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From:   Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Date:   Mon, 16 Sep 2019 09:17:10 -0700
Message-ID: <CAHk-=wjWSRzTjwN9F5gQcxtPkAgaRHJOOOTUjVakqP-Nzg9BXA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Linux 5.3-rc8
To:     Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc:     "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
        Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>,
        "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>,
        Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>,
        Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
        Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>,
        William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>,
        "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>,
        zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
        lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
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On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 11:13 PM Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
>
> >
> > So three out of four flag combinations end up being mostly "don't
> > use", and the fourth one isn't what you'd normally want (which is just
> > plain /dev/urandom semantics).
>
> I'm seeing it from a different angle. I now understand better why
> getrandom() absolutely wants to have an initialized pool, it's to
> encourage private key producers to use a secure, infinite source of
> randomness.

Right. There is absolutely no question that that is a useful thing to have.

And that's what GRND_RANDOM _should_ have meant. But didn't.

So the semantics that getrandom() should have had are:

 getrandom(0) - just give me reasonable random numbers for any of a
million non-strict-long-term-security use (ie the old urandom)

    - the nonblocking flag makes no sense here and would be a no-op

 getrandom(GRND_RANDOM) - get me actual _secure_ random numbers with
blocking until entropy pool fills (but not the completely invalid
entropy decrease accounting)

    - the nonblocking flag is useful for bootup and for "I will
actually try to generate entropy".

and both of those are very very sensible actions. That would actually
have _fixed_ the problems we had with /dev/[u]random, both from a
performance standpoint and for a filesystem access standpoint.

But that is sadly not what we have right now.

And I suspect we can't fix it, since people have grown to depend on
the old behavior, and already know to avoid GRND_RANDOM because it's
useless with old kernels even if we fixed it with new ones.

Does anybody really seriously debate the above? Ted? Are you seriously
trying to claim that the existing GRND_RANDOM has any sensible use?
Are you seriously trying to claim that the fact that we don't have a
sane urandom source is a "feature"?

                   Linus