From: cgzones@googlemail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?Christian_G=C3=B6ttsche?=)
Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2017 14:23:15 +0200
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH] second strict patch
In-Reply-To: <20170419110059.edrv6goiv2xwrnvk@athena.coker.com.au>
References: <20170419110059.edrv6goiv2xwrnvk@athena.coker.com.au>
Message-ID: <CAJ2a_DduNAs7i-rMFTmpzkzPH1DWt6jnRgwaWfK5s+w03B4O7g@mail.gmail.com>
To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
List-Id: refpolicy.oss.tresys.com

2017-04-19 13:00 GMT+02:00 Russell Coker via refpolicy
<refpolicy@oss.tresys.com>:
> This is the rest of my policy that was developed on "strict" systems.  It also
> has no inter-dependencies with other patches.  I included the interface
> xdm_sigchld() in this patch as well so it can be applied on it's own, this
> means that it conflicts with the login patch.
>
> Chris, maybe even if you don't apply this patch or the login patch in the
> near future you could add the xdm_sigchld() interface so that both patches
> can be complete and working and not conflict.
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/contrib/gnome.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170419.orig/policy/modules/contrib/gnome.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/contrib/gnome.if
> @@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ template(`gnome_role_template',`
>
>         allow $3 { gconf_home_t gconf_tmp_t }:dir { manage_dir_perms relabel_dir_perms };
>         allow $3 { gconf_home_t gconf_tmp_t }:file { manage_file_perms relabel_file_perms };
> +       allow $3 gconfd_t:dbus send_msg;
> +       allow gconfd_t $3:dbus send_msg;
>         userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($3, gconf_home_t, dir, ".gconf")
>         userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($3, gconf_home_t, dir, ".gconfd")
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170419.orig/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc
> @@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
>  /usr/lib/ConsoleKit/.*         --      gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
>  /usr/lib/gdm3/.*               --      gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
>  /usr/lib/udisks/.*             --      gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
> +/usr/share/bug/.*              --      gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
>  ')
>
>  ifdef(`distro_gentoo', `
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170419.orig/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
> @@ -5249,3 +5249,22 @@ interface(`dev_unconfined',`
>
>         typeattribute $1 devices_unconfined_type;
>  ')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
> +##      Create subdir of /dev
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +##      <summary>
> +##      Domain allowed access.
> +##      </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`dev_create_subdir',`
> +       gen_require(`
> +               type device_t;
> +       ')
> +
> +       allow $1 device_t:dir { add_entry_dir_perms create };
> +       allow $1 device_t:dir search_dir_perms;
> +')
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170419.orig/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
> @@ -3379,6 +3379,26 @@ interface(`files_manage_etc_runtime_file
>
>  ########################################
>  ## <summary>
> +##     Relabel files and dirs to etc_runtime_t
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +##     <summary>
> +##     Domain allowed access.
> +##     </summary>
> +## </param>
> +## <rolecap/>
> +#
> +interface(`files_relabelto_etc_runtime',`
> +       gen_require(`
> +               type etc_runtime_t;
> +       ')
> +
> +       allow $1 etc_runtime_t:file relabelto;
> +       allow $1 etc_runtime_t:dir relabelto;
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
>  ##     Create, etc runtime objects with an automatic
>  ##     type transition.
>  ## </summary>
> @@ -6410,6 +6430,24 @@ interface(`files_setattr_pid_dirs',`
>  ')
>
>  ########################################
> +## <summary>
> +##     Create a /var/run directory.
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +##     <summary>
> +##     Domain allowed access.
> +##     </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`files_create_pid_dir',`
> +       gen_require(`
> +               type var_run_t;
> +       ')
> +
> +       allow $1 var_run_t:dir create_dir_perms;
> +')
> +
> +########################################
>  ## <summary>
>  ##     Search the contents of runtime process
>  ##     ID directories (/var/run).
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170419.orig/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.if
> @@ -769,6 +769,42 @@ interface(`fs_manage_cgroup_dirs',`
>
>  ########################################
>  ## <summary>
> +##     Relabel pstore directories.
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +##     <summary>
> +##     Domain allowed access.
> +##     </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`fs_relabel_pstore_dirs',`
> +       gen_require(`
> +               type pstore_t;
> +       ')
> +
> +       relabel_dirs_pattern($1, pstore_t, pstore_t)
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
> +##      Get the attributes of a pstore filesystem.
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +##      <summary>
> +##      Domain allowed access.
> +##      </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`ZZZfs_getattr_pstorefs',`
> +       gen_require(`
> +               type pstore_t;
> +       ')
> +
> +allow $1 pstore_t:filesystem getattr;
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
>  ##     Relabel cgroup directories.
