Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:37752 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726699AbeLJST1 (ORCPT ); Mon, 10 Dec 2018 13:19:27 -0500 Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 10:19:23 -0800 From: Eric Biggers To: Chandan Rajendra Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, adilger.kernel@dilger.ca, jaegeuk@kernel.org, yuchao0@huawei.com, corbet@lwn.net, ralf@linux-mips.org, paul.burton@mips.com, jhogan@kernel.org, green.hu@gmail.com, deanbo422@gmail.com, schwidefsky@de.ibm.com, heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com, richard@nod.at, dedekind1@gmail.com, adrian.hunter@intel.com, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 7/9] fsverity: Remove filesystem specific build config option Message-ID: <20181210181923.GG92174@gmail.com> References: <20181208065144.19486-1-chandan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20181208065144.19486-8-chandan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20181208065144.19486-8-chandan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Sender: linux-ext4-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Sat, Dec 08, 2018 at 12:21:42PM +0530, Chandan Rajendra wrote: > In order to have a common code base for fsverity "post read" processing > for all filesystems which support fsverity, this commit removes > filesystem specific build config option (e.g. CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY) > and replaces it with a build option (i.e. CONFIG_FS_VERITY) whose > value affects all the filesystems making use of fsverity. > > Signed-off-by: Chandan Rajendra Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers > --- > Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 4 ++-- > fs/ext4/Kconfig | 20 -------------------- > fs/ext4/ext4.h | 2 -- > fs/ext4/readpage.c | 4 ++-- > fs/ext4/super.c | 6 +++--- > fs/ext4/sysfs.c | 4 ++-- > fs/f2fs/Kconfig | 20 -------------------- > fs/f2fs/data.c | 2 +- > fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 2 -- > fs/f2fs/super.c | 6 +++--- > fs/f2fs/sysfs.c | 4 ++-- > fs/verity/Kconfig | 3 ++- > fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 1 - > include/linux/fs.h | 4 ++-- > include/linux/fsverity.h | 7 +++---- > 15 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst > index d633fc0567bd..bb208dad10d9 100644 > --- a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst > +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst > @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ ext4 > > ext4 supports fs-verity since kernel version TODO. > > -CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY must be enabled in the kernel config. Also, the > +CONFIG_FS_VERITY must be enabled in the kernel config. Also, the > filesystem must have been formatted with ``-O verity``, or had > ``tune2fs -O verity`` run on it. These require e2fsprogs v1.44.4-2 or > later. This e2fsprogs version is also required for e2fsck to > @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ f2fs > > f2fs supports fs-verity since kernel version TODO. > > -CONFIG_F2FS_FS_VERITY must be enabled in the kernel config. Also, the > +CONFIG_FS_VERITY must be enabled in the kernel config. Also, the > filesystem must have been formatted with ``-O verity``. This requires > f2fs-tools v1.11.0 or later. > > diff --git a/fs/ext4/Kconfig b/fs/ext4/Kconfig > index e1002bbf35bf..031e5a82d556 100644 > --- a/fs/ext4/Kconfig > +++ b/fs/ext4/Kconfig > @@ -96,26 +96,6 @@ config EXT4_FS_SECURITY > If you are not using a security module that requires using > extended attributes for file security labels, say N. > > -config EXT4_FS_VERITY > - bool "Ext4 Verity" > - depends on EXT4_FS > - select FS_VERITY > - help > - This option enables fs-verity for ext4. fs-verity is the > - dm-verity mechanism implemented at the file level. Userspace > - can append a Merkle tree (hash tree) to a file, then enable > - fs-verity on the file. ext4 will then transparently verify > - any data read from the file against the Merkle tree. The file > - is also made read-only. > - > - This serves as an integrity check, but the availability of the > - Merkle tree root hash also allows efficiently supporting > - various use cases where normally the whole file would need to > - be hashed at once, such as auditing and authenticity > - verification (appraisal). > - > - If unsure, say N. > - > config EXT4_DEBUG > bool "EXT4 debugging support" > depends on EXT4_FS > diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h > index 64bf9fb7ef18..bff8d639dd0c 100644 > --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h > +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h > @@ -41,8 +41,6 @@ > #endif > > #include > - > -#define __FS_HAS_VERITY IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY) > #include > > #include > diff --git a/fs/ext4/readpage.c b/fs/ext4/readpage.c > index 2c037df629dd..8717ac0a5bb2 100644 > --- a/fs/ext4/readpage.c > +++ b/fs/ext4/readpage.c > @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static struct bio_post_read_ctx *get_bio_post_read_ctx(struct inode *inode, > > if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) > post_read_steps |= 1 << STEP_DECRYPT; > -#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > if (inode->i_verity_info != NULL && > (index < ((i_size_read(inode) + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT))) > post_read_steps |= 1 << STEP_VERITY; > @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static void mpage_end_io(struct bio *bio) > > static inline loff_t ext4_readpage_limit(struct inode *inode) > { > -#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > if (IS_VERITY(inode)) { > if (inode->i_verity_info) > /* limit to end of metadata region */ > diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c > index 35ed3c48f8d2..0d169de59f76 100644 > --- a/fs/ext4/super.c > +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c > @@ -1316,7 +1316,7 @@ static const struct fscrypt_operations ext4_cryptops = { > }; > #endif > > -#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > static int ext4_set_verity(struct inode *inode, loff_t data_i_size) > { > int err; > @@ -1402,7 +1402,7 @@ static const struct fsverity_operations ext4_verityops = { > .set_verity = ext4_set_verity, > .get_metadata_end = ext4_get_metadata_end, > }; > -#endif /* CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY */ > +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_VERITY */ > > #ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA > static const char * const quotatypes[] = INITQFNAMES; > @@ -4235,7 +4235,7 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) > #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION > sb->s_cop = &ext4_cryptops; > #endif > -#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > sb->s_vop = &ext4_verityops; > #endif > #ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA > diff --git a/fs/ext4/sysfs.c b/fs/ext4/sysfs.c > index 8bc915452a38..6fa0f47c3180 100644 > --- a/fs/ext4/sysfs.c > +++ b/fs/ext4/sysfs.c > @@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(meta_bg_resize); > #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION > EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(encryption); > #endif > -#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(verity); > #endif > EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(metadata_csum_seed); > @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ static struct attribute *ext4_feat_attrs[] = { > #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION > ATTR_LIST(encryption), > #endif > -#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > ATTR_LIST(verity), > #endif > ATTR_LIST(metadata_csum_seed), > diff --git a/fs/f2fs/Kconfig b/fs/f2fs/Kconfig > index a5a1a381fcf1..e57cc754d543 100644 > --- a/fs/f2fs/Kconfig > +++ b/fs/f2fs/Kconfig > @@ -71,26 +71,6 @@ config F2FS_CHECK_FS > > If you want to improve the performance, say N. > > -config F2FS_FS_VERITY > - bool "F2FS Verity" > - depends on F2FS_FS > - select FS_VERITY > - help > - This option enables fs-verity for f2fs. fs-verity is the > - dm-verity mechanism implemented at the file level. Userspace > - can append a Merkle tree (hash tree) to a file, then enable > - fs-verity on the file. f2fs will then transparently verify > - any data read from the file against the Merkle tree. The file > - is also made read-only. > - > - This serves as an integrity check, but the availability of the > - Merkle tree root hash also allows efficiently supporting > - various use cases where normally the whole file would need to > - be hashed at once, such as auditing and authenticity > - verification (appraisal). > - > - If unsure, say N. > - > config F2FS_IO_TRACE > bool "F2FS IO tracer" > depends on F2FS_FS > diff --git a/fs/f2fs/data.c b/fs/f2fs/data.c > index 844ec573263e..83b59b985894 100644 > --- a/fs/f2fs/data.c > +++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c > @@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ static struct bio *f2fs_grab_read_bio(struct inode *inode, block_t blkaddr, > > if (f2fs_encrypted_file(inode)) > post_read_steps |= 1 << STEP_DECRYPT; > -#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_VERITY > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > if (inode->i_verity_info != NULL && > (first_idx < ((i_size_read(inode) + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT))) > post_read_steps |= 1 << STEP_VERITY; > diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h > index 54bd93c7b630..7161918042e7 100644 > --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h > +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h > @@ -25,8 +25,6 @@ > #include > > #include > - > -#define __FS_HAS_VERITY IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_F2FS_FS_VERITY) > #include > > #ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS > diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c > index 73320202bd01..4a67b901eefc 100644 > --- a/fs/f2fs/super.c > +++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c > @@ -2197,7 +2197,7 @@ static const struct fscrypt_operations f2fs_cryptops = { > }; > #endif > > -#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_VERITY > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > static int f2fs_set_verity(struct inode *inode, loff_t data_i_size) > { > int err; > @@ -2223,7 +2223,7 @@ static const struct fsverity_operations f2fs_verityops = { > .set_verity = f2fs_set_verity, > .get_metadata_end = f2fs_get_metadata_end, > }; > -#endif /* CONFIG_F2FS_FS_VERITY */ > +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_VERITY */ > > static struct inode *f2fs_nfs_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, > u64 ino, u32 generation) > @@ -3147,7 +3147,7 @@ static int f2fs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) > #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION > sb->s_cop = &f2fs_cryptops; > #endif > -#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_VERITY > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > sb->s_vop = &f2fs_verityops; > #endif > sb->s_xattr = f2fs_xattr_handlers; > diff --git a/fs/f2fs/sysfs.c b/fs/f2fs/sysfs.c > index 737677655bc0..949e6d87f4e3 100644 > --- a/fs/f2fs/sysfs.c > +++ b/fs/f2fs/sysfs.c > @@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(flexible_inline_xattr, FEAT_FLEXIBLE_INLINE_XATTR); > F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(quota_ino, FEAT_QUOTA_INO); > F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(inode_crtime, FEAT_INODE_CRTIME); > F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(lost_found, FEAT_LOST_FOUND); > -#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_VERITY > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(verity, FEAT_VERITY); > #endif > F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(sb_checksum, FEAT_SB_CHECKSUM); > @@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ static struct attribute *f2fs_feat_attrs[] = { > ATTR_LIST(quota_ino), > ATTR_LIST(inode_crtime), > ATTR_LIST(lost_found), > -#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_VERITY > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > ATTR_LIST(verity), > #endif > ATTR_LIST(sb_checksum), > diff --git a/fs/verity/Kconfig b/fs/verity/Kconfig > index a7470a2e4892..6d9437a432cd 100644 > --- a/fs/verity/Kconfig > +++ b/fs/verity/Kconfig > @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ > config FS_VERITY > - tristate "FS Verity (read-only file-based authenticity protection)" > + bool "FS Verity (read-only file-based authenticity protection)" > select CRYPTO > # SHA-256 is selected as it's intended to be the default hash algorithm. > # To avoid bloat, other wanted algorithms must be selected explicitly. > @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ config FS_VERITY > the contents may actually be needed. Also, fs-verity verifies > data each time it is paged back in, which provides better > protection against malicious disks vs. an ahead-of-time hash. > + Currently Ext4 and F2FS make use of this feature. > > If unsure, say N. > > diff --git a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h > index 4b39d0a5544b..a7acb98ac42e 100644 > --- a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h > +++ b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h > @@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ > #define pr_fmt(fmt) "fs-verity: " fmt > > #include > -#define __FS_HAS_VERITY 1 > #include > > /* > diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h > index de602d9f8d0e..1583b861a225 100644 > --- a/include/linux/fs.h > +++ b/include/linux/fs.h > @@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ struct inode { > struct fscrypt_info *i_crypt_info; > #endif > > -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > struct fsverity_info *i_verity_info; > #endif > > @@ -1407,7 +1407,7 @@ struct super_block { > #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION > const struct fscrypt_operations *s_cop; > #endif > -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > const struct fsverity_operations *s_vop; > #endif > struct hlist_bl_head s_roots; /* alternate root dentries for NFS */ > diff --git a/include/linux/fsverity.h b/include/linux/fsverity.h > index c30c4f6ed411..ea8c418bd7d5 100644 > --- a/include/linux/fsverity.h > +++ b/include/linux/fsverity.h > @@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ struct fsverity_operations { > int (*get_metadata_end)(struct inode *inode, loff_t *metadata_end_ret); > }; > > -#if __FS_HAS_VERITY > - > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > /* ioctl.c */ > extern int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg); > extern int fsverity_ioctl_measure(struct file *filp, void __user *arg); > @@ -42,7 +41,7 @@ static inline bool fsverity_check_hole(struct inode *inode, struct page *page) > return inode->i_verity_info == NULL || fsverity_verify_page(page); > } > > -#else /* !__FS_HAS_VERITY */ > +#else /* ! CONFIG_FS_VERITY */ > > /* ioctl.c */ > > @@ -107,6 +106,6 @@ static inline bool fsverity_check_hole(struct inode *inode, struct page *page) > return true; > } > > -#endif /* !__FS_HAS_VERITY */ > +#endif /* ! CONFIG_FS_VERITY */ > > #endif /* _LINUX_FSVERITY_H */ > -- > 2.19.1 >