From: guido@trentalancia.com (Guido Trentalancia) Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2011 22:53:00 +0100 Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH 13/34]: patch to allow networkmanager dbus chat In-Reply-To: <4D7533E5.9050806@tresys.com> References: <1297836836.3205.56.camel@tesla.lan> <4D651B7A.4010100@tresys.com> <1298487030.29671.20.camel@tesla.lan> <4D74E408.2050501@tresys.com> <1299517796.2978.41.camel@tesla.lan> <4D7533E5.9050806@tresys.com> Message-ID: <1299793980.4680.5.camel@tesla.lan> To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com List-Id: refpolicy.oss.tresys.com On Mon, 07/03/2011 at 14.37 -0500, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote: > On 03/07/11 12:09, Guido Trentalancia wrote: > > On Mon, 07/03/2011 at 08.56 -0500, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote: > >> On 02/23/11 13:50, Guido Trentalancia wrote: > >>> Hello Christopher ! > >>> > >>> On Wed, 23/02/2011 at 09.36 -0500, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote: > >>>> On 02/16/11 01:13, Guido Trentalancia wrote: > >>>>> This patch allows dbus chat between networkmanager and dbus and > >>>>> between networkmanager and xdm. It also adds a missing permission > >>>>> (sysnet_read_dhcpc_state) to the networkmanager module. > [cut] > >>>>> diff -pruN refpolicy-git-15022011-new-before-modification/policy/modules/services/xserver.te refpolicy-git-15022011-new-modified/policy/modules/services/xserver.te > >>>>> --- refpolicy-git-15022011-new-before-modification/policy/modules/services/xserver.te 2011-02-15 23:07:24.845137330 +0100 > >>>>> +++ refpolicy-git-15022011-new-modified/policy/modules/services/xserver.te 2011-02-15 23:17:05.369699539 +0100 > >>>>> @@ -548,6 +548,10 @@ optional_policy(` > >>>>> ') > >>>>> > >>>>> optional_policy(` > >>>>> + networkmanager_dbus_chat(xdm_t) > >>>>> +') > >>> More or less I have reported back what was being requested (in the form > >>> of a patch). > >> It makes me wonder if everything is running in the right domain. > > That could be. But I have not been provided with a reference. So, can > > you provide a reference ps auxZ which then I will compare as soon as I > > can access the test system again ? > > It would be simpler if you could provide the ps output. The only process that should be running in xdm_t should be xdm/gdm/kdm. If your nm-applet is running in xdm_t, it is wrong. It should be running in the user's domain. Yes, I can now confirm. Everything past the X login runs in xdm_t because pam_selinux open is disabled for gdm. Enabling pam_selinux open for gdm leads to graphical login failures. I am trying to sort this out now. Is it a known issue ? Do you believe such a case (gdm not using pam_selinux) should be dropped and not considered as a possible scenario ? > > Also, what do you think about the idea of providing a make target (say > > "make check") in refpolicy which runs some minimal checks on that for at > > least the core processes ? > > I can't think of how that would work off the top of my head. If you have ideas, I'd be happy to listen. I'd prefer to not write a script that has all of the checking hard coded in it. Regards, Guido