>  ## </summary>
>  ## <param name="domain">
> @@ -828,6 +864,26 @@ interface(`fs_read_cgroup_files',`
>
>  ########################################
>  ## <summary>
> +##     Create cgroup lnk_files.
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +##     <summary>
> +##     Domain allowed access.
> +##     </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`fs_create_cgroup_links',`
> +       gen_require(`
> +               type cgroup_t;
> +       ')
> +
> +       create_lnk_files_pattern($1, cgroup_t, cgroup_t)
> +       rw_lnk_files_pattern($1, cgroup_t, cgroup_t)

interface states create

> +       dev_search_sysfs($1)
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
>  ##     Write cgroup files.
>  ## </summary>
>  ## <param name="domain">
> @@ -858,7 +914,6 @@ interface(`fs_write_cgroup_files', `
>  interface(`fs_rw_cgroup_files',`
>         gen_require(`
>                 type cgroup_t;
> -
>         ')
>
>         rw_files_pattern($1, cgroup_t, cgroup_t)
> @@ -4505,6 +4560,24 @@ interface(`fs_read_tmpfs_symlinks',`
>  ')
>
>  ########################################
> +## <summary>
> +##     Relabelfrom tmpfs link files.
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +##     <summary>
> +##     Domain allowed access.
> +##     </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`fs_relabelfrom_tmpfs_symlinks',`
> +       gen_require(`
> +               type tmpfs_t;
> +       ')
> +
> +       allow $1 tmpfs_t:lnk_file { getattr relabelfrom };
> +')
> +
> +########################################
>  ## <summary>
>  ##     Read and write character nodes on tmpfs filesystems.
>  ## </summary>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170419.orig/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/services/ssh.if
> @@ -353,6 +353,8 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',`
>         allow $1_ssh_agent_t self:process { setrlimit signal };
>         allow $1_ssh_agent_t self:capability setgid;
>
> +       allow $1_ssh_agent_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
> +
>         allow $1_ssh_agent_t { $1_ssh_agent_t $3 }:process signull;
>
>         allow $1_ssh_agent_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
> @@ -436,6 +438,7 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',`
>         optional_policy(`
>                 xserver_use_xdm_fds($1_ssh_agent_t)
>                 xserver_rw_xdm_pipes($1_ssh_agent_t)
> +               xdm_sigchld($1_ssh_agent_t)
>         ')
>  ')
>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/system/fstools.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170419.orig/policy/modules/system/fstools.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/system/fstools.if
> @@ -191,3 +191,21 @@ interface(`fstools_getattr_swap_files',`
>
>         allow $1 swapfile_t:file getattr;
>  ')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
> +##     Write to fsadm_log_t
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +##     <summary>
> +##     Domain allowed access.
> +##     </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`fstools_write_log',`
> +       gen_require(`
> +               type fsadm_log_t;
> +       ')
> +
> +       allow $1 fsadm_log_t:file write_file_perms;
> +')
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/system/init.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170419.orig/policy/modules/system/init.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/system/init.if
> @@ -2966,6 +2966,7 @@ interface(`init_admin',`
>         init_reload($1)
>         init_reload_all_units($1)
>         init_shutdown_system($1)
> +       init_start_system($1)
>         init_start_all_units($1)
>         init_start_generic_units($1)
>         init_stop_all_units($1)
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/system/init.te
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170419.orig/policy/modules/system/init.te
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/system/init.te
> @@ -135,9 +135,19 @@ can_exec(init_t, init_exec_t)
>  allow init_t initrc_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
>
>  # For /var/run/shutdown.pid.
