From: "J. Bruce Fields" Subject: Re: NFSv3+Krb5 and mountd Date: Thu, 2 Sep 2004 11:39:08 -0400 Sender: nfs-admin@lists.sourceforge.net Message-ID: <20040902153908.GB32379@fieldses.org> References: <20040824184138.GB3251@nasse> <20040830020132.GA28919@fieldses.org> <20040830154541.GA3671@nasse> <1093884302.8729.21.camel@lade.trondhjem.org> <20040830171734.GC1555@fieldses.org> <1093887933.8729.35.camel@lade.trondhjem.org> <20040830180402.GE1555@fieldses.org> <1093904714.8729.106.camel@lade.trondhjem.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Cc: Per Olofsson , Paul Jakma , nfs@lists.sourceforge.net Return-path: Received: from sc8-sf-mx2-b.sourceforge.net ([10.3.1.12] helo=sc8-sf-mx2.sourceforge.net) by sc8-sf-list2.sourceforge.net with esmtp (Exim 4.30) id 1C2tgM-00048N-Sa for nfs@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 02 Sep 2004 08:39:26 -0700 Received: from dsl093-002-214.det1.dsl.speakeasy.net ([66.93.2.214] helo=pickle.fieldses.org) by sc8-sf-mx2.sourceforge.net with esmtp (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.34) id 1C2tgL-0003xw-5Y for nfs@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 02 Sep 2004 08:39:26 -0700 To: Trond Myklebust In-Reply-To: <1093904714.8729.106.camel@lade.trondhjem.org> Errors-To: nfs-admin@lists.sourceforge.net List-Unsubscribe: , List-Id: Discussion of NFS under Linux development, interoperability, and testing. List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , List-Archive: On Mon, Aug 30, 2004 at 06:25:14PM -0400, Trond Myklebust wrote: > P? m? , 30/08/2004 klokka 14:04, skreiv J. Bruce Fields: > > Well, I suppose unauthenticated locks are a DOS at worse. But the > > lookup of the initial filehandle seems more security-critical to me. > > What can an attacker do with that filehandle? One attack that rpcsec_gss is designed to prevent is spoofing of server's replies to the client. The client needs to be able to trust the root filehandle returned by the server; an attacker could probably do some interesting things by feeding the client faked replies with incorrect filehandles. > Actually re-reading the RFC, it does not actually restrict MOUNT to > AUTH_SYS-only, but again - interoperability with Solaris automounters > means that it is pretty much expected... Yeah, OK, but it's unfortunate. It would be better just to require the automounter to have credentials of some sort. --Bruce Fields ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.Net email is sponsored by BEA Weblogic Workshop FREE Java Enterprise J2EE developer tools! Get your free copy of BEA WebLogic Workshop 8.1 today. http://ads.osdn.com/?ad_id=5047&alloc_id=10808&op=click _______________________________________________ NFS maillist - NFS@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/nfs