From: sven.vermeulen@siphos.be (Sven Vermeulen)
Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2012 22:19:52 +0200
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH v2 2/6] Allow init scripts to handle sysctls
In-Reply-To: <4FF1B48F.4060909@tresys.com>
References: <1340911046-30441-1-git-send-email-sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
	<1340911046-30441-3-git-send-email-sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
	<4FF1B48F.4060909@tresys.com>
Message-ID: <20120702201951.GA19551@siphos.be>
To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
List-Id: refpolicy.oss.tresys.com

On Mon, Jul 02, 2012 at 10:47:43AM -0400, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> >  allow initrc_t self:process { getpgid setsched setpgid setrlimit getsched };
> > -allow initrc_t self:capability ~{ sys_admin sys_module };
> > +allow initrc_t self:capability ~{ sys_module };
> >  dontaudit initrc_t self:capability sys_module; # sysctl is triggering this
> >  allow initrc_t self:passwd rootok;
> >  allow initrc_t self:key manage_key_perms;
> 
> We typically try to separate out the sys_admin privileges since its so broad.  Can a new domain be created?

Its the init script calling the sysctl binary. We currently don't hold a
separate domain for sysctl, but that's certainly doable. I guess it would
start with allowing both initrc_t and sysadm_t to transition to sysctl_t.

But for some reason I think this has been thought of before - sysctl's are
well known throughout the policy (with specific labels for kernel sysctl's
and such). Was a new domain for sysctl's not done because there was little
need for, or am I missing something?

Wkr,
	Sven Vermeulen