> +allow init_t init_var_run_t:lnk_file manage_lnk_file_perms;
>  allow init_t init_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms;
>  files_pid_filetrans(init_t, init_var_run_t, file)
>
> +# for /run/systemd/inaccessible/{chr,blk}
> +allow init_t init_var_run_t:blk_file { create getattr };
> +allow init_t init_var_run_t:chr_file { create getattr };
> +
> +# for /run/initctl
> +allow init_t init_var_run_t:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
> +
> +allow init_t init_var_run_t:lnk_file manage_lnk_file_perms;
> +
>  # for systemd to manage service file symlinks
>  allow init_t init_var_run_t:file manage_lnk_file_perms;
>
> @@ -157,6 +167,7 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(init_t)
>  dev_read_sysfs(init_t)
>  # Early devtmpfs
>  dev_rw_generic_chr_files(init_t)
> +dev_relabel_generic_symlinks(init_t)
>
>  domain_getpgid_all_domains(init_t)
>  domain_kill_all_domains(init_t)
> @@ -170,6 +181,9 @@ files_read_etc_files(init_t)
>  files_rw_generic_pids(init_t)
>  files_manage_etc_runtime_files(init_t)
>  files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(init_t, file)
> +files_relabelto_etc_runtime(init_t)
> +files_list_usr(init_t)
> +
>  # Run /etc/X11/prefdm:
>  files_exec_etc_files(init_t)
>  # file descriptors inherited from the rootfs:
> @@ -178,6 +192,7 @@ files_dontaudit_rw_root_chr_files(init_t
>
>  fs_getattr_xattr_fs(init_t)
>  fs_list_inotifyfs(init_t)
> +fs_relabel_pstore_dirs(init_t)
>  # cjp: this may be related to /dev/log
>  fs_write_ramfs_sockets(init_t)
>
> @@ -225,6 +240,8 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
>         allow init_t self:netlink_selinux_socket create_socket_perms;
>         allow init_t self:unix_dgram_socket lock;
>
> +       allow init_t init_var_run_t:sock_file manage_sock_file_perms;
> +
>         allow init_t daemon:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
>         allow init_t daemon:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
>         allow init_t daemon:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
> @@ -257,6 +274,7 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
>         kernel_getattr_proc(init_t)
>         kernel_read_fs_sysctls(init_t)
>
> +       auth_manage_var_auth(init_t)
>         dev_rw_autofs(init_t)
>         dev_create_generic_dirs(init_t)
>         dev_manage_input_dev(init_t)
> @@ -318,10 +336,14 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
>         seutil_read_file_contexts(init_t)
>
>         systemd_manage_passwd_runtime_symlinks(init_t)
> +       systemd_use_passwd_agent(init_t)
>
>         # udevd is a "systemd kobject uevent socket activated daemon"
>         udev_create_kobject_uevent_sockets(init_t)
>
> +       # for systemd to read udev status
> +       udev_read_pid_files(init_t)
> +
>         optional_policy(`
>                 clock_read_adjtime(init_t)
>         ')
> @@ -350,11 +372,19 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
>         ')
>  ')
>
> +fs_relabelfrom_tmpfs_symlinks(init_t)
> +
>  ifdef(`distro_debian',`
>         fs_tmpfs_filetrans(init_t, initctl_t, fifo_file, "initctl")
>
>         allow init_t initrc_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms;
>         fs_tmpfs_filetrans(init_t, initrc_var_run_t, file, "utmp")
> +       fs_manage_tmpfs_files(initrc_t)
> +       sysnet_manage_config(initrc_t)
> +
> +       optional_policy(`
> +               postfix_read_config(initrc_t)
> +       ')
>  ')
>
>  ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
> @@ -370,6 +400,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
>  ')
>
>  optional_policy(`
> +       modutils_read_module_config(init_t)
> +       modutils_read_module_deps(init_t)
> +       modutils_read_module_objects(init_t)
> +')
> +
> +optional_policy(`
>         auth_rw_login_records(init_t)
>  ')
>
> @@ -423,6 +459,9 @@ term_create_pty(initrc_t, initrc_devpts_
>  # Going to single user mode
>  init_telinit(initrc_t)
>
> +# for logsave in strict configuration
> +fstools_write_log(initrc_t)
> +
>  can_exec(initrc_t, init_script_file_type)
>
>  create_dirs_pattern(initrc_t, daemonpidfile, daemonpidfile)
> @@ -442,6 +481,8 @@ manage_fifo_files_pattern(initrc_t, init
>
>  allow initrc_t initrc_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms;
>  files_pid_filetrans(initrc_t, initrc_var_run_t, file)
> +files_create_pid_dir(initrc_t)
> +files_setattr_pid_dirs(initrc_t)
>
>  allow initrc_t daemon:process siginh;
>
> @@ -491,6 +532,7 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(initrc_t)
>  corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(initrc_t)
>  corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(initrc_t)
>
> +dev_create_subdir(initrc_t)
>  dev_read_rand(initrc_t)
>  dev_read_urand(initrc_t)
>  dev_dontaudit_read_kmsg(initrc_t)
> @@ -825,26 +867,33 @@ ifdef(`enabled_mls',`
>         ')
>  ')
>
> +# for systemd
> +kernel_load_module(init_t)
> +
>  ifdef(`init_systemd',`
>         allow init_t self:system { status reboot halt reload };
>
>         allow init_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
>         allow init_t self:process { setsockcreate setfscreate setrlimit };
> -       allow init_t self:process { getcap setcap };
> +       allow init_t self:process { getcap setcap getsched setsched };
>         allow init_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
>         allow init_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
>         allow init_t self:netlink_audit_socket { nlmsg_relay create_socket_perms };
> +       allow init_t self:netlink_selinux_socket create_socket_perms;
>         # Until systemd is fixed
>         allow daemon init_t:socket_class_set { getopt read getattr ioctl setopt write };
>         allow init_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
