From: Eric Biggers Subject: [RFC PATCH 21/25] fscrypt: require that key be added when setting a v2 encryption policy Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2017 14:40:54 -0700 Message-ID: <20171023214058.128121-22-ebiggers3@gmail.com> References: <20171023214058.128121-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: Ryo Hashimoto , Gwendal Grignou , "Theodore Y . Ts'o" , Eric Biggers , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Nick Desaulniers , linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, Michael Halcrow , Sarthak Kukreti , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Jaegeuk Kim , linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20171023214058.128121-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: linux-f2fs-devel-bounces@lists.sourceforge.net List-Id: linux-ext4.vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers By looking up the master keys in a filesystem-level keyring rather than in the calling processes' key hierarchy, it becomes possible for a user to set an encryption policy which refers to some key they don't actually know, then encrypt their files using that key. Cryptographically this shouldn't actually be a major problem; for one, every file will still be encrypted with a unique derived key, rather than with the master key directly. But to be on the safe side, enforce that a v2 encryption policy can only be set if the user has previously added the key, or has capable(CAP_FOWNER). We tolerate that this problem will continue to exist for v1 encryption policies, however; there is no way around that. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 2 ++ fs/crypto/keyinfo.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/crypto/policy.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 50 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h index d0a63086fa95..7a0d5b6c2504 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h @@ -234,6 +234,8 @@ extern struct page *fscrypt_alloc_bounce_page(struct fscrypt_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp_flags); /* keyinfo.c */ +extern int fscrypt_verify_key_added(struct super_block *sb, + const u8 identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE]); extern struct key_type key_type_fscrypt_mk; extern struct key_type key_type_fscrypt_mk_user; extern void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void); diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c index 1fe44983239a..fd59f37dad10 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c @@ -851,6 +851,48 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_add_key); +/* + * Verify that the current user has added a master key that has the given + * identifier (returns -ENOKEY if not). This is needed to prevent a user from + * encrypting their files using some other user's key which they don't actually + * know. Cryptographically speaking, it's debatable how much of a problem this + * actually would be, but it's best to just forbid it. + * + * The system administrator (CAP_FOWNER) can override this, which should be + * enough for any use cases where encryption policies are being set using keys + * that were chosen ahead of time but aren't available at the moment. + */ +int fscrypt_verify_key_added(struct super_block *sb, + const u8 identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE]) +{ + struct fscrypt_key_specifier mk_spec; + struct key *key, *mk_user; + struct fscrypt_master_key *mk; + int err; + + mk_spec.type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER; + memcpy(mk_spec.identifier, identifier, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE); + + key = find_master_key(sb, &mk_spec); + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + err = PTR_ERR(key); + goto out; + } + mk = key->payload.data[0]; + mk_user = find_master_key_user(mk); + if (IS_ERR(mk_user)) { + err = PTR_ERR(mk_user); + } else { + key_put(mk_user); + err = 0; + } + key_put(key); +out: + if (err == -ENOKEY && capable(CAP_FOWNER)) + err = 0; + return err; +} + static void evict_dentries_for_decrypted_inodes(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) { struct fscrypt_info *ci; diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c index 27a391038f73..cfb404def9ed 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/policy.c +++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c @@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ static int set_encryption_policy(struct inode *inode, const union fscrypt_policy *policy) { union fscrypt_context ctx; + int err; if (!fscrypt_supported_policy(policy)) return -EINVAL; @@ -190,6 +191,11 @@ static int set_encryption_policy(struct inode *inode, */ pr_warn_once("%s (pid %d) is setting less secure v1 encryption policy; recommend upgrading to v2.\n", current->comm, current->pid); + } else { + err = fscrypt_verify_key_added(inode->i_sb, + policy->v2.master_key_identifier); + if (err) + return err; } return inode->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(inode, &ctx, -- 2.15.0.rc0.271.g36b669edcc-goog ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most engaging tech sites, Slashdot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot