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Date:   Fri, 10 Jan 2020 00:02:37 +0100
From:   Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
To:     "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc:     Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
        "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>,
        Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>,
        Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
        Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
        Ext4 Developers List <linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/8] Rework random blocking
Message-ID: <20200109230237.GA2992@roeckx.be>
References: <20191226140423.GB3158@mit.edu>
 <4048434.Q8HajmOrkZ@tauon.chronox.de>
 <20191227130436.GC70060@mit.edu>
 <15817620.rmTN4T87Wr@tauon.chronox.de>
 <20191227220857.GD70060@mit.edu>
 <20200109220230.GA39185@roeckx.be>
 <20200109224011.GD41242@mit.edu>
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On Thu, Jan 09, 2020 at 05:40:11PM -0500, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 09, 2020 at 11:02:30PM +0100, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
> > 
> > One thing the NIST DRBGs have is prediction resistance, which is
> > done by reseeding. If you chain DRBGs, you tell your parent DRBG
> > that you want prediction resistance, so your parent will also
> > reseed. There currently is no way to tell the kernel to reseed.
> 
> It would be simple enough to add a new flag, perhaps GRND_RESEED, to
> getrandom() which requests that the kernel reseed first.  This would
> require sufficient amounts of entropy in the input pool to do the
> reseed; if there is not enough, the getrandom() call would block until
> there was enough.  If GRND_NONBLOCK is supplied, then getrandom()
> would return EAGAIN if there wasn't sufficient entropy.
> 
> Is this what you want?

I think some people might want to see it, but I think you
shouldn't add it.

> > I don't think we want that. As far as I know, the only reason for
> > using /dev/random is that /dev/urandom returns data before it
> > has sufficient entropy.
> 
> Is there any objections to just using getrandom(2)?

It provides the interface we want, so no. But there are still
people who don't have it for various reasons. OpenSSL actually
does the system call itself if libc doesn't provider a wrapper for
it.


Kurt