMVaHR0cDovL3d3dy5jYWNlcnQub3JnMSIwIAYDVQQDExlDQSBDZXJ0IFNpZ25p bmcgQXV0aG9yaXR5MSEwHwYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhJzdXBwb3J0QGNhY2VydC5vcmcCAxEt+DAN BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAgCWWuFoUTqUSz3x3mcTcR+lwaVb2l1uaKJ+t2BrrztgX2LuV6bR W5Bu+AZ5fiuCz0DkRWPTLylUlHpRhcMxbWk+K1fdwIoQ4eahjhm7IGJxCgKtl5RXhV9wQC3Q Epb/iIZbbRVQE/BjZKayDRlJlQTUxVGm6rq8eK2xK93KLraCKpDkXm8bE2bjzq4pcj0l1+6g +EcnJXt+lTVlgdiUO8iEtXbsl+JNldmLY2PFSWvHWjZmk9Io6qIABx5usfQwro7/g9WZng7N WzsyAHDo4OM4+wjo7hKf6jlrCTAhq2TYqJ0xfbM4qh+2NX3IE5scQxX+Tawrq729onQ+6uN9 UvZOCljtOKWJPshwWQgWBnJk84ijIp55KYTyWwfdMFhzQxcU0MRh5gaKD8AhPAW/dY3yyhaT alt8FA1BkOLb1XwC1AfTZ9LSiK4aB2x9RNl1P671wl1e81zrzBXde04EsSs38hIZFbooxXc7 NANxTEmDhKX85MRll75lDLU7sQCajx8BtYEfbSvHwh6Fs2d6DuBamBcQbL9sEK8Vu29S7CYB No/SBmsFRim1bLpAhUIRNo/7FnYt112SVUIVp+vpnZpybjCpz4vproYMhMiJBeXYxSVPFjGd AKxZRXd2s2IMc5LukNGsVk0AyBn/jtY5Jg1l1YcUKoVY6W14hA2IxbbNHwAAAAAAAA== --------------ms040606010009020500030007-- --===============1381062868233193127== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline _______________________________________________ xfs mailing list xfs@oss.sgi.com http://oss.sgi.com/mailman/listinfo/xfs --===============1381062868233193127==--