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Date:   Sun, 15 Sep 2019 09:27:05 +0200
From:   "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
To:     Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
Cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
        Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
        Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>,
        William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>,
        "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>,
        zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
        lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Linux 5.3-rc8
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On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 08:51:42AM +0200, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> On Sa, 14.09.19 09:30, Linus Torvalds (torvalds@linux-foundation.org) wrote:
[...]
> 
> And please don't break /dev/urandom again. The above code is the ony
> way I see how we can make /dev/urandom-derived swap encryption safe,
> and the only way I can see how we can sanely write a valid random seed
> to disk after boot.
>

Any hope in making systemd-random-seed(8) credit that "random seed
from previous boot" file, through RNDADDENTROPY, *by default*?

Because of course this makes the problem reliably go away on my system
too (as discussed in the original bug report, but you were not CCed).

I know that by v243, just released 12 days ago, this can be optionally
done through SYSTEMD_RANDOM_SEED_CREDIT=1. I wonder though if it can
ever be done by default, just like what the BSDs does... This would
solve a big part of the current problem.

> Lennart

thanks,

-- 
darwi
http://darwish.chasingpointers.com