From: guido@trentalancia.net (Guido Trentalancia)
Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2016 00:21:32 +0200
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH v3] Add module_load permission to
 can_load_kernmodule
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	<5ce89d31-5641-a464-cd73-43590848aa49@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <1471299692.2901.0.camel@trentalancia.net>
To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
List-Id: refpolicy.oss.tresys.com

Hello Dominick.

On Sun, 14/08/2016 at 23.23 +0200, Dominick Grift wrote:
> On 08/14/2016 11:02 PM, Guido Trentalancia wrote:
> > The "module_load" permission has been recently added to the
> > "system"
> > class (kernel 4.7).
> > 
> > The following patch updates the Reference Policy so that the new
> > permission is allowed when a kernel module should be loaded.
> > 
> > A couple of unneeded permissions (probably obsolete) are removed
> > from the kernel module loading section.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.net>
> > ---
> > ?policy/modules/kernel/files.te??|???11 +++++++++++
> > ?policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te |????7 ++-----
> > ?2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> > 
> > --- refpolicy-git-06082016-orig/policy/modules/kernel/files.te	
> > 2016-08-06
> > 21:26:43.284774157 +0200
> > +++ refpolicy-git-06082016/policy/modules/kernel/files.te	20
> > 16-08-14
> > 22:35:30.602463332 +0200
> > @@ -208,6 +208,17 @@ fs_associate_tmpfs(tmpfsfile)
> > ?
> > ?########################################
> > ?#
> > +# Kernel module loading policy
> > +#
> > +
> > +neverallow ~can_load_kernmodule modules_object_t:system
> > module_load;
> > +
> > +if( ! secure_mode_insmod ) {
> > +	allow can_load_kernmodule modules_object_t:system
> > module_load;
> > +}
> > +
> > +########################################
> > +#
> > ?# Unconfined access to this module
> > ?#
> > ?
> > --- refpolicy-git-06082016-orig/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te	
> > 2016-08-09
> > 16:09:48.811753763 +0200
> > +++ refpolicy-git-06082016/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te	2
> > 016-08-14
> > 22:35:47.997714250 +0200
> > @@ -216,6 +216,8 @@ allow kernel_t self:fd use;
> > ?
> > ?allow kernel_t debugfs_t:dir search_dir_perms;
> > ?
> > +allow kernel_t modules_object_t:system ~module_load;
> 
> I can't make sense of this rule

It's a mistake and it has been removed in the latest forthcoming
version of this patch.

> > +
> > ?allow kernel_t proc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
> > ?allow kernel_t proc_t:file read_file_perms;
> > ?allow kernel_t proc_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
> > @@ -428,11 +430,6 @@ optional_policy(`
> > ?
> > ?if( ! secure_mode_insmod ) {
> > ?	allow can_load_kernmodule self:capability sys_module;
> > -
> > -	# load_module() calls stop_machine() which
> > -	# calls sched_setscheduler()
> > -	allow can_load_kernmodule self:capability sys_nice;
> > -	kernel_setsched(can_load_kernmodule)
> 
> I would not remove the above. Might break compatibility

I have checked backwards up to kernel version 2.6.37 and there is no
trace of calls to sched_setsched().

Also, even if there was such a call, it was most probably something
wrong !

Therefore, I oppose reverting that (sys_nice + kernel_setsched()).

Regards,

Guido