>         allow init_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms;
>         allow init_t initrc_t:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
> -       allow initrc_t init_t:system { status reboot halt reload };
> +       allow initrc_t init_t:system { start status reboot halt reload };
>         allow init_t self:capability2 audit_read;
>         manage_files_pattern(initrc_t, initrc_lock_t, initrc_lock_t)
>         files_lock_filetrans(initrc_t, initrc_lock_t, file)
>
>         manage_dirs_pattern(initrc_t, init_var_run_t, init_var_run_t)
> +       allow initrc_t init_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
> +       allow initrc_t init_var_run_t:lnk_file create_lnk_file_perms;
> +       allow initrc_t init_var_run_t:service { start status };
>
>         manage_dirs_pattern(initrc_t, initrc_var_run_t, initrc_var_run_t)
>         manage_chr_files_pattern(initrc_t, initrc_var_run_t, initrc_var_run_t)
> @@ -868,6 +917,7 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
>         kernel_read_software_raid_state(init_t)
>         kernel_unmount_debugfs(init_t)
>         kernel_setsched(init_t)
> +       kernel_rw_unix_sysctls(init_t)
>
>         auth_relabel_login_records(init_t)
>         auth_relabel_pam_console_data_dirs(init_t)
> @@ -926,6 +976,7 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd',`
>         fs_list_auto_mountpoints(init_t)
>         fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(init_t)
>         fs_manage_cgroup_files(init_t)
> +       fs_create_cgroup_links(init_t)
>         fs_manage_hugetlbfs_dirs(init_t)
>         fs_manage_tmpfs_dirs(init_t)
>         fs_mount_all_fs(init_t)
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/system/modutils.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170419.orig/policy/modules/system/modutils.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/system/modutils.if
> @@ -39,6 +39,25 @@ interface(`modutils_read_module_deps',`
>
>  ########################################
>  ## <summary>
> +##     Read the kernel modules.
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +##     <summary>
> +##     Domain allowed access.
> +##     </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`modutils_read_module_objects',`
> +       gen_require(`
> +               type modules_object_t;
> +       ')
> +
> +       files_list_kernel_modules($1)
> +       allow $1 modules_object_t:file read_file_perms;
> +')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
>  ##     Read the configuration options used when
>  ##     loading modules.
>  ## </summary>
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170419.orig/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ template(`userdom_base_user_template',`
>         dontaudit $1_t user_tty_device_t:chr_file ioctl;
>
>         kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_t)
> +       kernel_read_vm_sysctls($1_t)
>         kernel_dontaudit_list_unlabeled($1_t)
>         kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_files($1_t)
>         kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_symlinks($1_t)
> @@ -78,6 +79,12 @@ template(`userdom_base_user_template',`
>         dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_blk_files($1_t)
>         dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_chr_files($1_t)
>
> +       # for X session unlock
> +       allow $1_t self:netlink_audit_socket { create_socket_perms nlmsg_relay };
> +
> +       # for KDE
> +       allow $1_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket connected_socket_perms;
> +
>         # When the user domain runs ps, there will be a number of access
>         # denials when ps tries to search /proc. Do not audit these denials.
>         domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state($1_t)
> @@ -108,6 +115,14 @@ template(`userdom_base_user_template',`
>
>         sysnet_read_config($1_t)
>
> +       # kdeinit wants systemd status
> +       init_get_system_status($1_t)
> +
> +       optional_policy(`
> +               apt_read_cache($1_t)
> +               apt_read_db($1_t)
> +       ')
> +
>         tunable_policy(`allow_execmem',`
>                 # Allow loading DSOs that require executable stack.
>                 allow $1_t self:process execmem;
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/support/file_patterns.spt
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170419.orig/policy/support/file_patterns.spt
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/support/file_patterns.spt
> @@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ define(`rw_chr_files_pattern',`
>  define(`create_chr_files_pattern',`
>         allow $1 self:capability mknod;
>         allow $1 $2:dir add_entry_dir_perms;
> -       allow $1 $3:chr_file create_chr_file_perms;
> +       allow $1 $3:chr_file { create_chr_file_perms setattr };

why setattr in create pattern?

>  ')
>
>  define(`delete_chr_files_pattern',`
> Index: refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
> ===================================================================
> --- refpolicy-2.20170419.orig/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
> +++ refpolicy-2.20170419/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
> @@ -1561,3 +1561,21 @@ interface(`xserver_unconfined',`
>         typeattribute $1 x_domain;
>         typeattribute $1 xserver_unconfined_type;
>  ')
> +
> +########################################
> +## <summary>
> +##     Allow domain to send sigchld to xdm_t
> +## </summary>
> +## <param name="domain">
> +##     <summary>
> +##     Domain allowed access.
> +##     </summary>
> +## </param>
> +#
> +interface(`xdm_sigchld',`
> +       gen_require(`
> +               type xdm_t;
> +       ')
> +
> +       allow $1 xdm_t:process sigchld;
> +')
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