From: dwalsh@redhat.com (Daniel J Walsh)
Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2011 11:59:00 -0500
Subject: [refpolicy] [patch 1/1] sudo: Fixes for sudo,
	handle /var/db/sudo
In-Reply-To: <4D6271B6.8020105@gmail.com>
References: <4D5EA91C.1080409@redhat.com>
	<1298092089.3101.51.camel@tesla.lan>	<4D62706E.9090801@redhat.com>
	<4D6271B6.8020105@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4D6299D4.5030001@redhat.com>
To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
List-Id: refpolicy.oss.tresys.com

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On 02/21/2011 09:07 AM, Dominick Grift wrote:
> On 02/21/2011 03:02 PM, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>> On 02/19/2011 12:08 AM, Guido Trentalancia wrote:
>>> Hello Miroslav !
> 
>>> On Fri, 18/02/2011 at 17.15 +0000, Miroslav Grepl wrote:
>>>> http://mgrepl.fedorapeople.org/F15/admin_sudo.patch
>>>>
>>>>      * Allow sudo to send signals to any domains the user could have 
>>>> transitioned to.
>>>>      * Handle /var/db/sudo
>>>>      * Allow users to run executables in /tmp or ~/
> 
>>> To the best of my knowledge, the first part of the last change is
>>> something really bad from a security point of view. 
> 
>>> System administrators put much effort to avoid that (such as
>>> mounting /tmp with noexec, nosuid options) !
> 
>>> A legitimate user does not need to store his/her executables in /tmp, as
>>> he/she has at least its own home directory available for that (and if
>>> he/she cannot write there, then he/she is probably over quota).
> 
>>> /tmp just "potentially provides storage space for malicious
>>> executables" (quoted from paragraph 2.2.1.3 of NSA public document
>>> "Guide to the Secure Configuration of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5"
>>> Revision 4, but any decent web search engine would easily provide you
>>> with tons of pages relative to the cries of those whom have allowed that
>>> sort of thing to happen on their systems).
> 
>>> Regards,
> 
>>> Guido
> 
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> refpolicy mailing list
>>> refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
>>> http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy
> 
>> +	userdom_domtrans_user_tmp($1_sudo_t, $3)
> 
>> Says to run user_tmp_t files as staff_t, Which is the equivalent of if
>> the staff_t had executed the file directly.
> 
>> I guess if execution of homedir/tmp dir was turned off this could be
>> seen as a priv escalation.
> 
> refpolicy does not have the above functionality afaik.
> 
>> staff_t is not allowed to execute user_tmp_t, but it can if it goes
>> through sudo.
> _______________________________________________
> refpolicy mailing list
> refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
> http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy
> 
_______________________________________________
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Are you saying staff_t is not allowed to execute user_tmp_t in reference
policy?
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