From: Trond Myklebust Subject: Re: NFSv3+Krb5 and mountd Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2004 18:25:14 -0400 Sender: nfs-admin@lists.sourceforge.net Message-ID: <1093904714.8729.106.camel@lade.trondhjem.org> References: <20040824184138.GB3251@nasse> <20040830020132.GA28919@fieldses.org> <20040830154541.GA3671@nasse> <1093884302.8729.21.camel@lade.trondhjem.org> <20040830171734.GC1555@fieldses.org> <1093887933.8729.35.camel@lade.trondhjem.org> <20040830180402.GE1555@fieldses.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Cc: Per Olofsson , Paul Jakma , nfs@lists.sourceforge.net Return-path: Received: from sc8-sf-mx1-b.sourceforge.net ([10.3.1.11] helo=sc8-sf-mx1.sourceforge.net) by sc8-sf-list2.sourceforge.net with esmtp (Exim 4.30) id 1C1uag-0006mk-0x for nfs@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 30 Aug 2004 15:25:30 -0700 Received: from dh138.citi.umich.edu ([141.211.133.138] helo=lade.trondhjem.org ident=Debian-exim) by sc8-sf-mx1.sourceforge.net with esmtp (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.34) id 1C1uae-0000Dl-Ck for nfs@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 30 Aug 2004 15:25:29 -0700 To: "J. Bruce Fields" In-Reply-To: <20040830180402.GE1555@fieldses.org> Errors-To: nfs-admin@lists.sourceforge.net List-Unsubscribe: , List-Id: Discussion of NFS under Linux development, interoperability, and testing. List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , List-Archive: P=E5 m=E5 , 30/08/2004 klokka 14:04, skreiv J. Bruce Fields: > Since we specify the rpcsec_gss security flavor as the client in > /etc/exports, in the place of the ip address/network/whatever, this > means in practice we'd need to allow MOUNT from any ip address for a > filesystem that's exported to rpcsec_gss. Which I suppose is OK, though > I don't understand why clients really want to do that. See the RFC. It was basically Sun's decision in order to avoid having to assign machine credentials to their automounters. If you want your server to work with SunOS clients, then that's all pretty mandatory. > > mountd should always support AUTH_SYS, so no changes required there > > (apart from the need to add the supported RPCSEC_GSS pseudoflavours to > > the "auth_flavors" list). > > As far as I know, nobody (not even Sun) has set up NLM to work with > > RPCSEC_GSS either. >=20 > Well, I suppose unauthenticated locks are a DOS at worse. But the > lookup of the initial filehandle seems more security-critical to me. What can an attacker do with that filehandle? Actually re-reading the RFC, it does not actually restrict MOUNT to AUTH_SYS-only, but again - interoperability with Solaris automounters means that it is pretty much expected... Cheers, Trond ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.Net email is sponsored by BEA Weblogic Workshop FREE Java Enterprise J2EE developer tools! Get your free copy of BEA WebLogic Workshop 8.1 today. http://ads.osdn.com/?ad_id=5047&alloc_id=10808&op=click _______________________________________________ NFS maillist - NFS@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/nfs